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Abstract 
 
The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall 
field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1, entitled “The Determinants of Dynamic Dependence: 
An Analysis of Commodity Futures and Equity Markets,” examines the determinants of the 
dynamic equity-commodity return correlations between five commodity futures sub-sectors 
(energy, foods and fibers, grains and oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals) and a value-
weighted equity market index (S&P 500). The study utilizes the traditional DCC model, as well 
as three time-varying copulas: (i) the normal copula, (ii) the student’s t copula, and (iii) the 
rotated-gumbel copula as dependence measures. Subsequently, the determinants of these various 
dependence measures are explored by analyzing several macroeconomic, financial, and 
speculation variables over different sample periods. Results indicate that the dynamic equity-
commodity correlations for the energy, grains and oilseeds, precious metals, and to a lesser 
extent the foods and fibers, sub-sectors have become increasingly explainable by broad 
macroeconomic and financial market indicators, particularly after May 2003. Furthermore, these 
variables exhibit heterogeneous effects in terms of both magnitude and sign on each sub-sectors’ 
equity-commodity correlation structure. Interestingly, the effects of increased financial market 
speculation are found to be extremely varied among the five sub-sectors. These results have 
important implications for portfolio selection, price formation, and risk management. Chapter 2, 
entitled, “US Community Bank Failure: An Empirical Investigation,” examines the declining, 
but still pivotal role, of the US community banking industry. The study utilizes survival analysis 
to determine which accounting and macroeconomic variables help to predict community bank 
failure. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Bank data are utilized to 
compare 452 community banks which failed between 2000 and 2013, relative to a sample of 
surviving community banks. Empirical results indicate that smaller banks are less likely to fail 
than their larger community bank counterparts. Additionally, several unique bank-specific 
indicators of failure emerge which relate to asset quality and liquidity, as well as earnings ratios. 
Moreover, results show that the use of the macroeconomic indicator of liquidity, the TED spread, 
provides a substantial improvement in modeling predictive community bank failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Dependence, Commodity Futures, DCC, Copulas, Failure Risk, US 
Community Banks, Survival Analysis 
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Chapter 1 
The Determinants of Dynamic Dependence: An Analysis of Commodity Futures and 
Equity Markets 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous strands of literature have emerged over the last decade which have touted commodity 
futures as useful additions to investor portfolios for diversification, inflation hedging, and risk 
management purposes (see Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Buyuksahin et al., 2010; Conover et 
al., 2010; Jensen et al., 2000). Moreover, as documented by Erb and Harvey (2006), among 
others, investment in commodity futures can provide “equity like” returns through a “tactical” 
rebalancing strategy. These attractive investment benefits stem from the theoretical motives that 
commodities, and in turn commodity futures, form an alternative asset class to that of equity and 
bond markets. Thus, the financially transformed fungible raw materials, in theory, are expected 
to exhibit little (or even negative) correlation with the more traditional asset classes. The reason 
for this low correlation is that the underlying factors which drive the commodity futures prices, 
such as weather, supply and demand constraints, geopolitical conditions, and event risk, are very 
different, if not completely segmented, from those factors which drive the value of the equity and 
bond markets (see Symeonidis et al., 2012). 
 However, an ever-growing strand of literature posits that the financialization of the 
commodity markets—the process whereby the raw materials have been transformed from mere 
goods into widely (popular) tradable financial instruments—occurring in the early 2000’s, has 
resulted in increased integration with more traditional asset classes (see Buyuksahin et al., 2009; 
Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos, 2011; Tang and Xiong, 2012; Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013). 
Moreover, this financialization is a result of increased investor participation over the last decade 
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(see Buyuksahin and Robe, 2013) spurred by the potential benefits of commodity-related 
investment. According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the total value 
of different commodity index-related instruments purchased by institutional investors, including 
pension funds, endowments, trusts, and banks, increased from $10 billion in 2000 to a staggering 
$256 billion by mid-2011. In other words, increased investor interest in commodity futures, 
particularly by speculators, which is motivated by the belief that the unique asset class offers 
steadfast diversification and hedging opportunities in market downturns, has weakened the 
potential advantages of commodity futures investment as the shocks from the conventional asset 
markets enter the commodity futures price dynamics through the increased dependence of the 
return structure. 
 However, not all commodities, and hence commodity futures, are created equal—some 
commodities are storable goods while other are not, and what is more, some commodities serve 
as intermediate goods while others are merely input goods. Hence, due to these fundamental 
differences, the factors which drive the return dependence between commodity futures and the 
other asset classes are likely heterogeneous across different sub-sectors. In fact, such differences 
can be readily viewed by looking at simple 52-week rolling correlations between equity and 
commodity returns. Figure 1 provides correlations between the S&P 500 and five different 
commodity sub-sectors. We note that none of the sub-sectors’ correlations move in lock-step 
with each other (some groups actually move in opposite directions), and the magnitude of the 
change in dynamic correlations varies greatly by group. Together, these observations motivate 
our choice to examine the issue of time-varying dependence and its determinants between the 
commodity futures markets and the equity markets at the sub-sector level. An understanding of 
the determinants of the various correlations has important implications for portfolio selection, 
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price formation, risk management, as well as aiding in the comprehension of the overall futures 
market, particularly for non-index commodity futures investors. Furthermore, knowledge of how 
the equity-commodity determinants have evolved over time, the sensitivity of these factors to 
different forms of dependence measures, and the nature of the return relationship between 
commodity futures and equity markets (i.e. symmetrical vs. asymmetrical) will provide 
investors, particularly those involved in commodity futures a more detailed level of 
understanding of the overall market. This research also provides policymakers information on 
how different markets react to shocks, hence providing empirical evidence for any potential 
reforms of the US financial system. 
 Recent studies on the determinants of equity-commodity return correlations generally 
utilize a single commodity index composed of futures returns from numerous different sub-
sectors (see Buyuksahin and Robe, 2013; Bhardwaj and Dunsby, 2013; Delatte and Lopez, 
2013). Moreover, these indices, such as the well-known Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SP-
GSCI) and the Dow Jones UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBS), tend to put more weight on certain 
commodity futures (such as energy or agriculture) and less weight on others, hence shifting, and 
effectively decreasing, the importance of other sub-sectors of the futures market. While studies 
which implement such broad commodity futures indices in their analysis have uncovered both 
interesting and valuable contributions to the literature sect on commodities as investments, we 
feel that the heterogeneous nature of commodities, in general, provides sufficient motivation to 
further investigate the futures at a more disaggregated (i.e. sub-sector) level in an effort to reveal 
the distinct determinants of the dynamic equity-commodity return correlations. For instance, the 
factors which explain the equity-commodity correlations for the energy sub-sector may have a 
differential impact than the factors which explain the correlations for say, livestock. A 
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commodity futures index makes it virtually impossible to detect and disentangle such effects, but 
an analysis of the various sub-sectors highlights such relevant information, providing active 
traders in the commodity futures market, particularly those who do not merely invest in index-
related products, invaluable information regarding the futures return behavior and the potential 
for diversification benefits and/or speculation profits. 
 However, determining the factors which explain the dependence of the equity-commodity 
return correlations for the various sub-sectors is complicated by the issue of identifying the 
appropriate nature of dependence among the two asset classes. It is well-documented that asset 
classes are not normally distributed (see Longin and Solnik, 2001), thus simple correlation 
coefficients are not sufficient to properly measure the true relationship between returns. Further, 
many empirical studies tend to impose the, somewhat unrealistic, assumption of time-stability on 
asset relationships. In order to account for these problematic issues, a recent study by 
Buyuksahin and Robe (2013) implement the popular time-varying dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC) dependence measure (see Engle, 2002), the likes of which they use to show 
that the correlation between rates of return on broad market investible commodity and equity 
indices have increased as a result of greater participation by speculative hedge funds. However, 
the DCC model imposes the assumption of common dynamics among all assets used (see Billio 
et al., 2006). This particular restriction may or may not be true, but the imposition that the 
correlations of commodity futures are identical to US equity indices seems somewhat 
impractical. In order to overcome these previously ascribed pitfalls and assumptions associated 
with estimating asset correlations we appeal to the alternative copula approach which provides a 
dynamic measure of financial market comovements. This approach disentangles the unique 
characteristics of each return series from the dependence structure which links them together and 
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allows for a range of models which capture different forms of dependence between variables. 
The dependence structure estimated via copula is more robust in the sense that the approach 
separates the dependence structure from the choice of marginal distributions. Moreover, the 
copula approach does not require elliptically distributed returns and is invariant with respect to 
increasing and continuous transformations of the marginals.1 
 In this paper, we calculate the dynamic dependence structure between the returns of five 
different commodity futures sub-sectors (energy, foods and fibers, grains and oilseeds, livestock, 
and precious metals) and a well-known value-weighted equity market index (S&P 500).2 We 
employ the DCC model, as in Buyuksahin and Robe (2013), as a baseline approach to our 
investigation of the determinants of equity-commodity correlations, as well as three time-varying 
copulas. In particular, we analyze (i) the normal copula—a symmetrical and frequent dependence 
structure which has no tail dependence, (ii) the student’s t copula—a symmetrical but non-zero 
tail dependence structure which nests the normal copula, and (iii) the rotated-gumbel copula—a 
left tail, non-linear, asymmetrical dependence structure, which is mostly present during extreme 
negative events. Practically speaking, these copulas represent the most relevant shapes for 
finance and are frequently used in empirical papers (see Embrechts et al., 2002; Patton, 2004; 
Rosenberg and Schuermann, 2006; Patton, 2009; Chollete et al., 2011; Aloui et al., 2011; Delatte 
and Lopez, 2013). We then explore the determinants of these various dependence measures by 
analyzing several comprehensive macroeconomic, financial market, and speculation variables 
over the period October 1992 to October 2013, via sub-sample and dummy variable regression 
analysis. 
1 Manner and Reznikova (2012) provide an extensive survey on time-varying copulas and their properties. 
2 We also calculate results using the value-weighted Russell 3000 equity index and find very similar univariate and 
regression results. Therefore, for both brevity and space we only discuss and report the equity-commodity results 
regarding the S&P 500. 
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 Our examination finds that while copulas offer a more robust measure of time-varying 
dependence there are numerous similarities between the DCC model and the copula dependence 
measures. We document that the dynamic equity-commodity return correlations for the energy, 
grains and oilseeds, precious metals, and to a lesser extent the foods and fibers sub-sectors have 
become increasingly explainable by broad macroeconomic and financial market indicators, 
particularly after the period May 2003. This evolution of explanatory variables coincides with 
the financialization of the commodities market, whereby commodity futures prices, and hence 
returns, behave in a manner more strongly associated with traditional asset class returns. 
Contrastingly, the livestock sub-sector return correlations seem to be much less explainable 
using the broad market indicators. Additionally, we document that increased participation by 
financial market speculators is not a primary determinant for all sub-sectors’ equity-commodity 
return correlations, as posited by previous literature. Though sensitive to the dependence 
measure, the energy and foods and fibers sub-sectors generally exhibit a positive statistically 
significant speculation coefficient. This suggests, in line with prior literature, that an increase in 
speculation, caused by non-commercial participants, increases dynamic equity-commodity 
correlations. Contrastingly, the grains and oilseeds sub-sector generally exhibits a negative and 
significant speculation coefficient; this means that an increase in speculation actually causes a 
decrease in dynamic equity-commodity correlations. Interestingly, both livestock and precious 
metals generally yield insignificant speculation coefficients. These findings are of particular 
importance given that prior work has acknowledged that increased participation, particularly by 
speculators, helps to predict observed long-run fluctuations in dynamic commodity-equity 
correlations. 
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 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a pertinent review of the 
literature on the commodity-equity dependence relationship, as well as our contribution. Section 
3 focuses on the methodology and dataset. Section 4 describes our empirical regression analysis 
and provides the results over all sample periods. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In a flight-to-quality argument, Chong and Miffre (2010) document that over the period 1981-
2006, the correlations between equities and individual commodity futures tend to fall both over 
time, in general, and tempestuous financial market periods. Buyuksahin et al. (2010) document a 
similar result over the early 1990’s to mid-2000’s while investigating structural shift in 
correlation dynamics over both calm and tumultuous financial market periods. In particular, they 
find a lack of “greater return co-movement across equities and commodities [which] suggests 
that commodities should retain their role as a portfolio diversification tool.” 
 However, much more recent research finds contradictory conclusions regarding the 
movement of these correlations. For instance, Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) find that 
conditional volatility and correlation dynamics for returns to commodity futures, stocks, and 
bonds have become increasingly integrated over the period 1990-2009. Furthermore, they note a 
structural break in conditional correlations occurring in the late 1990’s. Buyuksahin and Robe 
(2011) document significant changes in the make-up of the open interest between 2000 and 2010 
and show that these changes impact asset pricing for the energy futures market. Specifically, they 
find that the dynamic conditional correlations between the rates of return on energy and stock 
market indices increase significantly from greater activity by speculators and hedge funds. 
 Interestingly, there is a growing strand of literary evidence that links the growth of index 
funds and other investment vehicles in the commodity futures market as the means of increased 
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integration between the commodity market and the stock and bond markets; this integration has 
effectively reduced or diminished the sought after benefits of commodities. Recent work by Tang 
and Xiong (2012) finds that since the early 2000’s the futures prices of non-energy commodities 
in the US have become significantly more correlated with oil futures prices. They argue that this 
increased integration, or comovement, is largely a reflection of the financialization of commodity 
markets. Furthermore, they show that this trend is more pronounced for commodities in the 
popular SP-GSCI and DJ-UBS commodity indices, which they attribute to the growing 
prominence of index trading. Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) look at the impact of financialization 
and speculation in the crude oil futures market; however, their analysis finds little evidence that 
hedge funds or other non-commercial speculators position changes cause price changes. They 
conclude that fundamentals and not speculation were most likely behind the 2004-2008, boom-
bust commodity price cycle. Yet, numerous other studies exist which investigate, and attribute, 
financial speculation as a primary determinant of commodity spot price correlation, but these 
papers are largely confined to the investigation of the crude oil markets (see Hamilton, 2009; 
Fattouh et al., 2013; Kilian and Murphy, 2014) or industrial metals markets (see Korniotis, 
2009). More recently, Buyuksahin and Robe (2013) implement a unique non-public dataset of 
trader positions in US commodity futures which focuses on the trading activity of speculators. 
They document that “excess speculation” by investor participants, especially by hedge funds, is 
positively related to the commodity returns’ (index) increased correlation with equity markets. 
Furthermore, they find that the strength of the commodity-equity linkages has fluctuated 
substantially over the last 20 years, but that the activities of speculators, helps to predict 
observed long-run fluctuations in the dynamic commodity-equity correlation. 
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 Given that both theory and empirical work predict no common risk factor structure in the 
cross-section of commodity futures risk premiums (see Daskalaki et al., 2014) we demonstrate 
that an analysis of commodity futures within their respective sub-sectors provides a much more 
meaningful analysis of the futures markets and its determinants. Furthermore, given that there is 
some dispersion in the literature about the comovement of the equity-commodity correlations, 
we employ several different measures of dependence. This methodological choice is based on the 
discussion of Delatte and Lopez (2013) who posit that a lack of consensus regarding the 
correlation structure between commodity futures and traditional asset market returns is due to the 
different dependence measures considered. Overall, we contribute to dual strands of literature. 
First, we explore several potential broad macroeconomic, financial, and speculation variables as 
determinants of the time-varying commodity-equity correlations. However, in contrast to prior 
work, we analyze each of the commodity futures sub-sectors individually. Second, given the 
pronounced increase in participation of financial traders in the commodity futures market in the 
early 2000’s, we analyze the evolution of these factors across different sub-sample periods, for 
each sub-sector, to see how they have changed. Third, and finally, we investigate each of the 
dependence measures of the commodity-equity relationship in a regression setting, which 
includes both the DCC as a baseline approach, and three popular copulas in finance. This 
approach allows us the advantage of viewing our determinants against different forms of 
dependence structures and viewing the sensitivity of the determinants against different dependent 
variables. Overall, we aim to bring to light new facts regarding the commodity futures market. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
3.1 Measures of Dependence 
The DCC framework, of Engle (2002), has become a largely popular approach to measuring the 
dependence structure between different financial assets. Notably, this dependence measure relies 
on the marginal distribution of returns. Hence, some empirical studies have taken a different 
approach to estimating the dependence structure using a copula methodology which, in contrast 
to the DCC approach, separates the dependence structure from the choice of marginal 
distribution creating a more robust approach to measuring dependence. Though the copula 
methodology is widely known and has been around for quite some time, its application to 
financial markets has become increasingly momentous in finance and risk management valuation 
within the last decade (see Patton, 2006; Kole et al., 2007; Chollete et al., 2010; Aloui et al., 
2011) as copulas provide an important way to appropriately define a correlation structure, which 
may be non-linear, between different variables. We employ the commonly implemented DCC 
dependence measure as a baseline approach to our investigation, as well as three time-varying 
copulas popular in the field of finance—the normal copula, the student’s t copula, and the 
rotated-gumbel copula.3 
3.1.1 DCC Model 
The multivariate GARCH model with DCC, a process whereby correlations are driven by the 
cross product of the lagged standardized residuals and an autoregressive term, was initially 
proposed by Engle (2002) and has since become a mainstream econometric methodology in 
finance and related applications. Briefly, the model is specified as: 
3 We disregard the constant dependence structure and focus solely on time-varying relationships as copious amounts 
of prior work have found the dependence relation among financial assets to indicate that it is anything but constant 
(see Erb et al., 1994; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Engle, 2002). 
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                                                                               Ht = DtRtDt                                                                   (1) 
where, Dt = diag��hi,t�, Rt is a time-varying correlation matrix containing conditional 
correlations, and the expressions for h, the conditional standard deviations, are generally thought 
of as univariate GARCH models, but can include functions of other variables in the system as 
either pre-determined or exogenous.4 We outline the details of our estimation procedure for the 
DCC model in Section 3.2.1. 
3.1.2 Copula Functions 
Copulas provide a convenient way to join or “couple” the marginal distributions of random 
variables into a joint distribution. Conversely, they can also allow one to separate a joint 
distribution into two contributions: the marginal distribution of each variable and the copula 
which combines these into a joint distribution (see Sklar, 1959). Copulas generally have a 
convenient parametric form and provide a large degree of flexibility in the specification of the 
marginal distributions and their dependence structure. Further, the choice of copula provides a 
great deal of control over what parts of the distribution the variables are most strongly 
associated; this convenience is particularly intriguing to market practitioners who are concerned 
with strong left tail dependence (i.e. the comovement of asset returns during market crises). 
 The theorem of Sklar (1959) illuminates the role copulas play in the relationship between 
multivariate distribution functions and their univariate marginals. Formally, in the bivariate case, 
if F(X1t, X2t) is a joint distribution function with marginal distribution functions F1(X1t) and F2(X2t), for random variables X1t and X2t, then there exists a copula, C(u, v), mapping the 
marginal distributions of X1t and X2t to their joint distribution: 
4 Given the popularity of the DCC model we refer the interested reader to Engle (2002) for additional details 
regarding the technical notes of the model and estimation procedure. 
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                                                           F(X1t, X2t) = C�F1(X1t), F2(X2t)�                                                 (2) 
If F1(X1t) and F2(X2t) are continuous, then the copula is unique, otherwise, the copula will not 
necessarily be unique. Thus, in the bivariate case, that means: 
                                                                  C(u, v) = Pr[U ≤ u, V ≤ v]                                                     (3) 
where, U and V are uniformly distributed on [0,1].5 Equation (2) explicitly highlights the 
practicality of copulas, in that one can simplify the analysis of dependence for a particular joint 
(return) distribution, F(X1t, X2t), by merely studying the copula. Conversely, if C(u, v) is a 
copula, and F1 and F2 are univariate distribution functions, then F(X1t, X2t) is a joint distribution 
function with  F1(X1t) and F2(X2t). Assuming that each marginal distribution is continuous and 
strictly increasing, we can write the copula as: 
                                                              C(u, v) = F(F1−1(u), F2−1(v))                                                     (4) 
where, u = F1(X1t) ⇔ X1t = F1−1(u) and v = F2(X2t) ⇔ X2t = F2−1(v) holds. Furthermore, 
assuming the marginals can be modeled parametrically, the probability integral transformation of 
equation (2) is given as: 
                                                                        Uit = Fi(Xit;ϕi)                                                                    (5) 
where, ϕi is the vector of parameters. The function Fi(Xit;ϕi) can be a conditional distribution 
(as it is in our analysis), where Xit is modeled by an ARMA-GARCH model, whose residuals are 
treated as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.6 Following Manner 
and Reznikova (2012), it is also assumed that each variable depends only on its own past, but not 
5 While copulas also work in the multivariate context, we give our primary attention to the bivariate case. 
6 It is also assumed that the copula belongs to a parametric family Cθ,θ ϵ Θ ⊂  ℝK. 
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on the past of the other variable, and that only instantaneous causality between the two variables 
exists. This assumption implies that the parameters of the copula are separate from the 
parameters of the marginal distributions. 
 Given, once again, that the copula function and the marginals are continuous, the 
following equation for the join probability density function (PDF) holds: 
                                                     f(X1t, X2t) = c(U1t, U2t; θ)� fi(2
i=1
Xit;ϕi)                                         (6) 
where, c(∙, ∙) is the copula density. Further, assuming a sample for X1t and X2t where, t =1, … , T, then the log-likelihood function is given as: 
                             L(θ,ϕ) = �{log c(U1t, U2t;θ) + log f1(X1t;ϕ1) +T
t=1
log f2(X2t;ϕ2)}                 (7) 
This statement is equivalent to:                                                      L(θ,ϕ) = LC(θ,ϕ) + LX1(ϕ1) + LX2(ϕ2)                                        (8) 
where, ϕ = (ϕ1′ ,ϕ2′ )′. Hence, the full log-likelihood function L(θ,ϕ) can be split into two parts, 
the copula likelihood LC(θ,ϕ) and the likelihood of the marginals LX1(ϕ1) and LX2(ϕ2). The 
parameters θ and ϕ are estimated via a two-step process proposed by Genest et al. (1995). First, 
since the marginal models are unknown, the marginal distributions are estimated with the 
empirical CDF, based on the i.i.d. of the residuals, via the following form: 
               u = F1�(X1t) = 1n + 1�1�X1,t−j≤x1t� n
j=1
and v = F2�(X2t) = 1n + 1� 1�X2,t−j≤x2t�            (9)n
j=1
 
Second, the copula parameters are estimated based on the rank of the data by maximizing the 
corresponding copula likelihood function given the results from the first step. This method 
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proves useful in that it is robust to misspecification of the marginals which can cause biased 
estimates of the copula parameter.7 
 Patton (2006) proposes an extension of the copula model where the time-varying 
dependence parameter of a copula is a function of an autoregressive term, which captures 
persistence in the dependence term, and a forcing variable, which captures any variation in 
dependence. We follow Patton’s extension to facilitate our analysis. For the normal and student’s 
t copula, the evolution equation for the dependence parameter, ρt, is given as: 
                     ρt = Λ− �ωρ + βρ(ρt−1) + α1n�ϕ−1�F1(X1,t−j)�ϕ−1�F2(X2,t−j)�n
j=1
�                      (10) 
where, Λ
−(x) = (1−e−x)(1+e−x) is a modified logistic transformation, designed to keep the correlation 
parameter ρt between (-1,1) at all times, and n is an arbitrary window length.8 The average of the 
product of the last n observations of the transformed variables is the forcing variable. For the 
rotated-gumbel copula, the evolution equation for the dependence parameter, φt, is given as: 
                          φt  = Λ− �ωρ + βρ(ρt−1) + α1n� |�F1(X1,t−j)� − �F2(X2,t−j)�|n
j=1
�                      (11) 
where, Λ
−(x) is a modified logistic transformation to ensure the parameter always remains in its 
domain, for the rotated-gumbel copula (φt = δt) it is 1 + e−x. In this instance, the mean 
7 The theoretical properties of this estimator in a time series are derived by Chen and Fan (2006). 
8 We follow the dynamic framework methodology proposed by Creal et al. (2013) for the programming procedure of 
the student’s t copula. The authors derive a Generalized Autoregressive Score (GAS) specification for the time-
varying correlation parameter, ρt, using the density of the Gaussian (normal) copula, following Patton (2006). 
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absolute difference of the transformed variables over the previous n periods is the forcing 
variable.9 
 The merits and importance of the copula methodology in our analysis comes from the 
convenience (and ability) to impose a particular distributional dependence structure between our 
two variables of interest (i.e. commodity futures returns and equity returns). For instance, we can 
observe both symmetrical dynamics and asymmetrical dynamics. Consequently, we can also 
measure the strength of the relation with the appropriate density function; however, our primary 
objective is to measure the time-varying relation between our two choice variables and determine 
the factors which influence the particular dependency relationship, as well as examine the 
evolution of these factors over time.10 While prior research has focused on a number of different 
parametric copula specifications, we focus on three types in our investigation of the determinants 
between commodity futures sub-sectors and equity returns: the normal, the student’s t, and the 
rotated-gumbel. The normal copula specification, with zero tail dependence, is a common 
distributional assumption in finance and provides a reasonable benchmark for our analysis. 
Further, it provides a practical basis in which to compare the results from the baseline approach 
using the DCC dependence measure. The student’s t copula is a useful measure as it has 
symmetric but non-zero tail dependence and consequently nests the normal copula. Finally, the 
rotated-gumbel copula is appealing because it provides the ability to measure the potential for the 
joint occurrence of left-tail extreme events, or lower tail dependence; that is, it captures the 
comovement of the return series jointly taking extremely low values. The rotated-gumbel has 
non-linear dependence as well as asymmetric tail dependence present during extreme negative 
events (i.e. the mass in the left tail is far larger than the mass in the right tail) and is a member of 
9 See Manner and Reznikova (2012) for additional details. 
10 Table A1 in Appendix A provides the best fit measures based on the log-likelihood criteria for all three copula 
functions, for each sub-sector, over the full sample period. 
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the extreme value copula family. Longin and Solnik (2001) find evidence of both extreme and 
asymmetrical forces at work in asset markets, thus, it seems reasonable to investigate the 
presence and determinants of these effects in equity-commodity correlations. In particular, 
investors are very much interested in how different markets commove together during severe 
downturns or crisis situations, as strong market comovements indicate a lack of diversification 
benefits, and weak comovements indicate the contrary. As noted in Chollete et al. (2011), 
practically speaking, these copulas are the most important shapes for finance as they represent a 
large subset of those implemented in empirical work. The corresponding copula functions and 
their dependence parameters are outlined in Table 1. 
3.2 Estimation Procedure and Dataset 
Our primary interest is the determinants of the dynamic equity-commodity return correlations for 
the five commodity futures sub-sectors, both over the entire sample period and two sub-sample 
periods so as to gauge the evolution of the determinants. Given this, we employ two conditional-
based methodologies in order to obtain dynamically efficient estimates of the intensity of the 
equity-commodity return comovements. First, we implement the well-known DCC methodology, 
which Buyuksahin and Robe (2013) use in a similar vein of research. Second, we implement the 
copula methodology which yields a more robust approach to measuring dependence over 
different portions of the return distribution. 
 In order to facilitate both types of analyses we have to construct return series for both the 
futures and equity indices. We extract daily price data from the Commodity Research Bureau 
(CRB) database, over the period October 1992 to October 2013, for each of the individual 
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Table 1 
Copula Distributions 
         Copula Parameter Range 
Normal          CN(u, v; ρ) = Φρ �Φ−1�F1(X1t)�,Φ−1�F2(X2t)�� ρ ϵ(−1,1) 
 
 Student's t          Ct(u, v; ρ, d) = td,ρ �td−1�F1(X1t)�, td−1�F2(X2t)�� ρ ϵ(−1,1)  
 Rotated-Gumbel 
         CRG(u, v; δ) = F1(X1t) + F2(X2t) − 1 + e�−��− ln�F1(X1t)��δ+�− ln�F2(X2t)��δ �1𝛿𝛿�    δ ϵ[1,∞)  
Note. This table provides the various distributions for the copulas examined. For the normal copula, Φ−1 is the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of a standard normal distribution, and the dependence parameter ρ is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
where the value 1 or -1 indicates complete dependence and 0 indicates complete independence. For the student’s t copula, if the 
dependence parameter, ρ, takes the value 1 or -1 it indicates complete dependence, and 0 indicates complete independence. Both the left 
(lower) tail and right (upper) tail dependence measures take the form 2𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑+1 �−�(𝑑𝑑+1)(1−𝜌𝜌)1+𝜌𝜌 �. For the rotated-gumbel copula, the 
dependence parameter, δ, takes the value of 1 for the case of independence and does not allow for negative dependence. The left (lower) 
tail dependence measure takes the form 2 − 21𝛿𝛿. 
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commodity futures we consider in our analysis.11 The individual commodity futures (along with 
their respective CRB symbol) are listed in Panel A of Table 2, along with the sub-sector to which 
it belongs. The inclusion of the specific commodity futures for this study is based on two criteria. 
First, each commodity future must have a continuous price series over the entire sample period 
considered. Second, the commodity futures must also have corresponding speculation data which 
can be extracted from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—described in 
section 3.3. The daily price series are averaged on a weekly (Tuesday-Tuesday) basis to obtain 
individual weekly price series. The same process is repeated for the equity index, the S&P 500, 
to obtain weekly equity price series; we extract daily equity price data from Bloomberg. Panel B 
of Table 2 lists the equity index as well as its respective Bloomberg identification symbol. 
Table 2 
Commodity Futures Groupings and Equity Index 
Panel A: Commodity Sub-sectors 
Commodity Futures CRB Symbol 
Energy 
 
 
Crude Oil, Brent CB 
 
Heating Oil #2 HO 
 
Unleaded Gasoline HU/RB 
 
Natural Gas NG 
   Foods & Fibers 
 
 
Cocoa CC 
 
Coffee KC 
 
Orange Juice OJ 
 
Sugar SB 
 
Cotton CT 
 
Lumber LB 
    
 
 
 
11 In constructing the individual commodity futures price series we follow the typical methodology of rolling over 
the futures prices to the next-nearby contract when the nearest futures contract is one month from expiration (see 
Asness et al., 2013). 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Commodity Futures Groupings and Equity Index 
Grains & Oilseeds 
 
 
Corn C_ 
 
Oats O_ 
 
Soybeans S_ 
 
Soybean Meal SM 
 
Soybean Oil BO 
 
Wheat W_ 
   Livestock 
 
 
Feeder Cattle FC 
 
Live Cattle LC 
 
Lean Hogs LH 
   Precious Metals 
 
 
Gold GC 
 
Palladium PA 
 
Platinum PL 
  Silver SI 
Panel B: Equity Index 
Financial Index BLM Symbol 
S&P 500 SPX 
Note. This table provides an overview of the commodity 
futures and equity index examined. Panel A displays the 
composition of the five commodity futures sub-sectors 
and their respective Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) 
symbols. Panel B displays the equity index and its 
respective Bloomberg (BLM) symbol. 
 
We calculate the return series for all financial assets using the common log transformation on 
two consecutive weeks, formally, this sequence is given as: 
                                                                    Xit = logPit − log Pit−1                                                          (12) 
where, Xit represents the log return series for each individual commodity future, or equity index, 
based on the price series, Pit. The weekly return series for each of the five commodity futures 
sub-sectors (energy, foods and fibers, grains and oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals) are 
calculated by taking an equally-weighted average of all futures returns, Xit, which comprise that 
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particular sub-sector. For instance, the energy sub-sector is composed of an equally-weighted 
index of returns from Brent crude oil, heating oil #2, unleaded gasoline, and natural gas. Table 3 
provides the summary statistics for the weekly rates of return. Specifically, Panel A summarizes 
the statistics for the weekly returns of the value-weighted equity index, while Panel B 
encapsulates the weekly return statistics for the five commodity futures sub-sectors. The excess 
skewness and kurtosis that the equity and commodity futures returns exhibit confirm the non-
normality assumption; hence, reaffirming the need to use alternative measures of correlation 
structure to those based on simple linear assumptions. In general, we see that the returns of the 
energy and precious metals sub-sectors seem to most closely mimic those of the equity indices in 
terms of average return, skewness, and kurtosis. However, the standard deviation of returns for 
the equity index is markedly lower than that of all commodity sub-sectors, except livestock 
(0.007169). Interestingly, livestock is the only sub-sector (or composite index if we include 
equity as well) which exhibits positive skewness (0.030680) over the sample period. Overall, one 
can observe that the return properties of the five sub-sectors appear to decidedly differ, giving 
rise to the notion that their determinants may likely be heterogeneous. 
3.2.1 DCC Estimation 
The DCC model is in effect a two-step process to estimate the time-varying correlations between 
two different financial series. First, an ARMA model is fit to the specified return series and used 
to estimate the time-varying GARCH parameters. Second, the parameters driving the correlation 
dynamics are estimated using the standardized residuals from the first step estimation. This 
estimation procedure bears some similarities to that of the copula models. 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Weekly Rates of Return for the Equity Index and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors (October 1992 - October 2013) 
Panel A: Equity Index         
         
   
S&P 500 Index 
    
  
Mean       0.000567 
    
  
Median   0.001232 
    
  
Maximum  0.034318 
    
  
Minimum  -0.053787 
    
  
Std. Dev.   0.008138 
    
  
Skewness   -0.665001 
    
  
Kurtosis   6.772715 
        Obs. 1,111         
Panel B: Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
            
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Mean       0.000619 0.000328 0.000317 0.000232 0.000622 
  
Median   0.001756 0.000181 -0.000033 0.000168 0.000965 
  
Maximum  0.097980 0.043599 0.036699 0.029603 0.040602 
  
Minimum  -0.067262 -0.061074 -0.058338 -0.034269 -0.054108 
  
Std. Dev.   0.014677 0.012034 0.010841 0.007169 0.010641 
  
Skewness   -0.225218 -0.022605 -0.175441 0.030680 -0.898585 
  
Kurtosis   5.537885 4.354079 4.525559 4.710997 6.409541 
    Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
Note. This table provides the summary statistics for the weekly rates of return for both the equity index and commodity futures sub-sectors over the period 
October 1992 to October 2013. Panel A displays the summary statistics for the unlevered rates of return for the S&P 500 index. All equity data is retrieved 
from Bloomberg. Equity index returns are calculated by taking the average value of daily index returns each week (Tuesday-Tuesday) and then taking the 
log difference on two consecutive weeks. Panel B displays the summary statistics for the rates of return for the various commodity futures sub-sectors. All 
commodity futures data is taken from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). Returns are calculated by taking the average value of daily individual 
commodity futures returns each week (Tuesday-Tuesday) and then taking the log difference on two consecutive weeks; the commodity futures sub-sector 
returns are then calculated by taking an equally-weighted average of all weekly futures returns which comprise that particular sub-sector. One month prior to 
the expiration of each individual commodity futures contract we roll the futures price series over to the next-nearby futures contract. 
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 Since high frequency asset returns have a tendency to display fat-tails along with 
conditional heteroskedasticity and autoregressive characteristics, we select a mean equation for 
each return series via an AR(k) model based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)—
which in our estimation provides the most parsimonious model. We then implement the Glosten-
Jagannathan-Runkle-GARCH model, or more aptly the GJR-GARCH(p, q) model, which 
includes a leverage term for modeling asymmetric volatility clustering. In the GJR design, large 
negative changes are much more likely to be clustered with positive changes.12 We apply p = q = 1 to our data sample given that this option usually best fits financial time series 
information. Thus, the model for each sub-sector and equity index log return series, Xt, is 
described via the following set of equations: 
                                        
Xt = µ + �θjXt−j + εtk
n=1i
εt = σtξt,     where ξt ∼ i. i. d.i
σt
2 = ω + �βσt−12p
i=1
+ �αεt−12q
j=1
+ �ξ I[εt−1 < 0]εt−12q
j=1 ⎭
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎫
                      (13) 
where, the indicator function I[εt−1 < 0] equals 1 if εt−1 < 0, and 0 otherwise. Hence, the 
leverage coefficient is applied to the negative innovations giving them more weight.13 Table 4 
provides the parameter estimates of the AR GJR-GARCH models for the S&P 500 equity index 
and the five commodity futures sub-sectors. In all cases, the BIC criteria chooses an AR(1) 
12 There are close similarities between the threshold GARCH (or T-GARCH) model and the GJR-GARCH model—
the T-GARCH model is a recursive equation for the standard deviation process, while the GJR-GARCH model is a 
recursive equation for the variance process. If the leverage coefficient is zero, then the GJR-GARCH model reduces 
to a GARCH model. 
13 See Glosten et al. (1993) for further details on stationarity and positivity constraints. 
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specification for each financial time series. Moreover, we find significant leverage coefficients 
for the S&P 500 index, and the energy, livestock, and precious metals commodity sub-sectors. 
Table 4 
AR GJR-GARCH Model Parameters 
   
Parameter t-statistic 
Panel A: S&P 500 Index   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000615 3.13  
  
AR(1) 0.142240 4.43  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000002 2.41  
  
GARCH(1) 0.824478 33.06  
  
ARCH(1) 0.017029 0.82  
  
LEVERAGE(1) 0.230510 7.30  
Panel B: Energy   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000228 0.56  
  
AR(1) 0.218450 7.03  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000005 1.99  
  
GARCH(1) 0.907876 46.31  
  
ARCH(1) 0.041361 2.14  
  LEVERAGE(1) 0.045607 2.12 
Panel C: Foods & Fibers   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000285 0.84  
  
AR(1) 0.211172  6.97  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000002 1.60  
  
GARCH(1) 0.933194 83.55  
  
ARCH(1) 0.065129  5.19  
  
LEVERAGE(1) -0.021456 -1.60 
Panel D: Grains & Oilseeds   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000414 1.46  
  
AR(1) 0.245357 7.91  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000004 2.57  
  
GARCH(1) 0.834690 32.75  
  
ARCH(1) 0.145544 5.07  
  
LEVERAGE(1) -0.022028 -0.66 
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Table 4 (continued) 
AR GJR-GARCH Model Parameters 
Panel E: Livestock   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000122 0.61  
  
AR(1) 0.173848 5.73  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000001 1.80  
  
GARCH(1) 0.912555 69.31  
  
ARCH(1) 0.017020 1.37  
  
LEVERAGE(1) 0.086612 4.53 
Panel F: Precious Metals   
      ARMA(1,0) 
  
  
Constant 0.000486 1.85  
  
AR(1) 0.204885 6.85  
     GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
  
  
Constant 0.000002 1.74  
  
GARCH(1) 0.870060 44.23  
  
ARCH(1) 0.169278 6.40  
  LEVERAGE(1) -0.096992 -3.97 
Note. This table provides the autoregressive (AR) Glosten-
Jagannathan-Runkle GARCH (GJR-GARCH) parameter 
estimates for modeling asymmetric volatility of the equity and 
commodity financial return series over the period October 1992 
to October 2013. 
 
 The residual series from (13) are standardized and used to estimate the time-varying 
correlation matrix between each of our five commodity futures sub-sectors and the equity 
indices, respectively, via maximum likelihood. Panel A of Table 5 presents the summary 
statistics for the DCC correlations between the S&P 500 and each of the commodity futures sub-
sectors. The highest mean correlations occur for grains and oilseeds (0.149219) and precious 
metals (0.148714), while the greatest variation belongs to the energy sub-sector which has a 
standard deviation of 0.207809, far surpassing that of any other sub-sector. Most importantly, all 
sub-sector correlations, which are bounded between above (+1) and below (-1), are stationary 
according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results presented at the bottom of the 
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panel, thus permitting our use of the dependence measure as a reliable dependent variable in our 
regression analysis in Section 4. 
 The most interesting aspect of the DCC model comes from an inspection of Figure 2 
which plots the time-varying correlations between the S&P 500 and the five sub-sectors. Two 
things become readily apparent from the figure. First, the correlations between the equity 
markets and the commodity sub-sectors differ tremendously over the sample period, for example, 
the foods and fibers sub-sector shows much less variation in its correlation with the equity 
markets than does the energy sub-sector. Second, starting around mid-2003 the correlations 
between the commodity sub-sectors and the equity market seems to experience a slight upward 
trend, which becomes readily apparent in the post-2007 period. This rise in correlations 
corresponds to Buyuksahin et al. (2010) who note that this particular period (i.e. post-May 2003) 
is characterized by increasing participation of financial traders in the commodity futures market. 
3.2.2 Copula Estimation 
The initial steps of the copula estimation procedure are similar to those of the DCC described 
previously, whereby we utilize equation set (13) which contains the mean equation to 
accommodate for autocorrelation of each return series, via an AR(k) model, and the GJR-
GARCH(p, q) model, using p = q = 1, to accommodate for heteroskedasticity. The parameters 
of this estimation procedure were described and reported in Table 4. The residuals from each 
series of this procedure are then standardized and used to estimate the empirical CDF of the 
filtered return series. Following the work of Patton (2006), we use these values to estimate, via 
maximum likelihood, the parameters of the normal, student’s t, and rotated-gumbel copulas, 
outlined in Table 1. Panels B, C, and D of Table 5 present the summary statistics for the normal,  
 
26 
 
  
 
27 
 
student’s t, and rotated-gumbel copula correlations between the S&P 500 and each of the 
commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. The correlations for the normal and student’s t 
copulas closely resemble those of the DCC model in terms of mean, maximum, and minimum 
values. However, there are a few distributional changes regarding the correlation measures; in 
particular, the normal copula tends to exhibit greater kurtosis over that of the DCC specification. 
In addition, the skewness measures for both copulas differ (both positively and negatively) from 
the DCC case. These distributional differences in univariate statistics underlie the fundamental 
differences in how copulas disentangle the unique characteristics of each return series from the 
dependence structure which links them together in order to estimate its dependence series. As in 
the DCC model, the equity-commodity correlations are bounded above (+1) and below (-1) for 
the normal and student’s t copulas; moreover, rejection of the null hypothesis of the ADF tests 
permits the use of the correlation measures as dependent variables in our regression analysis due 
to their stationarity. Alternatively, in Panel D of Table 5, the rotated-gumbel offers another view 
of the dynamic equity-commodity correlations. The measure itself captures the lower left tail 
dependence and is unbounded above (∞), but bounded below (+1). The mean correlation 
measure across all sub-sectors ranges from 1.03 to 1.13 and have, in general, skewness and 
kurtosis distributional measures which are much greater than those in the (baseline) DCC case or 
the other two copulas.14 Since this particular copula measures the comovement of the different 
financial assets in an extreme sense, these distributional differences are not too surprising. 
Further examination of the properties of the rotated-gumbel correlations also reveal that they are 
stationary, per the ADF results, and also permissible as a dependent variable in a regression 
setting. 
14 Even though the rotated-gumbel copula is unbounded above, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the copula 
and find that, in the bivariate case, financial asset return series would have to comove very, very strongly to achieve 
a dependence parameter greater than two. 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Time-Varying Correlation Measures between S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors (October 1992 - October 2013) 
Panel A: Dynamic Conditional Correlations 
            
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Mean       0.126069 0.125489 0.149219 0.058425 0.148714 
  
Median   0.107409 0.130840 0.140200 0.055995 0.115488 
  
Maximum  0.654980 0.289116 0.482622 0.562071 0.407364 
  
Minimum  -0.381763 -0.044773 -0.219353 -0.233247 -0.048541 
  
Std. Dev.   0.207809 0.080540 0.117315 0.085951 0.100704 
  
Skewness   0.308420 -0.013501 0.004694 0.237842 0.800524 
  
Kurtosis   2.796507 1.814036 2.698508 4.874993 2.760354 
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
        
  
ADF level -3.6603 -2.8313 -6.7141 -13.8197 -3.2697 
    ADF first diff. -32.5152 -34.0796 -35.9554 -15.5627 -35.5540 
Panel B: Normal Copula 
             
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Mean       0.106621 0.121179 0.143618 0.064962 0.151442 
  
Median   0.103570 0.120225 0.132827 0.064368 0.148810 
  
Maximum  0.685544 0.307746 0.581658 0.365862 0.369051 
  
Minimum  -0.459251 -0.050378 -0.280172 -0.159836 -0.130011 
  
Std. Dev.   0.171787 0.041576 0.117906 0.067869 0.098891 
  
Skewness   0.074327 -0.016404 0.121557 0.441763 -0.094123 
  
Kurtosis   3.701664 4.304427 3.388926 4.034291 2.647368 
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
        
  
ADF level -3.8620 -4.5766 -4.2010 -5.0842 -4.1359 
    ADF first diff. -12.2665 -11.6330 -12.7967 -12.3530 -6.5630 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Time-Varying Correlation Measures between S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors (October 1992 - October 2013) 
Panel C: Student's t-Copula 
            
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Mean       0.121276 0.130730 0.153388 0.060871 0.153499 
  
Median   0.082237 0.123567 0.154018 0.062701 0.140089 
  
Maximum  0.630170 0.274209 0.531798 0.503927 0.444629 
  
Minimum  -0.333668 -0.021026 -0.279869 -0.265786 -0.092299 
  
Std. Dev.   0.209177 0.074892 0.145963 0.087834 0.113016 
  
Skewness   0.513095 0.009141 -0.129689 -0.087889 0.394606 
  
Kurtosis   2.621861 1.905078 2.461630 3.800448 2.660061 
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
        
  
ADF level -2.5227 -2.5681 -7.0675 -14.5816 -3.3463 
    ADF first diff. -31.9363 -33.7978 -35.7528 -15.9471 -35.1611 
Panel D: Rotated-Gumbel Copula 
            
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Mean       1.122521 1.083149 1.107318 1.020608 1.119811 
  
Median   1.066057 1.083026 1.085596 1.006884 1.089794 
  
Maximum  1.871284 1.100000 1.469600 1.244000 1.648219 
  
Minimum  1.000100 1.069708 1.000100 1.000100 1.003236 
  
Std. Dev.   0.139193 0.002383 0.095962 0.034708 0.112460 
  
Skewness   1.610933 0.344062 1.013706 3.008329 2.655377 
  
Kurtosis   5.765241 5.683194 3.518673 13.184990 10.494070 
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
        
  
ADF level -4.7136 -4.7546 -6.2368 -9.4629 -3.3308 
    ADF first diff. -13.7744 -12.2148 -13.7591 -26.4828 -7.8700 
Note. This table provides the summary statistics for the time-varying correlation measures between the S&P 500 and the five commodity futures sub-sectors 
over the full sample period (October 1992 to October 2013). Panel A provides the dynamic conditional correlations (DCC), while panels B, C, and D 
provide the correlations from normal, student’s t, and rotated-gumbel copulas, respectively. ADF represents the Augment Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. 
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Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C highlight the various correlation time paths between the S&P 500 and 
the five different commodity futures sub-sectors for the normal, student’s t, and rotated-gumbel 
copulas, respectively. While all three copulas highlight the heterogeneity between the dynamic 
equity-commodity correlation measures, the student’s t copula, and to a lesser extent the normal 
copula, visibly illustrate a rise in the correlations that is documented as beginning in mid-2003. 
Interestingly, over the latter part of the sample period, we also witness a spike in the lower tail 
dependence for several equity-commodity pairings, in particular, energy, precious metals, and 
grains and oilseeds. 
3.3 Explanatory Variables 
We employ a series of macroeconomic and financial market variables along with a measure 
which captures aggregate market speculation for each commodity sub-sector, in order to 
determine what factors determine the dynamic correlations for each equity-commodity sub-
sector pairing. We follow the suggestions of prior literature in our choice and implementation of 
these variables. 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
It is well-known that business cycle factors have an impact on commodity returns (see Erb and 
Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). Given this observation, we use an aggregate 
measure of US macroeconomic conditions called the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index (ADSI), 
which tracks real business conditions at a high frequency (see Aruoba et al., 2009; Buyuksahin 
and Robe, 2013). The ADSI variable is a composite of several underlying seasonally adjusted 
(high- and low-frequency) economic indicators which include: weekly initial jobless claims, 
monthly payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less transfer payments, 
manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP. The index is normalized such that the 
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ADSI variable is zero. Progressively larger positive values indicate better-than-average business 
conditions, whereas progressively more negative values indicate worse-than-average business 
conditions. Using historical statistics dating back to 1960, Bhardwaj and Dunsby (2013) find that 
the equity-commodity correlation business cycle component increases during period of economic 
weakness, and that the link between the equity-commodity correlation and business cycle is 
stronger for industrial commodities than agricultural commodities. However, Buyuksahin and 
Robe (2013) find that business conditions impart a positive, though not consistently significant, 
impact on dynamic equity-commodity correlations. 
 While US macroeconomic conditions are of substantial importance to the prices of 
financial assets, worldwide economic activity also plays a central role, particularly for 
commodities. Thus, we implement a measure of real global economic activity called the Baltic 
Dry Shipping Index (BDSI). The BDSI is an indicator of transportation costs for raw materials 
shipped by sea. It’s based on a daily quote, published by the Baltic Exchange in London, for 
booking vessels of various sizes and across multiple maritime routes. Specifically, the BDSI is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the Baltic Exchange’s indices for the shipping costs of the 
four largest dry-vessel classes. Our interest in this measure is based on the idea that the supply 
structure of the shipping industry is generally predictable and that changes in shipping costs are 
largely due to changes in the worldwide demand for raw materials. Kilian (2009) uses a similar 
type of freight measure and finds that increases in the shipping rates of freight can be used as 
indicators of both demand and supply shifts in global commodity markets. This link to global 
demand has prompted some interest in the BDSI as a leading indicator of global economic 
activity. Withstanding recent work by Bakshi et al. (2011), who investigate the BDSI as a 
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predictor for global stock and commodity returns, not many studies have used the variable for 
analysis beyond that of economic growth. 
 Panel A of Table 6 provides the summary statistics of these macroeconomic variables. 
Most importantly diagnostic tests reveal that the variables are both stationary in the level form, 
thus permitting them as usable variables in our regression. Additionally, it is apparent that the 
magnitude of the mean of the BDSI variable (2,356.17) is much greater than the mean of the 
ADSI (-0.1499), or any of our dependent variables, so we use the natural logarithm of the BDSI 
to remedy the issue in our regression analysis in Section 4. 
3.3.2 Financial Market Indicators 
Recent work by Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) documents that for certain commodity futures 
higher than expected US stock volatility can help to predict higher volatility in those markets. 
Alternatively, for a small sample of other commodity futures they note the opposite effect. 
Overall, they conclude that an increase in stock market volatility, as proxied by the VIX index, 
can be linked to an increase in correlations across markets. Based on this finding we include the 
VIX index, a measure of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, or better regarded as a 
gauge of investor sentiment (or “fear” index), as a regressor in our analysis. A general 
interpretation of the index is as follows, higher values of the VIX correspond to greater investor 
uncertainty about the equity markets. 
 While equity market volatility is well captured using the VIX index, broad market 
financial stress may not be so easily encapsulated. The finance literature has acknowledged that 
an increase in cross-market correlations in crisis periods occurs due to arguments such as spill-
over effects and flight-to-quality (see Danielsson et al., 2011; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2008; Kyle 
and Xiong, 2001). Therefore, following the work of Hong and Yogo (2012), who investigate the  
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics for Macroeconomic, Financial Market, and Speculation Variables  (October 1992 - October 2013) 
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variables       
         
   
Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti 
Index (ADSI) 
Baltic Dry Shipping 
Index (BDSI) 
   
  
Mean       -0.1499 2,356.17 
   
  
Median   -0.0452 1,562.00 
   
  
Maximum  1.8019 11,573.40 
   
  
Minimum  -3.9308 653.60 
   
  
Std. Dev.   0.7528 1,964.65 
   
  
Skewness   -2.0591 2.2540 
   
  
Kurtosis   9.8130 8.3934 
   
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 
           
  
ADF level -3.1758 -2.8736 
   
  
ADF first diff. -13.3703 -13.5897 
   Panel B: Financial Market Variables         
        
   
Market Volatility 
Index (VIX) 
Yield Spread             
(YS)                
   
  
Mean       20.3922 0.9684 
   
  
Median   18.9220 0.8640 
   
  
Maximum  72.7200 3.4480 
   
  
Minimum  9.5775 0.5260 
   
  
Std. Dev.   8.3245 0.4458 
   
  
Skewness   1.9062 3.0442 
   
  
Kurtosis   9.0562 14.6389 
   
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 
           
  
ADF level -4.2232 -3.3236 
       ADF first diff. -31.8152 -12.3040       
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Table 6 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Macroeconomic, Financial Market, and Speculation Variables  (October 1992 - October 2013) 
Panel C: Sub-sector Excess Speculation Measures 
            
   
Energy    
(SPE_ENERGY) 
Foods & Fibers 
(SPE_FOODFIB) 
Grains & Oilseeds 
(SPE_GRAINS) 
Livestock 
(SPE_LIVESTK) 
Precious Metals 
(SPE_PMETALS) 
  
Mean       0.333579 1.049820 1.052079 1.289389 0.489811 
  
Median   0.226707 0.958957 0.778949 1.091181 0.450626 
  
Maximum  0.949566 4.567558 13.753700 6.753103 1.450270 
  
Minimum  0.000000 0.109335 0.234880 0.320550 0.071367 
  
Std. Dev.   0.246275 0.477917 1.250135 0.729180 0.225018 
  
Skewness   0.572599 1.947755 5.326990 2.175143 1.086559 
  
Kurtosis   1.916844 10.410460 36.967110 10.532740 4.322239 
  
Obs. 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 
        
  
ADF level -4.0186 -5.8459 -9.4453 -7.0662 -7.4378 
    ADF first diff. -26.2772 -25.9532 -14.2246 -31.9454 -31.7010 
Note. This table provides the summary statistics for the macroeconomic, financial, and speculation variables over the period October 1992 to October 2013. 
Panel A displays the summary statistics of the weekly macroeconomic variables, the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index (ADSI) tracks real business conditions at 
a high frequency and the Baltic Dry Shipping Index (BDSI) provides an assessment of the price of moving major raw commodity materials by sea. Panel B 
displays the summary statistics for the weekly financial market variables, the market volatility index (VIX) represents the market's expectation of stock 
market volatility and the Yield Spread (YS) is the difference between Moody's Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields, which represents a reflection of the 
overall broad corporate economy (and therefore credit quality and financial stress). Panel C displays the summary statistics regarding the calculation of the 
excess speculation index for each commodity futures sub-sector. Excess speculation for each individual commodity futures series is calculated via 
Working’s “T” method based on weekly (Tuesday-Tuesday) speculation data provided by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and 
then aggregated to its respective sub-sector. The variables SPE_ENERGY, SPE_FOODFIB, SPE_GRAINS, SPE_LIVESTK, and SPE_PMETALS 
represent speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. ADF 
represents the Augment Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. 
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predictability of commodity futures as well as other asset returns, we proxy for aggregate 
financial market stress using a slight variation of the yield spread (YS). Here, YS is defined as 
the difference between Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield and Baa corporate bond yield. 
 Panel B of Table 6 provides the summary statistics of the financial market variables. As 
in the case of BDSI, we use the log of VIX to facilitate our regression analysis given that its 
mean value (20.3922) is substantially larger than the mean value of all other independent and 
dependent variables. Additionally, both financial indicators are stationary in their level 
permitting reasonable inferences from the regression in Section 4. 
3.3.3 Excess Speculation 
Recent literature on the financialization of commodity markets recognizes the idea that “who 
trades matters,” and that the presence of increased market participation may in fact propagate the 
linkage between cross-market (price) correlation dynamics (see Etula, 2009; Tang and Xiong, 
2012; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2013). We address this issue by acknowledging that speculators 
and index investors perform very different economic roles in the commodity futures market and 
that these differences should have dissimilar influences on commodity prices. A survey by 
Greely and Currie (2008) highlights that speculators bring information to the commodity futures 
markets on future supply and demand fundamentals, while index investors merely earn a passive 
return as payment for bearing the risk of price fluctuations. We postulate that the role of 
speculators may be unique among the different sub-sectors of commodity futures given the 
distinctiveness of the commodities themselves, as well as their individual trading volume.15 
 In order to create an index which accounts for market speculation we appeal to the 
Commitment of Traders (COT) reports which aggregate the positions of “major players” in the 
15 See volume statistics at www.futuresindustry.org. 
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US commodity futures markets each week. It is exclusively devoted to the domain of open 
interest with no price or volume data. Traders are divided into commercials traders, non-
commercial traders, and small traders. Commercial traders (or hedgers) participate in order to 
hedge their inherent commodity price risk exposure, whereas non-commercial traders (or 
speculators) participate in order to profit from the anticipation of future price movements. We 
utilize the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTCs) sub-classification of open 
interest data to measure speculation in the market. Prior studies analyzing the role of speculation 
have utilized Working’s “T” index, defined as the ratio of positions held by speculators to that of 
hedgers (see Buyuksahin and Robe, 2013). Working’s “T” measures the extent to which 
speculation is in “excess” of the level required to satisfy hedgers’ net demand for hedging at the 
market clearing price. It is common to interpret a high index or high volatility of the index as 
indicative of excess speculation. For each of our 23 commodity futures (i = 1,2, … ,23) we 
calculate Working’s “T” on a weekly basis (Tuesday-Tuesday), as that is when COT publically 
publishes their trading data. 
 Formally, for the ith commodity market in week t we calculate the speculation index as 
follows: 
                                            Tit =
⎩
⎨
⎧
SSiHLit + HSit  if HSit ≥ HLitSLiHLit + HSit  if HSit < HLit    (for i = 1, … ,23)                          (14) 
where, SSi  ≥ 0 and represents the “Speculator Short” positions held in aggregate by all non-
commercial traders, SLi  ≥ 0 and represents the “Speculator Long” positions held in aggregate 
by all non-commercial traders, HSit ≥ 0 and represents all commercial “Hedge Short” positions, 
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and HLit ≥ 0 and represents all commercial “Hedge Long” positions. After calculating excess 
speculation in each individual market, we aggregate the measure for each sub-sector as follows: 
                                                                SInt = �Tit,n     (for n = 1, … ,5)                                         (15)k
i=1
 
where, SInt is the “Speculation Index” for each of the five sub-sectors, n, composed of the 
individual commodity futures which belong to it. 
 Panel C of Table 6 summarizes the speculation measures for each of the five sub-sectors 
investigated in this paper. The univariate statistics differ quiet drastically between markets, with 
livestock reporting the highest mean measure of excess speculation (1.289389) and energy 
reporting the lowest (0.333579). Furthermore, tests of non-stationarity reveal that all speculation 
indices are, in fact, stationary in their level form and hence usable variables in our regression 
analysis. 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Given the unique characteristics among the different types of commodities, the factors which 
determine the time-varying correlations among the various sub-sectors with other asset markets, 
in particular equities, should also be unique. In order to explore this hypothesis we utilize the 
following regression model: 
                                                                  ynt = αwt + βxt + γznt + εt                                                 (16) 
where, ynt is a t × 1 vector of dependent variable dynamic correlations from either the DCC 
model or one of the copula specifications for a given sub-sector (n), x is a t × k vector of 
regressors consisting of macroeconomic and financial market variables, znt is t × 1 vector of 
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Working’s “T” excess speculation measure for a given sub-sector (n), and w is a  t × 1 vector of 
one’s. We estimate the model parameters using ordinary least squares (OLS) and report Newey-
West t-statistics which correct for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.16 The results from 
the regression analysis provide a more detailed level of understanding of the commodity futures 
market and its dependence with the equity markets. Furthermore, accurate and current 
knowledge on the determinants of the dynamic equity-commodity correlations at the sub-sector 
level has implications for non-index commodity futures investors and portfolio managers alike. 
4.1 Equity-Commodity Correlation Determinants 
In order to evaluate the evolution of the determinants of the dynamic correlations we decompose 
our overall sample (October 1992 to October 2013) into two sub-samples: sub-sample A 
(October 1992 to May 2003) and sub-sample B (May 2003 to October 2013). The justification 
for splitting the sample around mid-2003 stems from Buyuksahin et al. (2010) who note that the 
latter sub-period is characterized by increasing participation of financial traders in the 
commodity futures market. This observation and the emerging literature which argues that the 
increased financialization of commodities has contributed to the increase in dynamic correlations 
with more traditional assets makes the break in the overall sample period a natural choice.17 
4.1.1 The DCC Model 
Table 7 presents our baseline approach using the DCC as the dependent variable. Panel A 
presents the results for the energy sub-sector. For the full sample period, we find that the 
variables ADSI, YS, and SPE_ENERGY are all positive and highly statistically significant. 
16 We also estimate model parameters using time series regression techniques and find similar results. 
17 The literature on commodities lacks a complete consensus on when investing in commodity futures became highly 
popularized; however, the general consensus is that it occurred in the early 2000’s. Given this, we analyze individual 
trading volumes of commodity futures in conjunction with Buyuksahin et al. (2010) and find mid-2003 to be a 
suitable place to divide the sample. 
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Hence, a 1% increase in ADSI, YS, and SPE_ENERGY, ceteris paribus, results in a 0.0786%, 
0.1396%, and 0.4285% increase in the dynamic equity-commodity correlations, respectively. 
These findings are largely consistent with those of Buyuksahin and Robe (2013), which is not 
too surprising since they examine the DCC between the SP-GSCI (which is heavily weighted in 
energy futures) and the S&P 500. Conversely, we find that coefficient on BDSI is negative, but 
highly statistically significant. Its economic influence seems to be substantially less than the 
other factors however, as only a 1% decrease in BDSI results in a 0.003396% increase in the 
equity-commodity correlations. Since aggregate worldwide demand is approximated using 
BDSI, this result confirms the intuition that cross-market correlations increase in poor global 
economic conditions. Interestingly, when we decompose these results into the two sub-periods, 
we find that in the latter sub-period, B, all of the explanatory variables become highly significant 
and are of the expected sign, whereas in the former sub-period, A, just three of the variables 
(BDSI, VIX, and SPE_ENERGY) are statistically significant, but VIX and SPE_ENERGY are 
not of the expected sign. Thus, in the period characterized by increased market participation, we 
find that the equity-commodity correlations for the energy sub-sector are strongly determined by 
our macroeconomic, financial, and speculation indicators. Prior to this period, however, the 
determinants of the dynamic correlations are less linked to overall macroeconomic and global 
market conditions. Moreover, two of the variables which are significant, VIX and 
SPE_ENERGY, take the opposite (negative) sign indicating that prior to 2003 the return 
properties between the two asset classes drastically differed. 
 Panel B presents the results for the foods and fibers sub-sector. Over the full sample 
period, all of the explanatory variables are significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on VIX is significantly negative; however, given the findings of Silvennoinen and 
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Thorp (2013) we would expect the sign to be positive. Yet, the overall economic significance of 
this change seems rather small, as a 1% increase in the VIX results in a decrease of 0.00716% in 
the equity-commodity correlations. The coefficient on BDSI tells a similar story. Interestingly, 
the results across the two sub-periods are strikingly similar to what we observed in Panel A. All 
the coefficients on the variables in the latter sub-period take the expected sign and are 
statistically significant, whereas in the first sub-sample period just three of the variables are 
significant, and the sign of VIX is the opposite of expectations. Disparate from Panel A, we see 
the economic impact of all variables is markedly smaller in Panel B. For instance, the 
speculation measure though significant in the latter sub-period, its economic impact is decidedly 
smaller; a 1% increase in speculation leads to a 0.0314% increase in the equity-commodity 
correlations. Nonetheless, this result lends some credence to the argument that increased market 
participation, by market speculators, is in fact a prime contributor to the increased comovement 
between commodity futures and equities, hence deteriorating the long-run benefits of commodity 
futures. 
 Panel C, which shows the grains and oilseeds sub-sector, displays some interesting results 
regarding the evolution of the determinants of the equity-commodity correlations. In the full 
sample period, the only coefficients which are not rendered insignificant are ADSI and YS. 
However, an examination of sub-period A shows that none of the factors surveyed help to 
explain the dynamic correlations. Yet, sub-period B reveals that all of the factors are now highly 
significant at conventional levels. Overall, we see a drastic shift in the determinants of the 
dynamic correlations of the sub-sector in the period characterized by an increase in speculative 
activity. This characteristic is particularly interesting given that the latter sub-period results are 
similar to those found in Panel B, except that the sign of the coefficient on the speculative  
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Table 7 
Determinants of Dynamic Conditional Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
      
Oct. 1992 - Oct. 2013  
(Full Sample Period)   
Oct. 1992 - May 2003 
(Sub-period A)   
June 2003 - Oct. 2013 
(Sub-period B) 
Panel A: Energy 
             
  
Constant 0.8424 
 
2.2233 
 
0.0816 
   
(4.01) 
 
(5.39) 
 
(0.34) 
  
ADSI 0.0786 
 
-0.0047 
 
0.1704 
   
(3.26) 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(6.23) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.3396 
 
-0.5712 
 
-0.2938 
   
(-7.22) 
 
(-5.09) 
 
(-5.06) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0999 
 
-0.2769 
 
0.5297 
   
(1.31) 
 
(-3.74) 
 
(5.05) 
  
YS 0.1396 
 
0.0675 
 
0.1815 
   
(3.68) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(4.05) 
  
SPE_ENERGY 0.4285 
 
-0.4720 
 
0.5055 
   
(6.56) 
 
(-2.35) 
 
(4.07) 
            R2 0.4427    0.2717 
 
0.6055 
Panel B: Foods & Fibers 
  
      
        
  
Constant -0.1047 
 
0.2528 
 
0.0901 
   
(-1.12) 
 
(1.41) 
 
(1.20) 
  
ADSI 0.0294 
 
-0.0140 
 
0.0335 
   
(2.33) 
 
(-1.12) 
 
(3.93) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0523 
 
-0.0599 
 
-0.0322 
   
(2.57) 
 
(-1.22) 
 
(-1.82) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0716 
 
-0.0684 
 
0.0964 
   
(-1.90) 
 
(-1.70) 
 
(2.86) 
  
YS 0.1176 
 
0.0808 
 
0.0439 
   
(6.53) 
 
(2.95) 
 
(2.42) 
  
SPE_FOODFIB 0.0386 
 
0.0358 
 
0.0314 
   
(3.87) 
 
(4.31) 
 
(2.67) 
        
  
R2 0.3117 
 
0.1953 
 
0.1974 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Determinants of Dynamic Conditional Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel C: Grains & Oilseeds         
        
  
Constant 0.1279 
 
-0.1703 
 
0.2728 
   
(0.92) 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(1.60) 
  
ADSI 0.0361 
 
0.0072 
 
0.0717 
   
(2.54) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(3.71) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0168 
 
0.1103 
 
-0.0983 
   
(-0.53) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(-2.43) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0379 
 
-0.0655 
 
0.1579 
   
(-0.60) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(1.77) 
  
YS 0.1324 
 
0.0447 
 
0.1295 
   
(6.08) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(3.37) 
  
SPE_GRAINS 0.0017 
 
0.0030 
 
-0.1060 
   
(0.35) 
 
(0.72) 
 
(-3.12) 
        
  
R2 0.1160 
 
0.0197 
 
0.3094 
Panel D: Livestock           
        
  
Constant -0.0478 
 
-0.2534 
 
-0.0286 
   
(-0.65) 
 
(-1.05) 
 
(-0.31) 
  
ADSI 0.0031 
 
0.0149 
 
-0.0105 
   
(0.41) 
 
(1.32) 
 
(-0.96) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0034 
 
0.0736 
 
-0.0133 
   
(0.22) 
 
(1.11) 
 
(-0.61) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0329 
 
0.0190 
 
0.0912 
   
(1.01) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(1.74) 
  
YS 0.0487 
 
0.0624 
 
0.0151 
   
(2.92) 
 
(1.90) 
 
(0.61) 
  
SPE_LIVESTK 0.0048 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0027 
   
(0.95) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.35) 
        
  
R2 0.0637 
 
0.0165 
 
0.1092 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Determinants of Dynamic Conditional Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel E: Precious Metals         
        
  
Constant -0.0023 
 
0.8589 
 
0.3982 
   
(-0.02) 
 
(5.09) 
 
(3.61) 
  
ADSI 0.0293 
 
-0.0384 
 
0.0297 
   
(1.98) 
 
(-3.69) 
 
(2.32) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0054 
 
-0.2562 
 
-0.1702 
   
(0.20) 
 
(-5.23) 
 
(-7.07) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0394 
 
0.0561 
 
0.3972 
   
(0.78) 
 
(1.64) 
 
(6.78) 
  
YS 0.0776 
 
-0.0377 
 
-0.0893 
   
(2.98) 
 
(-1.86) 
 
(-3.22) 
  
SPE_PMETALS 0.0245 
 
-0.0107 
 
-0.0067 
   
(0.78) 
 
(-0.73) 
 
(-0.18) 
            R2 0.0672 
 
0.3885 
 
0.3938 
Note. This table provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each of the commodity futures sub-
sectors over the full sample period (October 1992 to October 2013) and two sub-periods (October 1992 to May 2003 and 
May 2003 to October 2013). In panels A, B, C, D, and E the dependent variable is the time-varying dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC) between the weekly rates of return on the S&P 500 equity index and the equally-weighted weekly 
futures returns on the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals sub-sectors, respectively. 
The variables ADSI, BDSI, VIX, and YS represent the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index, the Baltic Dry Shipping Index, the 
market volatility index, and yield spread, respectively. The variables SPE_ENERGY, SPE_FOODFIB, SPE_GRAINS, 
SPE_LIVESTK, and SPE_PMETALS represent speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, 
and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. In all sample periods, Newey-West t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients, along with the R2 of the regression. 
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variable (SPE_GRAINS) is negative. According to prior work using commodity indices the 
variable’s sign should be positive (as increased speculator participation has been shown to 
increase correlations). As such, our results curiously indicate that for the grains and oilseeds 
market a 1% increase in speculative activity results in a 0.1060% decrease in dynamic 
correlations between the equity and commodity futures market. This result highlights the point 
that outside of a commodity index setting the factors which affect the dynamic correlations 
between commodity futures and traditional assets are not homogenous across all futures markets. 
 Panel D highlights the regression results for the livestock sub-sector. A quick inspection 
of the results reveals that over all sample periods only a few of the explanatory variables 
generally aid in explaining the dynamic equity-commodity correlations. Over the full sample 
period, yield spread (YS) is highly significant and positive, which is observed in all the other 
commodity sub-sectors examined up to this point as well. Similar to Panel C, the regression 
model does a poor job of explaining the equity-commodity correlations in sub-period A. 
However, unlike Panel C, the explanatory variables in sub-period B also seem to do a rather 
inadequate job of explaining the dynamic correlations as well, as only VIX is significant at 
standard confidence levels. Furthermore, the regression in Panel D also shows an R-squared for 
sub-period B that is approximately 11% (comparably, sub-period A only has an R-squared of 
1.7%). Thus, the livestock sub-sector correlations with the equity market are far removed from 
the broad market explanatory variables we saw in the other groups. This result provides further 
credence for the heterogeneity among the different sub-sectors and that the differences in 
financial asset return determinants translate into real opportunities for price formation and risk 
management strategies. 
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 Finally, the results panel E, which contains the precious metals sub-sector, tells a 
strikingly similar story of a drastic shift in the sub-sector determinants as seen in Panels A, B, 
and C. Sub-period A presents the ADSI, BDSI, and YS as significantly negative determinants of 
the dynamic correlations. However, the shift to sub-period B shows not only increased 
significance of the VIX variable, but a change in the sign of ADSI. Unlike prior analysis of the 
sub-sectors the YS is unexpectedly negative, and the speculation variable is statistically 
insignificant altogether. These findings once again highlight the heterogeneous effects of not 
only speculation, but also of all the determinants considered across the various sub-sectors. 
 Implementing the DCC model as the dependent variable reveals some very interesting 
results across the different commodity futures sub-sectors. In general, we see that in moving 
from sub-period A to sub-period B the dynamic equity-commodity return correlations are 
increasingly explainable by the series of macroeconomic and financial market indicators. 
Furthermore, the effect of increased investor speculation in the market is heterogeneous across 
the various commodity futures sub-sectors. For both the energy and foods and fibers sub-sectors 
the speculation variable is positive and significant for their respective equity-commodity return 
correlations, in both the full and sub-sample B periods. However, the economic magnitude of the 
coefficients for the foods and fibers group is noticeably less than that of the energy sector. 
Contrastingly, for the grains and oilseeds sub-sector we find the speculation variable is 
insignificant for the full sample period but negative and significant sign in sub-period B. This 
result suggests that increased speculation actually decreases dynamic equity-commodity 
correlations within the group. Finally, in the livestock and precious metals sub-sectors the 
speculation variable is insignificant in all regression periods. One additional thought-provoking 
point is that for each sub-sectors’ full sample period regressions the proxy for financial stress 
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(YS) is positive and highly significant. Overall, a 1% increase in the yield spread results in 
roughly a 0.05%-0.14% increase in dynamic equity-commodity return correlations. 
4.1.2 The Normal Copula 
Table 8 presents our regression results using the normal copula as the dependent variable. The 
normal copula is a symmetrical dependence structure which allows for no tail dependence and 
provides in many senses a more robust measure of the return comovement. Panel A summarizes 
our findings for the energy sub-sector. In general, we find a similar pattern between the normal 
copula and the DCC results for the sub-sector. The significance of the results do not vary much, 
although the magnitude of the relevant coefficients seems to decrease for both the full sample 
and sub-sample B in comparison to the results in Panel A of Table 6. Overall results again 
illuminate the unique fact that the returns of the energy sub-sector and equity market both seem 
to be highly intertwined and determined via broad market macroeconomic and financial market 
indicators as well as speculative activity since May 2003. 
 Interestingly, the regression results of Panel B differ quite a bit from those of the 
(baseline) DCC model. In the normal copula case, only YS is significant (and positive) for the 
full sample period. However, the most prominent changes come in evaluating the results in sub-
period A where only the VIX is significant. In the latter period, the variables ADSI, VIX, and YS 
are all highly significantly positive for the normal copula, and the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are economically similar to those in the DCC model. Moreover, as in Panel A, sub-period B 
elicits a higher R-squared over the earlier period. The normal copula based findings paint a 
markedly similar picture of increased integration among the equity-commodity return 
determinants in the last 10 years. 
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 The results of Panels C and D, which summarize the grains and oilseeds and livestock 
sub-sectors, respectively, do not dramatically differ from those found in Table 6, both the 
magnitude and sign of the coefficients are relatively unchanged. The only major difference is 
that the ADSI coefficient becomes significantly positive in sub-period A of the livestock sub-
sector. Regarding grains and oilseeds, the speculation variable, interestingly, remains 
significantly negative, indicating that a 1% increase in speculative activity results in a 0.0982% 
decrease in the equity-commodity return correlations. Results based on the dynamic copula 
correlations for the two sub-sectors also highlight the heterogeneous effects of the broad market 
indicators. Furthermore, they also detail a story of increased integration among the deterministic 
return factors between the equity and commodity futures markets; though the copula based 
results tend to be less acute. 
 The results for Panel E, the precious metals sub-sector, are somewhat different from the 
DCC (baseline) case. The entire set of coefficients are insignificant for the full sample period. 
However, in sub-sample A we find the variables ADSI, BDSI, and YS all become statistically 
significant, just as in the DCC model. We again see that ADSI and YS are of the opposite than 
expected sign. Yet, in sub-sample B, ADSI changes its sign to positive, YS becomes statistically 
insignificant, and VIX becomes positive and significant. The fact that ADSI and YS are of the 
negative sign in sub-period A, but of the positive sign in sub-period B, highlights an evolution of 
the determinants in the particular sub-sector. Interestingly, the speculation variable is 
insignificant in all cases, similar to the findings in Panel D. The latter sub-period results are 
similar to the DCC model with the exception of the insignificant YS variable. Panel E brings to 
light some interesting points to debate. For example, the macroeconomic conditions variable 
(ADSI) shows that during the period October 1992 to May 2003 a 1% increase in the  
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Table 8 
Determinants of Normal Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
      
Oct. 1992 - Oct. 2013  
(Full Sample Period)   
Oct. 1992 - May 2003 
(Sub-period A)   
June 2003 - Oct. 2013 
(Sub-period B) 
Panel A: Energy 
             
  
Constant 0.4898 
 
2.2189 
 
-0.0492 
   
(2.71) 
 
(4.54) 
 
(-0.25) 
  
ADSI 0.0336 
 
-0.0311 
 
0.0891 
   
(1.70) 
 
(-1.44) 
 
(4.15) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.2036 
 
-0.5578 
 
-0.1942 
   
(-4.85) 
 
(-4.09) 
 
(-4.09) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0854 
 
-0.2595 
 
0.5254 
   
(1.19) 
 
(-3.20) 
 
(5.42) 
  
YS 0.1165 
 
-0.0045 
 
0.1100 
   
(3.12) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(2.34) 
  
SPE_ENERGY 0.1967 
 
-0.4918 
 
0.1594 
   
(3.56) 
 
(-2.30) 
 
(1.69) 
            R2 0.2594 
 
0.1924 
 
0.4858 
Panel B: Foods & Fibers 
 
        
        
  
Constant 0.0744 
 
0.2820 
 
0.0318 
   
(2.03) 
 
(3.04) 
 
(0.82) 
  
ADSI 0.0031 
 
-0.0094 
 
0.0100 
   
(0.71) 
 
(-1.58) 
 
(2.48) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0077 
 
-0.0367 
 
-0.0018 
   
(0.86) 
 
(-1.48) 
 
(-0.19) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0090 
 
-0.0470 
 
0.0581 
   
(-0.61) 
 
(-2.48) 
 
(2.93) 
  
YS 0.0294 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0188 
   
(3.70) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(2.04) 
  
SPE_FOODFIB 0.0048 
 
-0.0019 
 
0.0124 
   
(0.95) 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(2.39) 
        
  
R2 0.0728 
 
0.0197 
 
0.1243 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Determinants of Normal Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel C: Grains & Oilseeds         
        
  
Constant 0.0400 
 
-0.1847 
 
0.1534 
   
(0.29) 
 
(-0.69) 
 
(0.85) 
  
ADSI 0.0429 
 
0.0168 
 
0.0756 
   
(3.17) 
 
(1.06) 
 
(3.97) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0077 
 
0.0984 
 
-0.0792 
   
(-0.24) 
 
(1.25) 
 
(-1.88) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0072 
 
-0.0262 
 
0.1903 
   
(0.11) 
 
(-0.30) 
 
(1.88) 
  
YS 0.1308 
 
0.0438 
 
0.1299 
   
(5.29) 
 
(0.93) 
 
(3.18) 
  
SPE_GRAINS -0.0005 
 
0.0005 
 
-0.0982 
   
(-0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(-3.03) 
        
  
R2 0.1194 
 
0.0082 
 
0.3015 
Panel D: Livestock           
        
  
Constant -0.0159 
 
-0.1686 
 
-0.0136 
   
(-0.26) 
 
(-0.86) 
 
(-0.18) 
  
ADSI 0.0017 
 
0.0143 
 
-0.0134 
   
(0.27) 
 
(1.72) 
 
(-1.34) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0009 
 
0.0599 
 
-0.0149 
   
(0.07) 
 
(1.09) 
 
(-0.77) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0241 
 
-0.0015 
 
0.1015 
   
(0.91) 
 
(-0.04) 
 
(2.56) 
  
YS 0.0474 
 
0.0558 
 
0.0084 
   
(3.30) 
 
(2.01) 
 
(0.37) 
  
SPE_LIVESTK 0.0012 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0063 
   
(0.29) 
 
(-0.42) 
 
(-0.97) 
        
  
R2 0.1032 
 
0.0258 
 
0.1814 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Determinants of Normal Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel E: Precious Metals           
        
  
Constant 0.0412 
 
1.0248 
 
0.2669 
   
(0.34) 
 
(3.71) 
 
(2.23) 
  
ADSI 0.0094 
 
-0.0645 
 
0.0399 
   
(0.53) 
 
(-4.16) 
 
(2.39) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0001 
 
-0.2842 
 
-0.1048 
   
(0.00)  
 
(-3.61) 
 
(-4.31) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0504 
 
0.0491 
 
0.2608 
   
(0.99) 
 
(0.81) 
 
(3.60) 
  
YS 0.0387 
 
-0.1090 
 
-0.0223 
   
(1.55) 
 
(-2.79) 
 
(-0.73) 
  
SPE_PMETALS 0.0193 
 
0.0020 
 
-0.0180 
   
(0.78) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(-0.52) 
            R2 0.0329 
 
0.2522 
 
0.2514 
Note. This table provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each of the commodity futures sub-
sectors over the full sample period (October 1992 to October 2013) and two sub-periods (October 1992 to May 2003 and 
May 2003 to October 2013). In panels A, B, C, D, and E the dependent variable is the time-varying normal copula 
correlation between the weekly rates of return on the S&P 500 equity index and the equally-weighted weekly futures 
returns on the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals sub-sectors, respectively. The 
variables ADSI, BDSI, VIX, and YS represent the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index, the Baltic Dry Shipping Index, the 
market volatility index, and yield spread, respectively. The variables SPE_ENERGY, SPE_FOODFIB, SPE_GRAINS, 
SPE_LIVESTK, and SPE_PMETALS represent speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, 
and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. In all sample periods, Newey-West t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients, along with the R2 of the regression. 
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macroeconomic conditions results in an decrease of 0.0645% in commodity-equity return 
correlations, and vice versa. However, over the period June 2003 to October 2013, the effect is 
the opposite, a 1% increase in macroeconomic conditions increases the commodity-equity return 
correlations by 0.0399%, and vice versa. Given that equity markets tend to prosper during 
economic booms, sub-period A underlies the fact that when equity returns were increasing, 
returns in the precious metals sub-sector were not commoving with them. Alternatively, when 
economic times were poor and equity markets were retrogressing, the commodity futures returns 
were moving in the opposite direction. Hence, the sub-sector returns were acting as a type of 
diversifying tool. A similar story is evident in the sub-periods of Panels A and B; these 
observations are very intriguing as they coincide with the literature which posits that the recent 
financialization and increased participation has otherwise diminished the benefits of commodity 
futures. 
 Overall, the results using the normal copula correlations as the dependent variable reveal 
many similarities and a few interesting differences from the DCC (baseline) case. It is clear that 
the broad market macroeconomic and financial indicator variables, which are generally 
associated with traditional asset (equity) market return fluctuations, now similarly influence 
commodity futures returns; thus, providing a measure of increasing return comovement between 
the two markets. These findings provide general support for the financialization of commodity 
futures argument. Additionally, the results also point out that the equity-commodity return 
correlations tend to increase in times of market distress (as proxied by YS), a downfall in global 
economic conditions (as proxied by BDSI), during periods of domestic market uncertainty 
(proxied by VIX), and with an improvement in domestic business conditions (proxied by ADSI) 
particularly over the full and sub-sample B periods. These findings seem to imply that 
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commodity futures returns act less like a hedge or diversifying tool than the used too. However, 
our analysis also reveals that the magnitude and significance of these effects is, again, 
heterogeneous across sub-sectors. 
4.1.3 The Student’s t Copula 
Table 9 presents our regression results using the student’s t copula as the dependent variable. The 
student’s t copula is a symmetrical but non-zero tail dependence structure which nests the normal 
copula. Panel A summarizes our findings for the energy sub-sector. Overall, regression results 
closely mirror that of the DCC and Normal copula approaches. Noticeably, however, the 
coefficient for the speculation factor (SPE_ENERGY) is quite larger under the student’s t copula 
correlations, implying a greater role for the variable regarding the correlations movement. The 
results also reveal a larger R-squared for both the full sample and sub-period B. The overall 
consistency of the findings for the energy sub-sector across all correlation measures further 
solidify the results that its returns with the equity market are strongly determined by all of our 
broad macroeconomic and financial indicators as well as excess speculative activity. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the deterministic factors as seen by the change in significance and 
sign of the coefficients across the two sub-periods supports the postulations of the 
financialization argument, in which large capital inflows to the energy sub-sector have integrated 
its return structure with the traditional financial markets, hence altering the behavior of the assets 
and theoretically the potential benefits. 
 Panel B results, for the foods and fibers sub-sector, more so resemble the DCC findings 
than the normal copula. The allowance of symmetrical tail dependence gives the highest R-
squared (approximately 40%) for the full sample period out of all dependence measures 
considered. We also find that all explanatory variables are highly significant in explaining the 
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dynamic equity-commodity return correlations, whereas in the case of the normal copula only the 
variable YS is significant at conventional levels. In sub-period B we observe that YS has lost its 
explanatory power (when compared to the DCC model), yet the remaining significant 
coefficients are largely the same as seen in Table 7. The regression results using the student’s t 
copula for the foods and fibers sub-sector show that the macroeconomic and financial indicator 
variables are relatively more important in the most recent sub-sample period compared to the 
initial sub-period. Moreover, the effects of the determinants have changed over the different sub-
sample periods. Even though the results of the sub-sector are sensitive to the measure of 
dependence, the aggregate copula and DCC findings tell a story of increasing return correlation 
between the two asset markets via the deterministic factors. 
 Panels C and D, of the grains and oilseeds and livestock sub-sectors, strongly resemble 
those found in both Tables 7 and 8. Over the full sample period the results are unchanged 
regardless of the dependence measure used. Across the two sub-samples there are only minor 
changes in the deterministic factors of the equity-commodity return correlations. Interestingly, 
the findings of Panel C again document a negative speculation coefficient (SPE_GRAINS), such 
that a 1% increase in speculation activity results in a decrease of 0.1390% in the sub-sectors’ 
equity-commodity correlations. Additionally, the sub-period B results of Panel D show that none 
of the explanatory variables are significant in explaining the dynamic equity-commodity 
correlations, whereas the prior tables found just the VIX variable to be of any importance. 
Overall, findings provide considerable credence to the observation that the determinants of the 
grains and oilseeds sub-sector have become more integrated with those of the equity markets, as 
seen by the considerable change in the explanatory variables; however, the livestock sub-sector  
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Table 9 
Determinants of Student’s t Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
      
Oct. 1992 - Oct. 2013  
(Full Sample Period)   
Oct. 1992 - May 2003 
(Sub-period A)   
June 2003 - Oct. 2013 
(Sub-period B) 
Panel A: Energy 
             
  
Constant 1.0439 
 
1.8784 
 
0.3198 
   
(5.36) 
 
(5.50) 
 
(1.38) 
  
ADSI 0.0839 
 
0.0133 
 
0.1594 
   
(3.88) 
 
(0.99) 
 
(5.64) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.3933 
 
-0.4636 
 
-0.3734 
   
(-8.89) 
 
(-5.00) 
 
(-6.49) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0707 
 
-0.3255 
 
0.5853 
   
(0.94) 
 
(-5.08) 
 
(5.12) 
  
YS 0.1064 
 
0.1066 
 
0.0983 
   
(2.75) 
 
(2.10) 
 
(1.69) 
  
SPE_ENERGY 0.5307 
 
-0.2247 
 
0.6061 
   
(8.35) 
 
(-1.28) 
 
(5.66) 
            R2 0.5265 
 
0.2918 
 
0.6661 
Panel B: Foods & Fibers 
 
        
        
  
Constant 0.0236 
 
0.3620 
 
0.1582 
   
(0.30) 
 
(3.08) 
 
(2.66) 
  
ADSI 0.0282 
 
-0.0019 
 
0.0241 
   
(3.56) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(3.40) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0478 
 
-0.0317 
 
-0.0499 
   
(2.71) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-3.49) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.1624 
 
-0.2206 
 
0.1158 
   
(-5.15) 
 
(-9.46) 
 
(4.11) 
  
YS 0.1346 
 
0.1048 
 
0.0195 
   
(8.94) 
 
(6.53) 
 
(1.24) 
  
SPE_FOODFIB 0.0311 
 
0.0188 
 
0.0305 
   
(3.95) 
 
(4.40) 
 
(2.83) 
        
  
R2 0.3956 
 
0.4571 
 
0.2330 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Determinants of Student’s t Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel C: Grains & Oilseeds         
        
  
Constant 0.2388 
 
-0.2281 
 
0.2665 
   
(1.38) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(1.74) 
  
ADSI 0.0403 
 
0.0044 
 
0.0869 
   
(2.33) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(3.54) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0260 
 
0.1703 
 
-0.1214 
   
(-0.67) 
 
(1.78) 
 
(-2.39) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.1191 
 
-0.1884 
 
0.1502 
   
(-1.55) 
 
(-1.77) 
 
(1.42) 
  
YS 0.1644 
 
0.0879 
 
0.1604 
   
(6.36) 
 
(1.55) 
 
(3.37) 
  
SPE_GRAINS -0.0011 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.1390 
   
(-0.18) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(-3.41) 
        
  
R2 0.1057 
 
0.0581 
 
0.2895 
Panel D: Livestock           
        
  
Constant -0.0209 
 
-0.1914 
 
-0.0092 
   
(-0.28) 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-0.10) 
  
ADSI 0.0030 
 
0.0118 
 
-0.0076 
   
(0.39) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(-0.69) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0024 
 
0.0611 
 
-0.0120 
   
(0.15) 
 
(0.87) 
 
(-0.55) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0180 
 
0.0047 
 
0.0736 
   
(0.55) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(1.44) 
  
YS 0.0462 
 
0.0564 
 
0.0173 
   
(2.98) 
 
(1.74) 
 
(0.73) 
  
SPE_LIVESTK 0.0051 
 
0.0024 
 
0.0016 
   
(1.03) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.20) 
        
  
R2 0.0463 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0816 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Determinants of Student’s t Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel E: Precious Metals           
        
  
Constant 0.0901 
 
1.2855 
 
0.4492 
   
(0.64) 
 
(5.33) 
 
(3.38) 
  
ADSI 0.0219 
 
-0.0670 
 
0.0430 
   
(1.20) 
 
(-4.82) 
 
(2.67) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0024 
 
-0.3569 
 
-0.1594 
   
(-0.08) 
 
(-5.27) 
 
(-5.49) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0081 
 
-0.0388 
 
0.3167 
   
(-0.15) 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(3.82) 
  
YS 0.0732 
 
-0.0270 
 
-0.0604 
   
(2.56) 
 
(-0.80) 
 
(-1.69) 
  
SPE_PMETALS 0.0290 
 
0.0069 
 
-0.0260 
   
(0.95) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(-0.60) 
            R2 0.0390 
 
0.3338 
 
0.3299 
Note. This table provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each of the commodity futures sub-
sectors over the full sample period (October 1992 to October 2013) and two sub-periods (October 1992 to May 2003 and 
May 2003 to October 2013). In panels A, B, C, D, and E the dependent variable is the time-varying student’s t copula 
correlation between the weekly rates of return on the S&P 500 equity index and the equally-weighted weekly futures 
returns on the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals sub-sectors, respectively. The 
variables ADSI, BDSI, VIX, and YS represent the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index, the Baltic Dry Shipping Index, the 
market volatility index, and yield spread, respectively. The variables SPE_ENERGY, SPE_FOODFIB, SPE_GRAINS, 
SPE_LIVESTK, and SPE_PMETALS represent speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, 
and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. In all sample periods, Newey-West t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients, along with the R2 of the regression. 
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seems to remain largely segmented from the equity markets via the insignificant coefficients on 
the explanatory variables. 
 The precious metals sub-sector results of Panel E are a hybrid of the findings of Tables 7 
and 8. The macroeconomic and financial market determinants of the return correlations for this 
sub-sector are all significant in sub-period B, whereas only ADSI and BDSI are relevant in sub-
period A. The interesting points of Panel E are that ADSI changes sign across the sub-periods 
and YS is statistically negative in the latter sample period (as in Table 7), which is opposite of 
expectations and means that a 1% increase in the YS (i.e. financial market stress) results in a 
decrease of 0.0604% in the sub-sectors equity market correlations. Provided that asset returns 
tend to commove more closely during times of financial distress, this result suggests that 
precious metals returns tend to move in the opposite direction of equities in periods of stress; this 
result is likely a product of the flight-to-quality, particularly for gold, during market downturns. 
Lastly, we again document that the speculation variables is insignificant in all regressions—
highlighting the heterogeneity of the explanatory variable across the different commodity groups. 
 Given the findings from Table 9, as well as those in Tables 7 and 8, we conclude that the 
factors which explain the equity-commodity return correlations for the energy, grains and 
oilseeds, precious metals, and to a lesser degree the foods and fibers sub-sector, have 
significantly changed over the last decade. The return correlations between the two different 
asset classes have become increasingly explained by both macroeconomic and financial market 
variables. However, the inferences seem to be somewhat sensitive to the dependence measure 
used. The livestock sub-sector displays a different pattern with its equity market return 
correlations. The sub-sectors return dependence is generally not explained by the broad 
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macroeconomic, financial, or speculation variables; the determinants of the sub-sectors equity-
commodity correlations show the weakest evidence of increasing return integration.  
 The findings of Table 9 supplement the conclusions reached in Tables 7 and 8 in that the 
variables which proxy for local market distress (YS), uncertainty (VIX), the business cycle 
(ADSI), and global financial market destabilization (BDSI) show that commodity futures returns 
act less like a hedge or diversification tool as they tend to commove more strongly with equity 
market returns under shocks to the explanatory variables in the more recent sample period. 
4.1.4 The Rotated-Gumbel Copula 
Table 10 presents our regression results using the rotated-gumbel copula as the dependent 
variable. The rotated-gumbel copula is a left tail, non-linear, asymmetrical dependence structure, 
which is mostly present during extreme negative events, and is suitable for analyzing dependence 
over the left portion of the distribution. Panel A summarizes our findings for the energy sub-
sector. In general, the findings reveal a similar pattern to the DCC model, normal copula, and 
student’s t copula in the prior tables. This is interpreted to mean that the factors which drive the 
equity-commodity return dependence relationship under the previous dependence structures 
examined are very similar to those which drive the time-varying relationship in left-tail crises 
situations. However, the overall explanatory power of the model does decrease for both the full 
sample period and sub-period B upon examination of the R-squared which are 23.8% and 38.9%, 
respectively. The foods and fibers sub-sector, in Panel B, consistently shows that the VIX and 
yield spread (YS) are important determinants of the left-tail dynamic dependence structure for 
both the full and sub-sample periods. Notably, the coefficients across all periods are decidedly 
smaller than in previous tables. Additionally, the relatively smaller R-squared for the sample 
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periods suggests that these explanatory variables matter less when left tail dependence is the 
dependent variable. 
 The results of Panel C, the grains and oilseeds sub-sector, are very similar to the findings 
of Table 9; the characteristics of the coefficients are not drastically different then what has 
already been documented. What is intriguing is that the variable SPE_GRAINS is negative and 
highly significant, which is what the other tables report as well. Hence, the effect of increased 
speculation on the dynamic correlations of the grains and oilseeds group is strikingly different 
than any other sub-sector examined. In addition, the R-squared of the regressions tend to be 
considerably lower than what was found in the prior tables. Similar to the interpretation of Panel 
B, this means that while these factors do help to explain the dynamic equity-commodity 
correlations of lower tail dependence, they do not have the substantial impact found under the 
more general or symmetric dependence models. 
 The results of Panel D, the livestock sub-sector, show a moderate increase in the 
significance of the variables which explain the correlations structure. While the R-squared 
remains low overall, it is on par with the results found in Table 8. Overall, we see that ADSI and 
BDSI are highly negatively significant, suggesting that macroeconomic conditions, and not 
financial market, are the primary drivers of the sub-sectors’ dynamic correlations. The precious 
metals sub-sector, in Panel E, seems to moderately resemble the findings from the DCC model, 
except that in this case we find the coefficient on SPE_PMETALS is statistically significant for 
the first time. In sub-period B we document a negative relationship between speculation activity 
and equity-commodity correlations; this result has otherwise only been seen in the grains and 
oilseeds sub-sector. 
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Table 10 
Determinants of Rotated-Gumbel Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
      
Oct. 1992 - Oct. 2013  
(Full Sample Period)   
Oct. 1992 - May 2003 
(Sub-period A)   
June 2003 - Oct. 2013 
(Sub-period B) 
Panel A: Energy 
             
  
Constant 1.5606 
 
1.9080 
 
1.0817 
   
(10.81) 
 
(7.31) 
 
(6.01) 
  
ADSI 0.0182 
 
-0.0372 
 
0.0768 
   
(1.12) 
 
(-2.75) 
 
(3.54) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.1567 
 
-0.1384 
 
-0.0156 
   
(-5.15) 
 
(-1.84) 
 
(-3.75) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0542 
 
-0.3196 
 
0.3291 
   
(-0.86) 
 
(-5.06) 
 
(2.85) 
  
YS 0.0768 
 
0.0635 
 
0.0736 
   
(2.84) 
 
(1.71) 
 
(1.50) 
  
SPE_ENERGY 0.2158 
 
-0.1739 
 
0.2407 
   
(4.14) 
 
(-1.32) 
 
(3.83) 
            R2 0.2378   0.1809 
 
0.3858 
Panel B: Foods & Fibers 
  
      
        
  
Constant 1.0810 
 
1.0730 
 
1.0826 
   
(389.34) 
 
(179.11) 
 
(353.13) 
  
ADSI -0.0001 
 
0.0007 
 
-0.0060 
   
(-0.22) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(-1.66) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0004 
 
0.0016 
 
-0.0003 
   
(-0.66) 
 
(0.96) 
 
(-0.35) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0042 
 
0.0055 
 
0.0026 
   
(3.79) 
 
(3.48) 
 
(1.75) 
  
YS -0.0020 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0021 
   
(-3.68) 
 
(-2.01) 
 
(-2.44) 
  
SPE_FOODFIB 0.0001 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0002 
   
(0.33) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(-0.52) 
        
  
R2 0.0966 
 
0.0937 
 
0.0383 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Determinants of Rotated-Gumbel Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel C: Grains & Oilseeds         
        
  
Constant 1.2279 
 
1.1398 
 
1.2879 
   
(11.27) 
 
(4.04) 
 
(8.50) 
  
ADSI 0.0177 
 
0.0036 
 
0.0354 
   
(1.55) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(1.84) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0204 
 
0.0331 
 
-0.0600 
   
(-0.92) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(-1.80) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0102 
 
-0.1722 
 
0.0256 
   
(-2.10) 
 
(-2.54) 
 
(0.32) 
  
YS 0.0857 
 
0.1009 
 
0.0758 
   
(4.64) 
 
(2.39) 
 
(2.10) 
  
SPE_GRAINS -0.0039 
 
-0.0024 
 
-0.0851 
   
(-1.30) 
 
(-0.89) 
 
(-3.10) 
        
  
R2 0.0690 
 
0.0752 
 
0.1342 
Panel D: Livestock           
        
  
Constant 1.0892 
 
0.9634 
 
1.1008 
   
(31.79) 
 
(6.19) 
 
(25.29) 
  
ADSI -0.0049 
 
0.0020 
 
-0.0123 
   
(-1.39) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(-1.82) 
  
Log(BDSI) -0.0185 
 
0.0276 
 
-0.0307 
   
(-2.58) 
 
(0.66) 
 
(-2.34) 
  
Log(VIX) -0.0257 
 
-0.0305 
 
0.0160 
   
(-2.07) 
 
(-1.31) 
 
(0.58) 
  
YS 0.0220 
 
0.0124 
 
0.0028 
   
(2.41) 
 
(0.69) 
 
(0.16) 
  
SPE_LIVESTK 0.0020 
 
-0.0013 
 
-0.0005 
   
(0.82) 
 
(-0.42) 
 
(-0.14) 
        
  
R2 0.1028 
 
0.0246 
 
0.1933 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Determinants of Rotated-Gumbel Copula Correlations between the S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors 
Panel E: Precious Metals         
        
  
Constant 0.9466 
 
1.3979 
 
1.2469 
   
(6.32) 
 
(11.45) 
 
(5.48) 
  
ADSI 0.0335 
 
-0.0268 
 
0.0553 
   
(1.78) 
 
(-3.03) 
 
(1.88) 
  
Log(BDSI) 0.0318 
 
-0.0842 
 
-0.0887 
   
(1.07) 
 
(-2.50) 
 
(-2.00) 
  
Log(VIX) 0.0181 
 
-0.0419 
 
0.2478 
   
(0.35) 
 
(-1.22) 
 
(1.83) 
  
YS 0.0673 
 
-0.0120 
 
-0.0076 
   
(2.55) 
 
(-0.60) 
 
(-0.14) 
  
SPE_PMETALS -0.0290 
 
0.0241 
 
-0.1401 
   
(-1.05) 
 
(1.40) 
 
(-2.28) 
            R2 0.0396   0.1527   0.1813 
Note. This table provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each of the commodity futures sub-
sectors over the full sample period (October 1992 to October 2013) and two sub-periods (October 1992 to May 2003 and 
May 2003 to October 2013). In panels A, B, C, D, and E the dependent variable is the time-varying rotated-gumbel copula 
correlation between the weekly rates of return on the S&P 500 equity index and the equally-weighted weekly futures 
returns on the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals sub-sectors, respectively. The 
variables ADSI, BDSI, VIX, and YS represent the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index, the Baltic Dry Shipping Index, the 
market volatility index, and yield spread, respectively. The variables SPE_ENERGY, SPE_FOODFIB, SPE_GRAINS, 
SPE_LIVESTK, and SPE_PMETALS represent speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, 
and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. In all sample periods, Newey-West t-statistics are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses, along with the corresponding R2 of the regression. 
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 Overall, regression results pertaining to the rotated-gumbel dependence structure seem to 
indicate that across the full sample and two sub-periods macroeconomic and financial market 
variables are important in determining the equity-commodity dynamic correlations in crisis 
situations. However, the overall explanatory power of the relevant variables seems to be 
substantially reduced. Most importantly, these results, similar to our prior findings, reflect the 
fact that the impact of the explanatory variables across the different sub-sectors is heterogeneous 
both in terms of magnitude and sign. 
4.2 Speculation and Dummy Variable Analysis 
Given the importance which prior work has placed on speculation as a first-order determinant of 
increasing equity-commodity correlations, we conduct a dummy variable analysis to gain a better 
understanding of such effects. Instead of utilizing sub-sample analysis we create a dummy 
variable (DUM) which takes on a value of zero between the period October 1992 and May 2003 
and is one otherwise. Subsequently, we create an interaction term (DUM*SPE_) between each 
sub-sectors’ speculation measure and the dummy variable. In this setting, if we consider our 
macroeconomic and financial market variables as control variables and merely analyze the role 
of speculation on dynamic correlations we gain some additional insights. Table 11 provides the 
regression results using the dummy variable analysis. Panel A, B, C, and D report the results 
using the DCC, normal copula, student’s t copula, and rotated-gumbel copula respectively. 
 The DUM variable is interpreted as the “premium” that post-period (i.e. sub-period B) 
correlation measures experience over the pre-period (i.e. sub-period A) correlations, provided 
that the sub-sectors respective speculation measure is zero. In general, we see that the DUM 
variable is positive for most sub-sectors and across different dependence measures; this means 
that dynamic correlations across the different groups have been on the rise since mid-2003 
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Table 11 
Determinants of Correlations between S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors with Time Period Dummy Variable 
      Constant ADSI Log(BDSI) Log(VIX) YS SPE_ DUM DUM*SPE_ R2 
Panel A: DCC 
                     
  
Energy 0.8842 0.1522 0.0860 -0.3157 0.1105 -0.7091 -0.2041 1.2381 0.4791 
   
(3.81) (4.22) (3.77) (-5.05) (1.48) (-2.87) (-2.28) (4.34) 
 
  
Foods & Fibers 0.1024 0.0416 0.0107 -0.0362 0.0131 0.0370 0.1120 -0.0144 0.4806 
   
(1.33) (2.21) (1.10) (-1.87) (0.40) (4.58) (5.00) (-0.93) 
 
  
Grains & Oilseeds 0.2746 0.1102 0.0340 -0.0718 -0.0123 0.0048 0.1130 -0.0879 0.1429 
   
(1.80) (4.28) (2.39) (-1.78) (-0.19) (1.04) (2.59) (-2.28) 
 
  
Livestock -0.0521 0.0491 0.0031 0.0044 0.0331 0.0053 0.0016 -0.0021 0.0620 
   
(-0.64) (2.50) (0.40) (0.21) (0.93) (0.75) (0.08) (-0.20) 
 
  
Precious Metals 0.4563 -0.0807 -0.0037 -0.1804 0.2080 -0.0057 0.2212 -0.0517 0.5092 
   
(4.65) (-4.06) (-0.34) (-7.41) (5.95) (-0.30) (7.03) (-1.06)   
Panel B: Normal Copula 
                     
  
Energy 0.5967 0.1094 0.0346 -0.2138 0.1218 -0.7881 -0.1040 0.9829 0.2973 
   
(3.06) (2.80) (1.79) (-4.13) (1.70) (-2.72) (-1.44) (3.18)  
  
Foods & Fibers 0.1088 0.0170 0.0011 -0.0053 0.0037 0.0008 0.0063 0.0083 0.0892 
   
(2.81) (1.89) (0.25) (-0.51) (0.25) (0.14) (0.64) (1.08)  
  
Grains & Oilseeds 0.1698 0.1121 0.0412 -0.0562 0.0287 0.0023 0.1010 -0.0799 0.1404 
   
(1.11) (4.03) (3.08) (-1.38) (0.42) (0.45) (2.41) (-2.22)  
  
Livestock -0.0315 0.0471 0.0016 0.0032 0.0275 0.0041 0.0100 -0.0097 0.1035 
   
(-0.45) (2.69) (0.25) (0.18) (0.95) (0.73) (0.55) (-1.10)  
  
Precious Metals 0.3984 -0.0764 -0.0156 -0.1416 0.1623 0.0175 0.1893 -0.0885 0.2961 
   
(3.44) (-3.11) (-0.96) (-4.95) (3.40) (0.60) (5.43) (-1.57)   
Panel C: Student’s t Copula       
                  
  
Energy 1.0478 0.1254 0.0925 -0.3588 0.0657 -0.3826 -0.2000 1.0382 0.5524 
   
(4.76) (3.20) (4.40) (-6.01) (0.89) (-1.85) (-2.46) (4.29)  
  
Foods & Fibers 0.2236 0.0614 0.0149 -0.0359 -0.0821 0.0256 0.0950 -0.0024 0.5741 
   
(3.56) (4.57) (2.33) (-2.29) (-3.11) (5.30) (4.44) (-0.17)  
  
Grains & Oilseeds 0.3908 0.1492 0.0398 -0.0805 -0.1021 0.0024 0.1253 -0.1097 0.1285 
   
(2.03) (4.83) (2.27) (-1.58) (-1.31) (0.41) (2.32) (-2.36)  
  
Livestock -0.0273 0.0456 0.0029 0.0030 0.0202 0.0066 0.0054 -0.0046 0.0448 
   
(-0.34) (2.53) (0.36) (0.14) (0.57) (0.94) (0.25) (-0.41)  
  
Precious Metals 0.5641 -0.0791 -0.0111 -0.1903 0.1393 0.0280 0.2523 -0.1204 0.3939 
   
(4.57) (-2.94) (-0.73) (-6.21) (2.96) (0.92) (6.47) (-1.92)   
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Table 11 (continued) 
Determinants of Correlations between S&P 500 and Commodity Futures Sub-sectors with Time Period Dummy Variable 
Panel D: Rotated-Gumbel Copula       
                  
  
Energy 1.5618 0.0866 0.0227 -0.1389 -0.0562 -0.2776 -0.1060 0.5583 0.2538 
   
(10.00) (2.96) (1.39) (-3.45) (-0.86) (-1.78) (-2.21) (3.23) 
 
  
Foods & Fibers 1.0797 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0001 0.0038 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.1023 
   
(368.89) (-2.50) (0.04) (0.08) (3.20) (0.64) (-0.45) (-0.40) 
 
  
Grains & Oilseeds 1.2952 0.0885 0.0195 -0.0414 -0.1055 -0.0020 0.0651 -0.0708 0.0897 
   
(10.32) (4.01) (1.67) (-1.30) (-2.18) (-0.71) (1.69) (-2.41) 
 
  
Livestock 1.0872 0.0195 -0.0054 -0.0203 -0.0208 0.0039 0.0079 -0.0044 0.1032 
   
(27.60) (1.60) (-1.43) (-1.73) (-1.28) (1.39) (0.63) (-0.98) 
 
  
Precious Metals 1.2916 -0.0204 0.0117 -0.0961 0.0704 0.0321 0.2320 -0.2247 0.2246 
    (7.96) (-0.76) (0.70) (-2.46) (1.24) (1.51) (4.34) (-3.24)   
Note. This table provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each of the commodity futures sub-sectors over the full sample period (October 
1992 to October 2013) and two sub-periods (October 1992 to May 2003 and May 2003 to October 2013). In panels A, B, C, and D the dependent variables are 
the time-varying dynamic conditional correlation (DCC), time-varying normal copula correlations, time-varying student’s t copula correlations, and time-
varying rotated-gumbel copula correlations, respectively, between the weekly rates of return on the S&P 500 equity index and the equally-weighted weekly 
futures returns on the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals sub-sectors. The variables ADSI, BDSI, VIX, and YS represent 
the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Index, the Baltic Dry Shipping Index, the market volatility index, and yield spread, respectively. The variable SPE_ represent 
speculation in the energy, foods & fibers, grains & oilseeds, livestock, and precious metals commodity futures sub-sectors, respectively. The variable DUM is a 
dummy variable which takes on the value of 0 between the period October 1992 and May 2003 and 1 otherwise. The variable DUM*SPE_ is an interaction term 
between the period dummy (DUM) and the respective sub-sectors’ speculation (SPE_). In all sample periods, Newey-West t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the corresponding coefficients, along with the R2 of the regression. 
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irrespective of speculation. However, not all of the DUM coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. The unique sub-sector to this generalization is the energy sub-sector which has a 
negative and statistically significant DUM coefficient in three out of four panels. This actually 
means that with speculation is zero, the energy group has experienced an average decrease in 
equity-commodity correlations over the post-period. The interaction term, DUM*SPE_, affords 
us the ability to interpret the effect of increased speculation on the correlation measures over the 
two different sub-periods. If the interaction term is positive then the effect of speculation for 
increasing correlations is greater on post-period correlations than pre-period correlations. That is, 
speculation causes larger increases in the sub-period B correlations than the sub-period A 
correlations. If the interaction term is negative then the effect of speculation for increasing 
correlations is smaller on post-period correlations then pre-period correlations. That is, 
speculation causes smaller increases in the sub-period A correlations than the sub-period B 
correlations. Results across all panels indicate a positive and significant interaction term for the 
energy sub-sector, which aligns with our prior findings regarding the evolution of the energy 
sub-sector determinants. Furthermore, consistent with our prior analysis, we find that the 
interaction term for the grains and oilseeds sub-sector is negative and significant across all 
panels. The interaction terms for the foods and fibers and livestock sub-sectors are both highly 
insignificant across all panels. Lastly, in two of the four panels (DCC and normal copula) we 
find that the interaction term for the precious metals sub-sector is insignificant, while in the other 
two (student’s t and rotated-gumbel copulas) the interaction term is negative and significant. 
 The dummy variable analysis allows us to view the effects of speculation on dynamic 
equity-commodity correlations in isolation. The results are consistent with the sub-sample 
examination but provide another view of the evolution of the determinant via the dummy 
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variable and the interaction term. The findings once again confirm the intuition that the effects of 
speculation (and other determinants as well) are unique among the sub-sectors. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Recent empirical research has documented an increase in equity-commodity return correlations 
over the last decade. Given this observation we bring to light new facts regarding the commodity 
futures market by investigating the determinants of the correlations and the evolution of these 
variables through time. Moreover, we undertake an analysis of the various sub-sectors of the 
futures market, as opposed to a commodity index, to highlight the heterogeneity of the different 
commodity groups. 
 In this paper we calculate the dynamic dependence structure between the returns of five 
commodity futures sub-sectors—energy, foods and fibers, grains and oilseeds, livestock, and 
precious metals—and a well-known value-weighted equity index—S&P 500. We then 
investigate the determinants of the equity-commodity return dependence structures, via sub-
sample and dummy variable regression analysis, using several comprehensive macroeconomic, 
financial market, and speculation explanatory variables. We utilize the well-known DCC model 
as a baseline approach to our investigation as well as three time-varying copulas. We analyze (i) 
the normal copula—a symmetrical and frequent dependence structure which has no tail 
dependence, (ii) the student’s t copula—a symmetrical but non-zero tail dependence structure 
which nests the normal copula, and (iii) the rotated-gumbel copula—a left tail, non-linear, 
asymmetrical dependence structure. Practically speaking, these copulas represent the most 
relevant shapes for finance and are frequently used in empirical papers. 
 We find that while copulas offer a more robust measure of time-varying dependence, 
there are many similarities between the DCC and copula dependence measures. We document 
71 
 
that the equity-commodity correlations for the energy, grains and oilseeds, precious metals, and 
to a lesser extent the foods and fibers sub-sectors have become increasingly explainable by 
macroeconomic and financial market indicators, particularly after the period May 2003. The 
livestock sub-sector exhibits the smallest increase in integration with the equity market returns as 
the majority of explanatory variables are, generally, statistically insignificant across all sample 
periods examined. In particular, we note that the variables which relate to market distress (YS), 
uncertainty (VIX), the business cycle (ADSI), and global financial market destabilization (BDSI) 
show that commodity futures returns act less like a hedge or diversification tool in more recent 
years as they tend to commove more strongly with equities. However, the macroeconomic, 
financial, and speculation variables do exhibit heterogeneous effects in terms of significance, 
magnitude, and sign. Moreover, we document that increased participation by financial market 
speculators is not a primary determinant for all sub-sectors’ dynamic equity-commodity return 
correlations. This suggests that other forces are at play regarding the previously documented 
market-wide increase in commodity correlations. Alternatively, our results underlie the 
importance of examining commodity sub-sectors as opposed to value-weighted commodity 
indices due to the heterogeneity among the different groups. 
 Our results have interesting implications for academicians and practitioners alike. 
Knowledge of the factors which drive the return dependence between different commodity 
futures and the equity market, how they have evolved over time, and the sensitivity of these 
factors to different forms of dependence will provide investors, particularly those involved in 
commodity futures a more detailed level of understanding of the overall market as we bring to 
light the empirical facts of the market. These details help economists grasp the links between the 
real economy and finance and inform policymakers how exogenous shocks affect the markets 
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and how to design reforms of the financial system. Moreover, the analysis also helps to highlight 
potential investment benefits for non-index futures investors regarding asset allocation and risk 
management. For instance, given that all commodity sub-sectors are not equally affected by the 
broad macroeconomic and financial market variables which traditionally play a strong role in 
equity market returns, non-index commodity investors could utilize certain commodity sub-
sectors, such as livestock for example, where the potential for diversification benefits are likely 
more intact. 
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Chapter 2 
US Community Bank Failure: An Empirical Investigation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The community banking industry has long been a pivotal cornerstone in US financial sector 
intermediation. The importance of the characteristically American enterprise stems from the 
provision of a unique combination of relationship lending services based on the knowledge and 
history of their generally smaller, rural clientele. This inherent flexibility and willingness of 
community banks to work with customers comes in stark contrast to big bank processes which 
are best described as transactional, quantitative, and standardized. However, the last 40 years 
have seen the overall number of small, locally owned community lenders markedly shrink. The 
savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s saw the first culling of the industry. This was followed by 
broad sweeping changes in regulation and industry practices in the early 1990’s which 
effectively removed the barriers to bank consolidation. Moreover, economic conditions, such as 
low interest rates and financial product innovations created a more favorable banking 
environment for larger financial institutions. Finally, the far-reaching financial shocks of the 
2008 global financial crisis propelled the most recent attenuation of the industry. 
 According to a recent 2012 FDIC community banking study, the share of US credit 
market debt held by the domestic financial intermediaries declined by almost 50 percent between 
1984 and 2011. Furthermore, the share of US banking assets held by community banks declined 
from 38 percent to 14 percent over the same period.18 Lux and Greene (2015) report a similar 
decline in the community bank lending-market over the last two decades, but document a much 
larger decline, of roughly 50 percent, in total banking assets. Yet, in spite of the changes the US 
18 Statistics come from Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds. 
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financial industry has undergone community banks continue to play a critical role in key lending 
segments of the US economy. As of 2012, the FDIC notes that approximately 92 percent of 
FDIC insured banks and 94 percent of US banking organization are made up of community 
banks. Additionally, Lux and Greene (2015) report that the unique financial sector provides 
nearly 77 percent of agricultural loans and approximately 50 percent of small business loans. 
Furthermore, community banks play a pivotal role in real estate lending, particularly for housing, 
where knowledge of local market conditions and borrowers is paramount. In 2013, it was 
reported that the default rates for loans secured by family residential properties was 
approximately 3.47 percent for community banks with $1 billion or less in assets, while banks 
with over $1 billion in assets reported default rates three times that, at 10.42 percent.19 The 
geographical and economic importance of these institutions cannot be overstated as the ability of 
small businesses and consumers to find and obtain adequate credit is vital to the overall health 
and growth of the US economy. Hence, by this standard, the failure of community banks is not 
merely trivial. We feel that for these reasons an analysis of why certain community banks fail, 
while others do not, is of particular merit and has important regulatory and policy implications. 
 While prior research has largely focused on US commercial banks as a whole, we feel 
that the indicators and implementation of early warning systems of community bank failure 
should recognize the distinct differences and risk profiles of community and non-community 
banks. As argued in Lux and Greene (2015), the financials of community banks are different 
than their larger (non-community) bank counterparts, with less leverage, less-robust returns, and 
less of an emphasis on technology. Additionally, community banks are not as intensely involved 
in capital or securitization markets, and their earnings streams tend to be less diverse which make 
19 Hester Peirce, Senior Research Fellow, The Mercatus Center at George Mason University, testimony on July 18, 
2013, before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Congress, 1st session. 
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them more vulnerable to economic and financial disruptions. Hence, recognizing the early 
symptoms of community bank failure is an initial step towards failure prevention and ensuring 
overall economic stability. A more accurate warning model can provide regulators with 
additional lead time to avert an institutions failure, or mitigate the impact of failure on the 
banking system and economy, if failure does in fact occur. 
 Prior studies confirm that accounting data can be exploited to differentiate between sound 
and unsound banking (see Pettway and Sinkey, 1980; Whalen, 1991; Demirguc-Kunt, 1989; 
Thomson, 1992) and that is the avenue we pursue. Using a broad set of bank-specific accounting 
data we incorporate information from balance sheet, income statement, and the CAMELS ratings 
to select the appropriate covariates for our various model specifications. In the spirit of Francis 
and Schipper (1999), who examine the claim(s) that financial statement information has lost its 
explanatory power for exchange-listed firms’ returns, and Beaver et al. (2005), who investigate a 
secular change in the ability of financial ratios to predict firm bankruptcy, we similarly explore 
the relevance of such accounting information and financial ratios (i.e. CAMELS ratings) in their 
ability to predict community bank failure. Pappas et al. (2013) pursue a similar undertaking in 
their study of Islamic and conventional banks from Middle and Far East countries. Additionally, 
we incorporate a well-known US market liquidity component, the TED spread, into our models 
to link how macroeconomic liquidity shocks contribute to community bank failure. The rise of 
the TED spread precipitated the 2008 financial crisis foretelling trouble for not only the US 
economy but the banking sector as well.20 Cole and Wu (2009) similarly extend their analysis of 
US commercial bank failure to incorporate macroeconomic components. Though they find 
20 Through 2006 and into the second quarter of 2007 the TED spread remained steadfast around 50 basis points; 
however, in August of 2007 the spread began to widen, reaching over 200 basis points in November 2007 (a year 
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers) and peaking at 315 basis points in September 2008. The TED spread 
remained elevated through year-end 2008, averaging nearly 150 basis points, before returning to pre-crisis levels in 
mid-2009. 
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evidence that declining economic growth contributes to the failure of banks with high non-
performing loans, and shocks to interest rates make banks heavily relying on long-term 
borrowing more susceptible to failure, both GDP growth and short-term interest rates do not 
improve the predictive accuracy of their model. 
 We employ survival analysis to examine the characteristics of failed US community 
banks relative to a sample of non-failed US community banks in order to determine the 
significant indicators of community bank failure. Specifically, we adopt the semiparametric Cox 
Proportional Hazards model which has the advantage of requiring no distributional assumptions 
about the failure times of the banks. We utilize both Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and Federal Reserve Bank historical data over the period 1992-2013 to examine the 
bank-specific and macroeconomic characteristics of community banks which failed between the 
years 2000-2013. Specifically, we examine 452 failed community banks consisting of 6,350 
bank-year observations and 6,217 non-failed community banks consisting of 124,167 bank-year 
observations, for a total of 6,669 community banks and 130,517 bank-year observations. Our 
empirical results indicate that ordinary balance sheet and income statement information are a 
relatively ineffective way to predict community bank failure, notwithstanding balance sheet 
information offers an informational edge over income statement information and highlights that 
smaller banks (based on total assets) are actually less likely to fail than their larger community 
bank counterparts. Financial ratio information, in particular ratios which encompass capital 
adequacy, asset quality and liquidity, and earnings, provide a dramatic increase in the ability to 
predict community bank failure risk. We find that community banks which have declining 
amounts of equity and loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets are much more likely to 
fail. We also find that banks with more commercial and industrial loans as well as real estate 
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loans relative to total assets have increased failure risk. Interestingly, community banks which 
reduce their proportion of consumer lending as a percentage of total assets are more likely to 
fail—emphasizing the importance of community banks and their smaller, rural lending practices. 
Overall, income-based ratios such as net operating income to total assets and return on equity 
seem to have less relative importance in predicting community bank failure. Finally, given the 
strong relational nature of community banking, we find that a decrease in salary and wage 
expenses as a proportion of total assets results in a dramatic increase in community bank failure 
rates. We posit that this result is a byproduct of two qualitative factors specific to the community 
banking industry—excellent management and quality employee retention. The relevant covariate 
(i.e. salary and wage expenses to total assets), we argue, is an indirect proxy of managerial 
effectiveness and efficiency. Provided that “better” more valuable managers require increased 
compensation for their efforts, a reduction in salary and wages as a proportion of total assets 
results in a strong increase in failure rates. Thus, managerial effectiveness and efficiency seems 
to be a vital component of community banking industry survival. Moreover, quality employee 
retention for the small institutions is paramount. Community banks strongly rely on the flexible 
relationship banking paradigm much more so than non-community banks, as such the 
interpersonal business model is only as good as its employees and their connections with the 
local community. In order to retain quality, knowledgeable employees and reduce turnover 
community banks must pay reasonable wages and benefits to their valued employees. 
Additionally, we document that the use of the macroeconomic indicator of liquidity conditions, 
the TED spread, provides a substantial improvement in modeling predictive community bank 
failure. Specifically, we document that as macroeconomic liquidity conditions deteriorate (i.e. as 
83 
 
the TED spread widens) there is a considerable rise in the risk of failure for community banks, 
especially for those banks which are already suffering from financial duress. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the pertinent literature on failure prediction. Section 3 describes our methodology, detailing our 
community bank definition, data sources, variables selection, and research design. Section 4 
presents our empirical results. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Trying to identify why some banks fail while others continue to thrive has been an ongoing issue 
in financial literature since the late 1960’s. Ravi Kumar and Ravi (2007) provide a 
comprehensive review of the research methodologies employed to try and solve bankruptcy 
prediction in both banks and firms. Their survey spans the period 1968-2005 and is largely 
organized by the type of techniques applied to the bankruptcy problem, such as: statistical 
models, neural networks, case-based reasoning, decision trees, operational research, evolutionary 
approaches, and soft computing techniques, among others. However, they emphasize that the 
most precise way of monitoring the financial condition of banks is via on-site examinations. 
These examinations are conducted on a bank’s properties by official regulators every 12-18 
months and are required by the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. To this end, regulators utilize a 
six part ratings system, known as CAMELS, which evaluates the safety and soundness of the 
institution under review. The ratings system appraises banks according to the following basic 
functional areas: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, 
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. These CAMELS ratings provide regulators with 
imperative information about the financial condition of the banks; however, Cole and Gunther 
(1995) report that these ratings decay quite rapidly. 
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 The majority of prior research relating to bank failure and prediction has largely relied on 
methodologies such as discriminant analysis, logit regressions, and neural networks (see Bell, 
1997; Kolari et al., 2002; Swicegood and Clark, 2001). Shumway (2001) was the earliest study 
to show how the dynamic hazard model outperforms these more traditional bankruptcy models, 
and that a new hazard model which combines both accounting and market information 
substantially improves predicting bankruptcy.21 While the work of Shumway (2001) was focused 
on US corporate bankruptcies, over the period 1962-1992, he comprehensively demonstrates that 
a (dynamic) hazard model provides more consistent in-sample estimations and more accurate 
out-of-sample predictions. Beaver et al. (2005) extend the work of Shumway (2001) by 
evaluating corporate bankruptcy data over a more recent period, 1962-2002, and find there is a 
slight decline in predictive ability of financial ratios, but that it can be compensated for by 
adding market variables into the hazard estimation. While the hazard model has been widely 
applied to corporate bankruptcy prediction (see Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008; 
Bonfim, 2009) it has received relatively less attention in the realm of predicting bank failure until 
recently. The notable exception to this is Wheelock and Wilson (2000) who implement the Cox 
Proportional Hazards model with time-varying covariates to analyze commercial banks over the 
period 1984-1993.22 Using traditional CAMELS variables as covariates they find that poorly 
capitalized banks, less liquid banks, less (managerially) efficient banks, and less profitable banks 
are much more likely to fail. They also document that banks holding more risky asset portfolios 
are more likely to fail. Their results provide strong evidence in favor of the CAMELS ratings 
21 Dynamic hazard models are preferable to static models in predicting bankruptcy for three reasons: (1) hazard 
models control for how long a firm is at risk of failure, (2) hazard models incorporate information from panel data, 
and (3) hazard models incorporate information from many observations, producing more accurate out-of-sample 
forecasts. 
22 A few early studies implement the hazard framework pertaining to predictive bank failure; however, they use 
static, single period, hazard models (see Lane et al., 1986; Whalen, 1991). 
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system. Cole and Wu (2009) take a different approach and analyze the forecasting accuracy of 
the dynamic hazard model using both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables on a very 
large sample of US commercial banks. They find that the hazard model significantly improves 
the accuracy of in-sample and out-of-sample failure forecasting relative to a static probit model. 
 More recently, Alali and Romero (2013) use survival analysis, in particular the Cox 
Proportional Hazards model, to determine how early the indicators of bank failure can be 
observed. Utilizing a large sample of US commercial banks which failed between 2000 and 
2012, they note that banks with high loan-to-asset and high personal-loan-to-assets are more 
likely to survive. Moreover, they document that older banks and banks with high real estate and 
agricultural loans, loan charge-offs, loan loss allowance, and non-performing loan-to-asset ratios 
are more likely to fail. Pappas et al. (2013) undertake a similar survival analysis in the banking 
sector except at the international level.23 They employ the Cox model to estimate the conditional 
hazard rates for both Islamic and conventional banks from 20 Middle and Far East countries. 
They find that Islamic banks have significantly lower risk of failure both unconditionally and 
conditionally on time-varying bank-specific and macroeconomic (i.e. GDP growth and inflation) 
covariates. Hence, the implementation of early warning systems of bank failure should recognize 
the distinct risk profiles of the two banks. 
 Our research complements the more recent line of literature on bank failure prediction. 
We employ survival analysis, and in particular the (semiparamteric) Cox Proportional Hazards 
model, to investigate the early warning signs of community bank failure. We feel that the 
obvious differences between community bank and non-community bank profiles (discussed 
23 Other international survival analysis studies include: Molina (2002), Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009), Sales 
and Tannuri-Pianto (2007), and Mannasoo and Mayes (2009); these studies utilize both semiparametric and 
parametric survival models. 
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earlier) may lend themselves towards less obvious differences in terms of bank-specific 
predictors of failure. As in the case of Islamic and conventional banks, the implementation of 
early warning systems and indicators of bank failure should recognize the distinct risk profiles of 
community and non-community banks. To this end we utilize a much broader set of bank-
specific data than previous studies which incorporates information from balance sheets, income 
statements, and the CAMELS ratings to provide an extremely thorough overview of the 
community banking industry. This line of research, while extremely important to a well-
functioning economy, has been somewhat overlooked. Additionally, prior work has also 
demonstrated that macroeconomic conditions can play a role in bank and firm failure. As such, 
we specifically incorporate a well-known US market liquidity component—the TED spread—
into our survivor analysis models to ascertain the magnitude of the link between macroeconomic 
liquidity shocks and their contribution to community bank failure. The TED spread is a great 
indicator of interbank credit risk, liquidity, and the perceived health of the banking system as a 
whole. A rising TED spread indicates a decrease in market liquidity and a rise in the risk of 
default rates, particularly for non-performing loans. Moreover, during liquidity crises the 
interbank lending market does not function smoothly and any shock in interest rates can make 
banks which heavily rely on long-term borrowing much more vulnerable to failure. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Community Banking Definition and Data Sample 
In order to analyze the community banking industry in the US it is first necessary to define what 
it means to be a community bank. In general, a rough agreement exists on the characteristics 
which define a community bank as most of the attributes encompass how and where a 
community bank conducts its business practices. For instance, community banks primarily focus 
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on traditional banking services in their local communities where they obtain the majority of their 
core deposits and provide the lion’s share of their loans to small businesses and local consumers. 
This form of banking practice is often referred to as “relationship” lending and borrowing (as 
opposed to “transactional”) since the small institutions have a specialized knowledge of their 
local community and customers.24 This expertise allows community banks to base their lending 
decisions on unique local knowledge and (non-standard) long-term relationship data rather than 
customary underwriting models alone, which are typically implemented by larger banks. 
 While there is a general consensus about the characteristics of community banks, clearly 
defining them has been a more difficult venture; what constitutes small, basic banking activities 
is very subjective and hard to measure. Most regulators and practitioners cannot even fully agree 
as to what constitutes a community bank. In fact, the three largest banking regulators: the Office 
of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board all use 
different definitions for community banks. In fact, the FDIC recently changed their definition of 
community banks (in 2012) to establish standard requirements for lending and deposit gathering 
as well as limits on the geographic scope of operations that an institution must meet to be 
designated as a community bank. The new definition still remains loosely based on the $1 billion 
total asset (i.e. size) threshold, but goes beyond the typical size criteria alone in separating 
community from non-community banks.25 The Federal Reserve Board defines community banks 
as having $10 billion or less in total assets, while the OCC uses a $1 billion total asset threshold. 
In general, the standard method used by prior research has been to define community banks 
according to a size threshold, per total assets, which has ranged anywhere from $750 million to 
24 Hein et al. (2005), Critchfield et al. (2004), and Berger and Udell (2001) provide more information on the practice 
of “relationship” banking. 
25 See the FDIC Community Banking Study (December 2012) for specific criteria; under the new thresholds 94% of 
US banking organizations are defined as community banks. 
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$10 billion. Though the threshold alone may be an imperfect criterion and may seem rather 
arbitrary, many studies use $1 billion in total assets as an approximate limit, which is typically 
applied at the charter level rather than the banking organization level.26 In this study, we 
similarly define a community bank as an FDIC-chartered institution which has $1 billion of total 
assets, in inflation-adjusted dollars. We adjust the nominal total asset values for the entire sample 
into 2013 constant-dollars using the CPI-U measure of inflation as reported by the Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics (BLS). It is essential that any dollar-based yardstick be adjusted over time to 
account for inflation, economic growth, and the size of the banking industry. More aptly, $1 
billion is not what it used to be. 
 We collect FDIC bank data, on an annual (year-end) basis, for all US banking institutions 
that are FDIC insured in the Statistics and Depository Institutions (SDI) database. The SDI 
database collects financial data for nearly 1,000 different variables for FDIC-chartered 
institutions; it includes information from income statements and balance sheets as well as other 
sources pertaining to derivatives, risky assets, and much more. Additionally, we obtain an 
indicator of US macroeconomic conditions (i.e. perceived credit risk in the general economy), 
the TED spread, from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The TED spread is the difference 
between interest rates on interbank loans and short-term US government debt. More specifically, 
the TED spread is the (percentage) difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-
month T-bill interest rate. A rising TED spread is a sign that lenders believe the risk of default on 
interbank loans is increasing and it often precipitates a downturn in the US financial markets as 
liquidity is “drying up.” When the risk of bank default is considered to be decreasing, the TED 
spread decreases, and market liquidity accordingly increases. 
26 Critchfield et al. (2004) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (June 2003) apply the $1 billion limit at the 
banking organization level; DeYoung et al. (2004), Hassan and Hippler (2014), the FDIC, and OCC apply the $1 
billion limit at the charter level. 
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 Initially, we apply our definition of a community bank to a sample of 516 US banking 
institutions from the “FDIC Failed Banks List” which failed between the period January 2000 
and December 2013 and have at least three years of data. This list includes banks that failed and 
were subsequently acquired by another institution and banks which failed and were not acquired 
at all.27 Given that the asset size of some community banks may have grown beyond the $1 
billion inflation-adjusted threshold during some periods of the study we analyze the initial 
sample to ensure that all banks are at or below the size threshold during at least one of the last 
five years of available institutional data, and those banks which do not meet this criteria are 
removed. Additionally, to ensure that institutions which initially qualified as community banks 
(based on size) but grew far beyond that threshold in the very latter years of the sample are 
removed from the failed community banks group, we winzorize the right-tail of the failed banks 
group at the 0.5% level when sorted on total assets.28 The results of this procedure yield a total of 
452 failed community banks and 6,350 bank-year observations. 
 Next, we apply our definition of a community bank to a sample of 9,350 non-failed US 
banking institutions from the FDIC database which have financial data reported over the period 
January 1992 (as that is when the FDIC institutional data becomes available), or since the 
institutions inception, to December 2013. Similar to the procedure used for the failed banks 
sample, we remove community banks that do not have at least three years of data, whose asset 
size has grown beyond the $1 billion inflation-adjusted threshold during the last five years of the 
sample period, and those which grew far beyond the asset threshold in the very latter years of the 
27 Of the 516 failed US banks, 485 were acquired by other institutions and 31 were not acquired at all. There were 
255 unique acquirers, and of those 167 made single bank acquisitions, while the rest (88) made multiple bank 
acquisitions (which accounted for approx. 3.6 acquisitions on average). 
28 We subsequently apply another filter where community banks missing return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA) data are removed from the sample of failed community banks. However, none of the 452 community 
banks failed this filtering process. 
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sample by winzorizing the right-tail of the non-failed banks group at the 1% level when sorted on 
total assets. Furthermore, we delete banks which do not have FDIC reported ROE and ROA 
data.29 The results of this procedure yield a total of 6,217 non-failed community banks and 
124,167 bank-year observations. The combined sample of failed and non-failed community 
banks results in a total of 6,669 subjects and 130,517 bank-year observations. This 
comprehensive dataset allows for a thorough, retrospective examination of failed community 
banks relative to non-failed community banks to determine the bank-specific and 
macroeconomic characteristics of why US community banks fail. 
3.2 Variable Selection 
This study is exploratory by design, and as such we examine prominent balance sheet and 
income statement variables as bank failure predictors; we also identify and utilize a 
comprehensive set of financial ratios, using prior literature (from section 2) as a guide, which fall 
under the umbrella of the accounting-based CAMELS ratings. Market-based models have found 
past stock return and volatility data to also be useful in failure studies (see Pettaway and Sinkey, 
1980; Curry et al. 2007; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al. 2008). Given that stock 
return data is only applicable to publicly listed banks and the universe of community banks are, 
generally, privately held we cannot use market data for the banks in our sample, and as such we 
only use accounting information to explain community bank failures.30 However, as discussed in 
Pettway and Sinkey (1980) accounting information generally leads market price information so 
29 The ROE and ROA criterion results in the removal of only four community banks from the sample. 
30 Community bank accounting data is obtained via FDIC certificate numbers for each bank. 
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that the sole use of accounting information is justifiable.31 We further extend the analysis by 
incorporating the macroeconomic TED spread covariate (Ted_Spread) into our failure analysis.32 
 Continued regulatory efforts, such as the Basel Accords, aimed at safeguarding the 
financial stability of banks continually rely on the assumption that capital (and liquidity) 
regulation make banks more resilient to shocks from the real economy. Kaplan and Minoiu 
(2013) highlight the role of bank balance sheet strength in the transmission of financial sector 
shocks to the real economy, noting that banks with strong balance sheets were better able to 
maintain lending during the 2008 financial crisis. Cole and Gunther (1995) find capital and 
troubled assets to be among the important variables in explaining the timing of bank failure. 
Given the empirical importance of balance sheet information in bank stability we analyze the 
following variables: total assets (Asset), total liabilities (Liab), total equity capital (Eqtot), Tier-
one core capital (Riskcapt1), commercial and industrial loans (Loanci), loans to individuals 
(Loancon), all real estate loans (Loanre), farm loans (Loanag), and total loans and leases 
(Loanlease).33 We similarly explore income statement information as conditioning variables to 
community bank failure. A careful review of a bank’s financial statement can reveal key factors 
of the institution’s financial condition; in fact, Cole and Gunther (1995) find net income to be an 
extremely important element of bank failure. The income statement variables analyzed include: 
total interest income (Intinc), income before extraordinary items (Incext), total interest expense 
(Intexp), total non-interest expense (Nonintinc), net income (Netinc), net operating income 
31 Management variables (ratios) are also excluded from this study due to data unavailability. 
32 Some more recent empirical research suggests that taking macroeconomic conditions into account may improve 
the prediction accuracy of default in corporate firms—although firm-specific characteristics are the major 
determinant of corporate failure (see Carling et al., 2007; Bonfim, 2009). Pertaining to bank failure, Arena (2008) 
studies the 1990’s Latin America and East Asia banking crises and notes that individual bank conditions explain 
bank failures, while macroeconomic shocks (which triggered the crises) primarily destabilized the weaker banks. 
33 While we consider farm loans and its accompanying ratios in our preliminary analysis, it is largely excluded from 
our final analysis because data is missing for many institutions; consequently, it dramatically reduces the overall 
number of failed and non-failed community banks available for analysis. 
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(Netopinc), and provisions for loan and lease losses (LLLP). Lastly, we capture three 
components of the CAMELS ratings using financial ratios based on balance sheet and income 
information—Capital adequacy, Asset quality and liquidity, and Earnings. Prior work by 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Cole and Wu (2009), Kolari et. al (2002), Bell (1997), and Alali 
and Romero (2013) find success analyzing CAMELS variables to identify the characteristics that 
cause banks to fail using neural network, logit, and hazard models. As such, we include the 
following capital adequacy ratios for analysis: total equity capital to total assets (Eq_Asset), total 
equity capital to total loans and leases (Eq_Loanlease), and total equity capital to risk-weighted 
adjusted assets (Eq_RWA). The asset quality and liquidity ratios include: commercial and 
industrial loans to total assets (Loanci_Asset), loans to individuals to total assets 
(Loancon_Asset), real estate loans to total assets (Loanre_Asset), farm loans to total assets 
(Loanag_Asset), total loans and leases to total assets (Loanlease_Asset), loss allowance to total 
assets (Lossallow_Asset), net charge-offs to total assets (Chargeoff_Asset), total loan and lease 
loss provision to total assets (LLLP_Asset), loss allowance to total loans and leases 
(LLLP_Loanlease), net charge-offs to total loans and leases (Chargeoff_Loanlease), total loans 
and leases to total deposits (Loanlease_Dep), and Tier-one capital to risk-weighted assets 
(Riskcapt1_RWA). Finally, the earnings ratios include: income before extraordinary items to 
total assets (Incext_Asset), net operating income to total assets (Netopinc_Asset), net interest 
margin (Netint_Asset), salary and wage expenses to total assets (Wage_Asset), return on assets 
(ROA), and return on equity (ROE). Table 1 provides a summary of the independent 
(conditioning) variables. 
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Table 1 
Dependent and Conditioning Variables 
Variables Symbol Type Definition 
Dependent 
           
Bank Failure Bank_Fail Qualitative 
Binary indicator variable which is equal to 1 for failed banks in the 
year in which they fail and 0 in all preceding years. The variable is 
equal to 0 in all sample years for surviving banks. 
Independent            
Total Assets Asset Balance Sheet 
The sum of all assets owned by the institution including cash, loans, 
securities, bank premises and other assets. This total does not 
include off-balance-sheet accounts. 
            
Total Liabilities Liab Balance Sheet 
Deposits and other borrowings, subordinated notes and debentures, 
limited-life preferred stock and related surplus, trading account 
liabilities and mortgage indebtedness. 
            
Total Equity Capital Eqtot Balance Sheet 
Total equity capital on a consolidated basis (note: beginning march 
2009, includes the non-controlling (minority) interests in 
consolidated subsidiaries for CALL report and TFR filers). 
            
Tier-one (core) Capital Riskcapt1 Balance Sheet 
Tier-one (core) capital includes: common equity plus 
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus minority interests in 
consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible 
intangible assets. The amount of eligible intangibles (including 
mortgage servicing rights) included in core capital is limited in 
accordance with supervisory capital regulations. As of March 2014, 
Advanced Approaches Institutions began reporting regulatory 
capital according to the amended Market Risk Capital Rule. 
            
Commercial and Industrial 
Loans Loanci Balance Sheet 
Commercial and industrial loans. Excludes all loans secured by real 
estate, loans to individuals, loans to depository institutions and 
foreign governments, loans to states and political subdivisions and 
lease financing receivables. 
            
Loans to Individuals Loancon Balance Sheet 
Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal 
expenditures including outstanding credit card balances and other 
secured and unsecured consumer loans. 
            
All Real Estate Loans Loanre Balance Sheet Loans secured primarily by real estate, whether originated by the bank or purchased. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Dependent and Conditioning Variables 
Farm Loans Loanag Balance Sheet Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers.  Excludes savings institutions filing a Thrift Financial Report. 
            
Total Loans and Leases Loanlease Balance Sheet Total loans and lease financing receivables, net of unearned income. 
            
Total Interest Income Intinc Income Statement 
Sum of income on loans and leases, plus investment income, 
interest on interest bearing bank balances, interest on federal funds 
sold and interest on trading account assets earned by the institution. 
            Income before 
Extraordinary Items Incext Income Statement 
Income (loss) before security transactions, extraordinary items and 
other adjustments.   
            Total Interest Expense Intexp Income Statement Total interest expenses. 
            
Total Non-interest Income Nonintinc Income Statement 
Income from fiduciary activities, plus service charges on deposit 
accounts in domestic offices, plus trading gains (losses) and fees 
from foreign exchange transactions, plus other foreign transaction 
gains (losses), plus other gains (losses) and fees from trading assets 
and liabilities. 
            
Net Income Netinc Income Statement 
Net interest income plus total noninterest income plus realized gains 
(losses) on securities and extraordinary items, less total noninterest 
expense, loan loss provisions and income taxes. 
            
Net Operating Income Netopinc Income Statement 
Net income excluding discretionary transactions such as gains 
(losses) on the sale of investment securities and extraordinary items. 
Income taxes subtracted from operating income have been adjusted 
to exclude the portion applicable to securities gains (losses). 
            
Provisions for Loan and 
Lease Losses LLLP Income Statement 
The amount needed to make the allowance for loan and lease losses 
adequate to absorb expected loan and lease losses (based upon 
management's evaluation of the bank’s current loan and lease 
portfolio). Prior to 2001 and after 2002, an allowance for transfer 
risk is also included to cover losses on international assets. 
Additionally, from 1997 to 2000, includes provision for credit 
losses on off-balance sheet credit exposures. Reflects net provision 
for losses on interest-bearing assets.  
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Table 1 (continued) 
Dependent and Conditioning Variables 
Total Equity Capital to 
Total Assets Eq_Asset Financial Ratio: Capital Adequacy Total equity capital as a percent of total assets. 
            Total Equity Capital to 
Total Loans and Leases Eq_Loanlease Financial Ratio: Capital Adequacy 
Total equity capital as a percent of total loans and lease financing 
receivables, net of unearned income. 
            
Total Equity to Risk-
Weighted Adjusted Assets Eq_RWA Financial Ratio: Capital Adequacy 
Total equity capital to total risk-weighted adjusted assets. Risk-
weighted assets are adjusted for risk-based capital definitions which 
include on-balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet items 
multiplied by risk-weights that range from zero to 200 percent. A 
conversion factor is used to assign a balance sheet equivalent 
amount for selected off-balance-sheet accounts. 
            Commercial and Industrial 
Loans to Total Assets Loanci_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity Commercial and industrial loans as a percent of total assets. 
            Loans to Individuals to 
Total Assets Loancon_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity Loans to individuals as a percent of total assets. 
            Real Estate Loans to Total 
Assets Loanre_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity All real estate loans as a percent of total assets. 
            Farm Loans to Total Assets Loanag_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity Farm loans as a percent of total assets. 
            Total Loans and Leases to 
Total Assets Loanlease_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Total loans and lease financing receivables, net of unearned income, 
as a percent of total assets. 
            
Loss Allowance to Total 
Assets Lossallow_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Allowance reserve for loan and lease losses that is adequate to 
absorb estimated credit losses associated with its loan and lease 
portfolio (which also includes off-balance-sheet credit instruments) 
as a percent of total assets. 
            Net Charge-offs to Total 
Assets Chargeoff_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Gross loan and lease financing receivable charge-offs, less gross 
recoveries, (annualized) as a percent of total assets. 
            
Total Loan and Lease Loss 
Provisions to Total Assets LLLP_Asset Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
The annualized provision for loans and lease losses as a percent of 
total assets on a consolidated basis. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Dependent and Conditioning Variables 
Total Loan and Lease Loss 
Provisions to Total Loans 
and Leases 
LLLP_Loanlease Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity Allowance for loan and lease losses as a percent of total loan and lease financing receivables, excluding unearned income. 
            
Net Charge-offs to Total 
Loans and Leases Chargeoff_Loanlease Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Total loans and leases charged-off (removed from balance sheet 
because of uncollectibility), less amounts recovered on loans and 
leases previously charged-off as a percent of total loans and lease 
financing receivables. 
            
Total Loans and Leases to 
Total Deposits Loanlease_Dep Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Total loans and lease financing receivables, net of unearned income, 
as a percent of the sum of all deposits including demand deposits, 
money market deposits, other savings deposits, time deposits and 
deposits in foreign offices. 
            
Tier-one Capital to Risk-
Weighted Adjusted Assets Riskcapt1_RWA Financial Ratio: Asset Quality and Liquidity 
Tier-one (core) capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets as 
defined by the appropriate federal regulator for prompt corrective 
action during that time period. 
            Income before 
Extraordinary Items to 
Total Assets 
Incext_Asset Financial Ratio: Earnings Income before extraordinary items as a percent of total assets. 
            Net Operating Income to 
Total Assets Netopinc_Asset Financial Ratio: Earnings 
Net operating income (annualized) as a percent of average total 
assets. 
            
Net Interest Margin Netint_Asset Financial Ratio: Earnings Total interest income less total interest expense (annualized) as a percent of average total earning assets. 
            Salary and Wage Expenses 
to Total Assets Wage_Asset Financial Ratio: Earnings Salary and employee benefit expenses as a percent of total assets. 
            
Return on Assets ROA Financial Ratio: Earnings Net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a percent of average total assets. 
            
Return on Equity ROE Financial Ratio: Earnings 
Annualized net income as a percent of average equity on a 
consolidated basis (note: negative retained earnings are shown as 
N/A). 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Dependent and Conditioning Variables 
TED Spread Ted_Spread Macroeconomic The (percentage) difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate. 
Note. All financial variable data and definitions are obtained from the FDIC database; macroeconomic data is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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3.3 Research Design 
We utilize survival analysis, or time to occurrence of an event, which is better suited for our 
purposes of analyzing community bank failure than more traditional models, such as binary logit 
or ordinary least squares (OLS). Survival models have the ability to easily accommodate both 
lifetime and censored (particularly, right-censored) data. More importantly, however, these 
models overcome the pitfall of assumed normality, which is the true drawback to the linear 
regression framework. The distributions for time to an event (in this case community bank 
failure) are likely disparate from the commonly assumed normal pattern and are undoubtedly 
non-symmetric, and may even be bimodal.34 A linear regression framework is not robust to these 
types of violations. However, survival analysis models can provide proper estimates of expected 
time to failure and relevant parameter covariates by substituting a more reasonable distribution 
assumption (e.g. Weibull, exponential, etc.) in the case of parametric modeling or making no 
distributional assumptions at all in the case of semiparametric and nonparametric modeling, all 
of which can be estimated via maximum likelihood (ML). Moreover, as mentioned above, 
survival models of bank failure naturally and easily control for the condition that the number of 
observation periods of a given bank may not represent the bank’s entire lifespan (i.e. 
censoring).35 Left-censoring means that the event (i.e. failure) occurs prior to a subject (i.e. bank) 
entering the study; however, given that no banks in the sample of this study failed prior to initial 
analysis (beginning in Jan. 1992), left-censoring is irrelevant. Contrastingly, right-censoring, 
means that a subject is under study for a period of time and thereafter is no longer observed. In 
the context of community bank failure, it is entirely plausible a bank could remain in business 
34 See Cleves et al. (2010) for further exposition. 
35 For a more complete and detailed discussion of survival analysis and its properties see Hosmer et al. (2008), 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), and Nelson (1972). 
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beyond the conclusion of the sample period (ending in Dec. 2013) and fail at some point in time 
afterwards. In fact, our entire sample of non-failed community banks (i.e. those which survive 
beyond year-end 2013) represent right-censored observations. Fortunately, the likelihood 
function can be easily expressed in the presence of right-censoring to account for such data.36 
 In our analysis, we adopt the semiparametric Cox Proportional Hazards model (of Cox, 
1972) in addressing the issue of community bank failure risk and its associated covariates. This 
methodological choice has key advantages over both the parametric and non-parametric survival 
analysis models. Parametric models require making distributional assumptions; this raises the 
concern that the assumptions, and not the data, are determining the results. Contrastingly, 
semiparametric and nonparametric models require no assumptions about the distribution of 
failure times. The key insight into removing this distributional assumption is realizing that with 
survival data the events occur at given times, and that these events can be ordered and the 
analysis can be performed using the ordered survival times. Thus, under semiparametric and 
nonparametric analysis time plays no significant role other than ordering the observations. 
Despite this (conditional) similarity a significant difference still exists between the two 
modelling techniques. In the case of semiparametric models, one is parameterizing the effect of 
the covariate(s), so that a parametric component of the analysis still exists; contrastingly, an 
entirely nonparametric approach is utilized when no covariates exist, or are purely qualitative in 
nature.37 Semiparametric models are parametric in the sense that the effect of the covariate(s) is 
assumed to take a definitive form. The semiparametric analysis is a combination of separate 
binary-outcome analyses (one per failure time), while parametric analysis is merely a 
36 In the case of semiparametric models, if subject i is censored at time ti, then that particular subject enters all the 
individual failure-time studies up to and including time ti, and after that is merely ignored (as the subject did not fail 
at that time). 
37 Nonparametric methods include those of Kaplan and Meier (1958), Nelson (1972), and Aalen (1978). 
100 
 
                                                             
combination of several analyses (at all possible failure times). If no failures occur over a certain 
interval, such periods are non-informative in semiparametric analysis, but very informative in 
parametric analysis. So it stands that while semiparametric analysis is advantageous in that it is 
not concerned with intervening analyses, the parametric analysis is much more efficient if the 
proper distributional assumptions are made around the times when failures are not observed; 
however, choosing the appropriate distributional assumptions is quite challenging in practice. 
Lastly, while the semiparametric model makes no distributional assumptions of failure times, as 
that is taken care of with an ordering of how the failures occurred, it does make an assumption 
about how each subject’s observed covariate value determined the probability that a subject 
would fail.38 
 To provide context to the survivor analysis model, which we explore shortly, let us 
denote T as time to failure event, where T ϵ [0,∞), and F(t) as its cumulative distribution 
function and f(t) as its probability density function, where F(t) = Pr (T ≤ t) and f(t) = −dF(t)
dt
. 
However, in survival analysis it is far more convenient to describe the probability distribution for T in terms of S(t), the survivor function, and h(t), the hazard function, rather than F(t) and f(t), 
respectively. The survivor function is merely the reverse cumulative distribution function of T, 
and is given by: 
                                                              S(t) = 1 − F(t) = Pr(T > t)                                                      (1) 
The survivor function gives the probability of surviving beyond time (i.e. year) t. In other words, 
it is the probability that there is no failure (event) prior to time t. At t = 0 the function is equal to 
one and subsequently decreases as t approaches infinity. Alternatively, the hazard function, or 
conditional failure rate, gives the instantaneous rate of failure. The function is given by: 
38 The nonparametric approach does away with the distributional assumption and lets the data do the speaking. 
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                                                h(t) = lim
∆t→0
Pr (t + ∆t > T > t|T > t)
∆t = f(t)S(t)                                       (2) 
More aptly, the hazard function is the probability of failure occurring within year t, conditional 
upon the subject having survived to the beginning of time t, divided by the width of the interval. 
The hazard rate can vary from zero (i.e. no risk) to infinity (i.e. certain instantaneous failure) and 
provides the rate at which risk is accumulated given the one-to-one relationship between the 
probability of survival past a certain time and the amount of risk that has been accumulated up to 
that particular time. The (time-varying) hazard rate of community bank failure risk is the primary 
object of interest in the present context. 
 The Cox Proportional Hazards model is formalized as: 
                                                                  h(t|xi) = h0(t) exp(xiβx)                                                        (3) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, xi is a row vector of covariates, and βx is a column 
vector of regression coefficients to be estimated by the data. The covariates can be of an 
indicator, categorical, or continuous nature. The beauty of the Cox (1972) model is that h0(t) is 
given no particular parameterization; actually, the baseline hazard is left unestimated altogether. 
Since semiparamteric analysis is confined to only those times for which failure occurs, the 
baseline hazard drops out from calculation.39 Since the model makes no assumptions about the 
shape of the baseline hazard function it can take any form one can imagine. However, whatever 
the general shape the baseline hazard does take, it is the same for all; the hazard for one subject 
is merely a multiplicative replica of another subject’s. More aptly, the model assumes the 
covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function. Comparing subject i to subject j, 
the model explicitly states that: 
39 For a detailed and technical treatment of how this occurs see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). 
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                                                                         h(t|xi)h(t|xj) = exp (xiβx)exp (xjβx)                                                           (4) 
assuming the covariates xi and xj do not change over time. Furthermore, the Cox model assumes 
the hazard rate increases linearly with time conditional on the covariate(s). In our context the 
covariates consist of bank-specific balance sheet, income statement, financial ratio, and 
macroeconomic variables. In order to estimate the time-dependent covariate coefficients we de-
mean the lagged variables so that the baseline hazard rate, h0(t), can be interpreted as the rate of 
an average bank in the population sample.40  A value of βx� greater (less) than 0 indicates that a 
rise in the xth covariate increases (decreases) failure risk and decreases (increases) survival time. 
The hazard rate, exp(βx), can be reformulated into 100 × exp(βx − 1) so that it is interpreted as 
the expected percentage increase in failure risk for a one unit increase in the xth covariate. In our 
analysis the Cox model covariate selection process is based on a general-to-specific procedure as 
outlined in Pappas et al. (2013).41 
 We employ the exact-marginal calculation method, or continuous-time calculation 
method, for tied failure events in our ML calculations; in the present context, this refers to 
community banks which failed during the same time (i.e. the same month and day). This 
calculation method assumes that the institutions which failed on the same day did not all fail at 
the exact same time on the given day and that we are merely limited by how precisely we can 
measure the failure time with the dataset. The exact-marginal calculation utilizes conditional 
probabilities of tied failures in the likelihood calculations and assumes continuous time which 
40 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for more information regarding the covariate estimates. 
41 Pappas et al. (2013) build on the work of Lane et al. (1986), utilizing a forward-and-backward variable selection 
procedure. The name refers to the fact that the technique can both drop and add covariates sequentially. For each full 
set of M bank-specific and macroeconomic variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and 
retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the significance of the covariates based on the P-values, (2) 
the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx = 0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the degrees-of-
freedom-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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makes it mathematically impossible that the community bank failures occurred at precisely the 
same instant.42 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the full sample of conditioning variables. The 
variables are grouped by the following categories: balance sheet, income statement, financial 
ratio, and macroeconomic. The financial ratio section is further sub-divided into the CAMELS 
ratings categories of capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity, and earnings. We report the 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, number of observations, and unit of 
measurement for each variable. 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Full Sample of Conditioning Variables 
Variables Units Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Balance Sheet 
       Asset $M 144,930.50 88,420.00 162,720.90 19.00 1,957,120.00 130,517 
Liab $M 130,520.84 78,728.00 168,543.10 0.00 14,264,000.00 130,517 
Eqtot $M 15,125.00 9,144.00 18,509.29 -47,041.00 825,213.00 130,517 
Riskcapt1 $M 14,567.81 8,910.00 21,458.34 -45,673.00 2,325,000.00 130,517 
Loanci $M 12,274.62 5,277.00 24,219.21 0.00 1,874,000.00 130,517 
Loancon $M 6,772.55 3,314.00 16,154.63 0.00 1,479,739.00 130,507 
Loanre $M 69,573.39 34,376.00 111,118.12 0.00 9,783,000.00 130,517 
Loanag $M 4,457.50 1,081.00 9,925.26 0.00 383,488.00 118,945 
Loanlease $M 93,415.47 52,889.00 114,639.90 0.00 1,639,110.00 130,517 
Income Statement 
       Intinc $M 8,080.45 5,148.00 9,090.73 0.00 305,089.00 130,495 
Incext $M 1,136.91 723.00 4,319.96 -351,282.00 439,941.00 130,517 
Intexp $M 2,959.99 1,760.00 3,615.47 -2.00 63,034.00 130,495 
Nonintinc $M 1,402.20 447.00 8,744.79 -120,461.00 909,750.00 130,517 
Netinc $M 1,136.90 724.00 4,320.72 -351,282.00 439,941.00 130,517 
Netopinc $M 1,102.94 704.00 4,287.38 -351,375.72 439,941.00 130,517 
LLLP $M 595.41 112.00 3,415.49 -12,198.00 370,000.00 130,517 
42 Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) provide a technical treatment of the marginal calculation method. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Full Sample of Conditioning Variables 
Financial Ratio 
         Capital Adequacy 
       Eq_Asset % 12.50 9.96 99.11 -13.51 15,242.01 130,517 
Eq_Loanlease % 77.97 16.48 3,998.17 -6,763.20 758,448.29 129,904 
Eq_RWA % 21.39 15.72 111.88 -18.95 19,094.34 130,517 
  Asset Quality and Liquidity 
      Loanci_Asset % 19.62 6.65 959.17 0.00 111,481.26 130,517 
Loancon_Asset % 5.86 4.29 6.52 0.00 282.93 130,507 
Loanre_Asset % 95.25 40.38 4,566.13 0.00 581,975.00 130,517 
Loanag_Asset % 5.59 1.38 8.65 0.00 73.61 118,945 
Loanlease_Asset % 61.61 62.74 65.98 0.00 8,347.96 130,517 
Lossallow_Asset % 54.23 0.79 4,499.71 0.00 574,360.50 130,517 
Chargeoff_Asset % 0.26 0.07 5.43 -6.86 1,742.11 130,517 
LLLP_Asset % 2.59 0.13 190.11 -25.42 22,010.71 130,517 
LLLP_Loanlease % 1.51 1.30 11.97 -4,285.71 100.00 129,925 
Chargeoff_Loanlease % 1.20 0.36 3.34 -27.44 470.44 129,956 
Loanlease_Dep % 75.24 73.71 327.58 0.00 107,033.34 130,468 
Riskcapt1_RWA % 20.75 15.22 109.48 -19.77 18,544.72 130,517 
  Earnings 
       Incext_Asset % 1.02 0.94 23.90 -3,471.04 3,254.80 130,517 
Netopinc_Asset % 0.84 0.98 2.58 -138.19 272.36 130,517 
Netint_Asset % 4.13 4.08 1.39 -166.67 72.64 130,514 
Wage_Asset % 3.48 1.55 148.21 -0.30 17,489.59 130,517 
ROA % 0.87 1.00 2.57 -138.19 272.36 130,517 
ROE % 7.53 9.32 78.18 -11,095.83 14,089.74 130,517 
Macroeconomic 
       Ted_Spread % 0.51 0.41 0.32 0.15 1.55 130,517 
Note. Descriptive statistics are aggregated for both failed and non-failed community banks and reported over the sample period 
1992-2013. 
The maximum number of bank-year observations for any given variable is 130,517. The variable 
Loanag has the lowest recorded number of observations at 118,945, which in many cases forces 
us to remove it from our analysis due to the substantial loss of observations, particularly for the 
failed banks group. Overall, the full sample of community banks has an average size of $144.93 
million; however, the standard deviation is quite large at $162.72 million indicating substantial 
variation among community banks even at an asset threshold of $1 billion. Given the type of 
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loan information available for study—Loanci, Loancon, Loanre, and Loanag—Loanre makes up 
the largest average dollar amount of loans for community banks at $69.57 million. Provided the 
critical role that community banks play in consumer lending, and particularly in local real estate, 
this observation is not too surprising. Income statement information shows average income 
measures (as measured by Incext, Netinc, and Netopinc) of the order of approximately $1.10 
million, but again considerable disparity exists with large standard deviation measures of 
approximately $4.30 million. The abundance of financial ratios tells a similar story of 
considerable variation amongst the sample of community banks. The bottom of Table 2 shows 
the average annual statistics of the macroeconomic liquidity measure TED_Spread. Over the 
entire sample period the average of the spread is 0.51% with a median value of 0.41%. It attains 
a minimum average spread value of 0.15% and a maximum of 1.55%, with the maximum values 
occurring over the 2007-2009 period. 
 The full sample summary statistics provide a useful overall picture of the community 
banking industry, but it is intuitively more useful to evaluate the summary information by group. 
Thus, we separate the sample statistics into failed and non-failed community bank categories. 
Table 3 reports the decomposition of the full sample summary statistics into the two groupings. 
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the conditioning variables for the failed community 
banks, while panel B provides the summary information for the non-failed community banks. 
Comparing the two panels we see that the average size of a failed community bank is roughly 
$178.13 million while that of a non-failed community bank is smaller at $143.24 million. We 
similarly see that the variables Liab, Loanre, and Loanlease are considerably larger for failed 
community banks ($163.75, $106.66, and $130.88 million, respectively) than non-failed 
community banks ($128.82, $67.68, and $91.50 million, respectively). Analyzing the income 
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statement variables we find the largest discrepancies between failed and non-failed community 
banks for the income-based variables Incext, Netinc, and Netopinc as well as the loss 
provisioning variable LLLP. Respectively, for the failed banks, we observe values of -$901.32, -
$895.95, and -$897.15 thousand, as well as $2.25 million; for the non-failed banks we observe 
values of $1.24, $1.24, and $1.21 million, as well as $510.99 thousand. The drastic difference in 
average income measures between groups is rather intuitive as failed community banks are 
expected to be noticeably less profitable than non-failed community banks. 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Conditioning Variables by Group 
Variables Units Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Panel A: Failed Banks 
       Balance Sheet 
       Asset $M 178,025.18 106,741.00 204,705.12 1,755.00 1,957,120.00 6,350 
Liab $M 163,746.30 98,424.00 190,032.35 96.00 1,822,604.00 6,350 
Eqtot $M 14,278.88 8,452.00 18,382.19 -47,041.00 209,684.00 6,350 
Riskcapt1 $M 13,707.81 8,214.00 17,486.31 -45,673.00 209,518.00 6,350 
Loanci $M 16,230.30 8,093.50 27,579.79 0.00 637,180.00 6,350 
Loancon $M 5,354.14 2,442.50 22,511.16 0.00 856,815.00 6,350 
Loanre $M 106,675.27 55,852.00 141,868.31 0.00 1,491,289.00 6,350 
Loanag $M 1,554.36 0.00 5,686.34 0.00 86,218.00 5,606 
Loanlease $M 130,879.60 73,545.50 162,044.60 0.00 1,639,110.00 6,350 
Income Statement 
       Intinc $M 10,654.46 6,155.00 14,198.21 2.00 278,482.00 6,350 
Incext $M -901.32 377.50 8,469.10 -165,024.00 49,809.00 6,350 
Intexp $M 4,621.63 2,576.00 5,925.42 0.00 63,034.00 6,350 
Nonintinc $M 1,308.45 474.50 4,274.97 -16,357.00 104,142.00 6,350 
Netinc $M -895.95 384.00 8,489.81 -165,024.00 51,478.00 6,350 
Netopinc $M -897.15 355.25 8,329.74 -154,895.27 49,709.00 6,350 
LLLP $M 2,246.03 295.00 7,994.67 -5,955.00 206,150.00 6,350 
Financial Ratio 
         Capital Adequacy 
       Eq_Asset % 9.85 8.60 8.20 -13.51 94.69 6,350 
Eq_Loanlease % 29.10 12.25 592.76 -6,763.20 44,854.54 6,341 
Eq_RWA % 16.45 11.74 52.16 -18.95 3,424.91 6,350 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Conditioning Variables by Group 
  Asset Quality and Liquidity 
      Loanci_Asset % 9.79 7.79 8.53 0.00 73.91 6,350 
Loancon_Asset % 4.28 2.38 5.85 0.00 96.75 6,350 
Loanre_Asset % 52.33 54.98 19.82 0.00 105.44 6,350 
Loanag_Asset % 1.91 0.00 5.52 0.00 65.55 5,606 
Loanlease_Asset % 68.72 71.49 15.58 0.00 97.88 6,350 
Lossallow_Asset % 1.28 0.94 1.19 0.00 20.06 6,350 
Chargeoff_Asset % 0.62 0.10 1.52 -2.01 37.84 6,350 
LLLP_Asset % 0.87 0.29 1.72 -2.09 23.95 6,350 
LLLP_Loanlease % 1.90 1.34 2.12 0.00 100.00 6,341 
Chargeoff_Loanlease % 1.72 0.50 3.61 -9.89 78.63 6,342 
Loanlease_Dep % 82.99 83.51 31.58 0.00 1,705.65 6,345 
Riskcapt1_RWA % 16.02 11.32 52.11 -19.77 3,424.91 6,350 
  Earnings 
       Incext_Asset % -0.34 0.62 2.74 -27.48 7.94 6,350 
Netopinc_Asset % -0.45 0.69 3.44 -79.48 9.94 6,350 
Netint_Asset % 4.16 4.16 1.84 -9.44 71.25 6,350 
Wage_Asset % 1.74 1.61 0.87 -0.30 14.83 6,350 
ROA % -0.44 0.72 3.47 -79.48 9.76 6,350 
ROE % -19.28 7.19 301.29 -11,095.83 6,375.35 6,350 
Macroeconomic 
       TED_Spread % 0.56 0.47 0.34 0.15 1.55 6,350 
Panel B: Non-Failed Banks 
       Balance Sheet 
       Asset $M 143,238.01 87,636.00 160,095.73 19.00 1,703,388.00 124,167 
Liab $M 128,821.67 77,985.00 167,193.46 0.00 14,264,000.00 124,167 
Eqtot $M 15,168.27 9,179.00 18,514.80 -2,984.00 825,213.00 124,167 
Riskcapt1 $M 14,611.79 8,945.00 21,641.03 -5,468.00 2,325,000.00 124,167 
Loanci $M 12,072.33 5,168.00 24,017.34 0.00 1,874,000.00 124,167 
Loancon $M 6,845.09 3,364.00 15,757.46 0.00 1,479,739.00 124,157 
Loanre $M 67,675.97 33,606.00 108,975.01 0.00 9,783,000.00 124,167 
Loanag $M 4,601.09 1,203.00 10,067.12 0.00 383,488.00 113,339 
Loanlease $M 91,499.52 52,059.00 111,338.70 0.00 1,515,332.00 124,167 
Income Statement 
       Intinc $M 7,948.79 5,106.00 8,729.40 0.00 305,089.00 124,145 
Incext $M 1,241.14 735.00 3,965.55 -351,282.00 439,941.00 124,167 
Intexp $M 2,875.00 1,730.00 3,434.55 -2.00 61,622.00 124,145 
Nonintinc $M 1,407.00 445.00 8,913.32 -120,461.00 909,750.00 124,167 
Netinc $M 1,240.86 737.00 3,964.31 -351,282.00 439,941.00 124,167 
Netopinc $M 1,205.23 716.12 3,944.46 -351,375.72 439,941.00 124,167 
LLLP $M 510.99 106.00 2,974.48 -12,198.00 370,000.00 124,167 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Conditioning Variables by Group 
Financial Ratio 
         Capital Adequacy 
       Eq_Asset % 12.64 10.02 101.59 -3.60 15,242.01 124,167 
Eq_Loanlease % 80.48 16.69 4,097.26 -4,399.33 758,448.29 123,563 
Eq_RWA % 21.64 15.91 114.09 -5.92 19,094.34 124,167 
  Asset Quality and Liquidity 
      Loanci_Asset % 20.12 6.60 983.39 0.00 111,481.26 124,167 
Loancon_Asset % 5.94 4.39 6.55 0.00 282.93 124,157 
Loanre_Asset % 97.44 39.74 4,681.42 0.00 581,975.00 124,167 
Loanag_Asset % 5.78 1.55 8.73 0.00 73.61 113,339 
Loanlease_Asset % 61.24 62.28 67.53 0.00 8,347.96 124,167 
Lossallow_Asset % 56.93 0.79 4,613.32 0.00 574,360.50 124,167 
Chargeoff_Asset % 0.24 0.07 5.55 -6.86 1,742.11 124,167 
LLLP_Asset % 2.68 0.13 194.91 -25.42 22,010.71 124,167 
LLLP_Loanlease % 1.49 1.30 12.26 -4,285.71 96.82 123,584 
Chargeoff_Loanlease % 1.17 0.35 3.32 -27.44 470.44 123,614 
Loanlease_Dep % 74.84 73.20 335.77 0.00 107,033.34 124,123 
Riskcapt1_RWA % 20.99 15.40 111.62 -13.52 18,544.72 124,167 
  Earnings 
       Incext_Asset % 1.09 0.95 24.49 -3,471.04 3,254.80 124,167 
Netopinc_Asset % 0.91 0.99 2.51 -138.19 272.36 124,167 
Netint_Asset % 4.12 4.08 1.36 -166.67 72.64 124,164 
Wage_Asset % 3.57 1.54 151.95 0.00 17,489.59 124,167 
ROA % 0.94 1.01 2.50 -138.19 272.36 124,167 
ROE % 8.90 9.38 41.76 -1,132.20 14,089.74 124,167 
Macroeconomic 
       Ted_Spread % 0.51 0.41 0.32 0.19 1.55 124,167 
Note. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for failed community banks over the period 1992-2013. Panel B reports the 
descriptive statistics for non-failed community banks over the period 1992-2013. 
Differences in financial ratios between the groups also exist. For instance, all average capital 
adequacy ratios tend to be larger for non-failed community banks than failed community banks. 
However, this type of pattern is not so evident with the asset quality and liquidity ratios; the most 
notable difference between the failed and non-failed banks’ asset quality and liquidity ratio 
sample statistics is the standard deviations which are substantially larger for the non-failed 
sample—however, this can likely be explained by the differences in group sample size. An 
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overview of the earnings ratios shows much poorer performance by the failed banks group. This 
finding is not too surprising given the subpar income statement figures we observed for the failed 
banks in Panel A. In fact, all earnings ratios, with the exception of Netint_asset and Wage_Asset, 
produce a negative mean value. We find the largest discrepancy between the groups’ earning 
ratios is for ROE, the failed community banks produce an average return of -19.28%, while that 
of the non-failed banks is approximately 8.90%. 
 The “eye-test” for analyzing the differences between the two sample groups can only 
provide so much insight as to why certain community banks fail and other survive. As such, 
Table 4 provides the statistical difference-in-means tests for the two groups of conditioning 
variables observed in Table 3. Tests of the balance sheet variables show that the difference-in-
means for failed and non-failed community banks are significant at better than the 1% level in all 
cases. Similar results are obtained for the difference-in-means tests of the income statement 
variables—the lone exception is the Nonintinc variable which is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels with a P-value of 0.38. Under the financial ratio section, specifically the 
capital adequacy ratios, only two of the four means tests (Eq_Asset and Eq_RWA) are 
statistically significant at better than the 5% level. This result comes as a bit of a surprise for the 
variable Eq_Loanlease since the difference between the failed mean (29.10%) and non-failed 
mean (80.48%) is seemingly so large; however, the extremely large standard deviation associated 
with the non-failed banks provides some context to the result. Regarding the asset quality and 
liquidity ratios we find significant difference-in-means results, at the 5% level or better, for eight 
(Loancon_Asset, Loanag_Asset, Loanlease_Asset, Chargeoff_Asset, LLLP_Loanlease, 
Chargeoff_Loanlease, Loanlease_Dep, and Riskcapt1_RWA) of the 12 variables considered. As 
described earlier, the insignificant results are largely attributable due to the relatively enormous  
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Table 4 
Univariate Difference-in-Means Tests of Conditioning Variables between Failed and Non-Failed Community Banks 
  
Failed Banks                        
(452 Banks) 
 
Non-Failed Banks                 
(6,217 Banks) 
 
      
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Diff. t-statistic P-value 
Balance Sheet 
         Asset 178,025.18 204,705.12 
 
143,238.01 160,095.73 
 
34,787.17 16.63 0.00 
Liab 163,746.30 190,032.35 
 
128,821.67 167,193.46 
 
34,924.63 16.12 0.00 
Eqtot 14,278.88 18,382.19 
 
15,168.27 18,514.80 
 
-889.39 -3.73 0.00 
Riskcapt1 13,707.81 17,486.31 
 
14,611.79 21,641.03 
 
-903.98 -3.27 0.00 
Loanci 16,230.30 27,579.79 
 
12,072.33 24,017.34 
 
4,157.97 13.35 0.00 
Loancon 5,354.14 22,511.16 
 
6,845.09 15,757.46 
 
-1,490.95 -7.17 0.00 
Loanre 106,675.27 141,868.31 
 
67,675.97 108,975.01 
 
38,999.29 27.357 0.00 
Loanag 1,554.36 5,686.34 
 
4,601.09 10,067.12 
 
-3,046.74 -22.48 0.00 
Loanlease 130,879.60 162,044.60 
 
91,499.52 111,338.70 
 
39,380.12 26.77 0.00 
Income Statement 
         Intinc 10,654.46 14,198.21 
 
7,948.79 8,729.40 
 
2,705.67 23.18 0.00 
Incext -901.32 8,469.10 
 
1,241.14 3,965.55 
 
-2,142.47 -38.79 0.00 
Intexp 4,621.63 5,925.42 
 
2,875.00 3,434.55 
 
1,746.63 37.75 0.00 
Nonintinc 1,308.45 4,274.97 
 
1,407.00 8,913.32 
 
-98.54 -0.88 0.38 
Netinc -895.95 8,489.81 
 
1,240.86 3,964.31 
 
-2,136.81 -38.66 0.00 
Netopinc -897.15 8,329.74 
 
1,205.23 3,944.46 
 
-2,102.37 -38.33 0.00 
LLLP 2,246.03 7,994.67 
 
510.99 2,974.48 
 
1,735.04 39.72 0.00 
Financial Ratio 
           Capital Adequacy 
         Eq_Asset 9.85 8.20 
 
12.64 101.59 
 
-2.79 -2.19 0.03 
Eq_Loanlease 29.10 592.76 
 
80.48 4,097.26 
 
-51.38 -1.00 0.32 
Eq_RWA 16.45 52.16 
 
21.64 114.09 
 
-5.19 -3.61 0.00 
  Asset Quality and Liquidity 
         Loanci_Asset 9.79 8.53 
 
20.12 983.39 
 
-10.33 -0.84 0.40 
Loancon_Asset 4.28 5.85 
 
5.94 6.55 
 
-1.66 -19.76 0.00 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Univariate Difference-in-Means Tests of Conditioning Variables between Failed and Non-Failed Community Banks 
Loanre_Asset 52.33 19.82 
 
97.44 4,681.42 
 
-45.11 -0.70 0.44 
Loanag_Asset 1.91 5.52 
 
5.78 8.73 
 
-3.87 -32.85 0.00 
Loanlease_Asset 68.72 15.58 
 
61.24 67.53 
 
7.48 8.82 0.00 
Lossallow_Asset 1.28 1.19 
 
56.93 4,613.32 
 
-55.66 -0.96 0.34 
Chargeoff_Asset 0.62 1.52 
 
0.24 5.55 
 
0.38 5.45 0.00 
LLLP_Asset 0.87 1.72 
 
2.68 194.91 
 
-1.81 -0.74 0.46 
LLLP_Loanlease 1.90 2.12 
 
1.49 12.26 
 
0.41 2.65 0.01 
Chargeoff_Loanlease 1.72 3.61 
 
1.17 3.32 
 
0.55 12.76 0.00 
Loanlease_Dep 82.99 31.58 
 
74.84 335.77 
 
8.15 1.93 0.05 
Riskcapt1_RWA 16.02 52.11 
 
20.99 111.62 
 
-4.97 -3.53 0.00 
  Earnings 
         Incext_Asset -0.34 2.74 
 
1.09 24.49 
 
-1.44 -4.68 0.00 
Netopinc_Asset -0.45 3.44 
 
0.91 2.51 
 
-1.36 -41.08 0.00 
Netint_Asset 4.16 1.84 
 
4.12 1.36 
 
0.04 1.97 0.05 
Wage_Asset 1.74 0.87 
 
3.57 151.95 
 
-1.83 -0.96 0.34 
ROA -0.44 3.47 
 
0.94 2.50 
 
-1.38 -41.88 0.00 
ROE -19.28 301.29 
 
8.90 41.76 
 
-28.19 -28.11 0.00 
Macroeconomic 
         Ted_Spread 0.56 0.34   0.51 0.32   0.05 11.54 0.00 
Note. The difference-in-means statistics are reported for all financial and macroeconomic variables; both t-statistics and P-values are reported in 
the far right column, respectively. 
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standard deviations of the non-failed banks. Lastly, we note that five (Incext_Asset, 
Netopin_Asset, Netintm, ROA, and ROE) of the six earnings ratios have significantly different 
means for the two groupings. 
 Overall, the sample statistics provide some general insights into the community bank 
failure investigation, but more so they validate the need for a more technical treatment into the 
reasons as to why certain community banks fail. In the following section we delve deeper into 
this issue by utilizing the Cox Proportional Hazards model to analyze and highlight the 
importance of certain covariates in predicting community bank failure. 
4.2 Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Analysis 
We utilize survival analysis techniques to gain a better understanding of which variables can help 
predict community bank failure. Given the exploratory nature of our study we estimate separate 
Cox Proportional Hazards models for balance sheet variables, income statement variables, 
capital adequacy ratios, asset quality and liquidity ratios, earnings ratios, and finally a 
comprehensive model which aggregates all financial ratio information. We apply the forward-
and-backward variable procedure, discussed earlier, to identify the various model specifications 
which yield the best overall fit of the data.43 For each regression model we report three different 
specifications: model I which includes only bank-specific covariates, model II which includes 
the same bank-specific covariates as model I but also incorporates the macroeconomic covariate, 
and model III which provides an alternative specification to that of model II. The results of the 
estimated models are provided in Tables 5 through 10. 
 An overall picture of the US community banking industry is given in Figure 1. It shows 
the Nelson-Aalen cumulative (community bank) hazard estimates as a plot of the percentage of 
43 Correlation matrices are also utilized to help identify the appropriate selection of variables in the various 
regression models; the correlation matrices are reported in Appendix A. 
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failed community banks relative to total community banks over the entire sample period. 
Overall, approximately 0.07% of the community banks in the entire sample have failed by the 
end of 2013. Below the x-axis of Figure 1 the number of community banks at risk and the 
number of failed community banks (listed in parenthesis) for a given time interval are displayed. 
For instance, between the years 1998 and 2003 approximately 118 community banks failed while 
6,613 were at risk at the beginning of the period. The largest failure rate occurs between 2008 
and 2013 with a total of 212 banks succumbing to failure. This observation coincides with the far 
reaching consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis on the US financial and banking 
sectors. 
 Table 5 reports the regression results of conditioning community bank failure on balance 
sheet information. Model I shows that the balance sheet variables Asset, Riskcapt1, Loanci, and 
Loancon are all significant at better than the 1% level, while Loanre is only significant at the 
10% level. The negative coefficients on Riskcapt1, Loanci, and Loancon suggest that the risk of 
community bank failure (i.e. the hazard rate) increases (or alternatively the survival likelihood 
decreases) as these covariates decrease. Thus, as the level of Tier-one core capital (a measure of 
a bank’s financial strength) decreases we see an increase in the rate of community bank failure; 
similarly, as the level of both commercial and industrial loans and loans to consumers decreases 
a corresponding increase in the community bank failure rate occurs. The positive coefficients on 
Asset and Loanre indicate that the risk of bank failure increases (or alternatively the survival 
likelihood decreases) as these covariates increase. This indicates that larger community banks 
(per the covariate Asset) are relatively more likely to fail than smaller ones. Taken together with 
the results of Tables 3 and 4 which show that the average size of failed community banks is 
larger than non-failed banks and that this difference is statistically significant, we infer that the 
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smallest community banks are not necessarily the most susceptible to failure. Prior work, such as 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Cole and Wu (2009), generally document that smaller banks 
are more likely to fail in the universe of US commercial banks. Our finding complements this 
line of literature in that the size effect is not fully linear—thus, while community banks may be 
more susceptible to failure relative to non-community banks, the smallest community banks are 
not the most at risk. We postulate that these smaller institutions likely maintain more risk-averse 
profiles relative to their larger counterparts, hence insulating them more from outside financial 
shocks. Likewise, the positive coefficient of Loanre indicates that an increase in real estate loans 
for an institution means an increased likelihood of failure. The strong link between the 2008 
global financial crisis and the high default rates in the real estate lending market provide a 
reasonable explanation for this finding. 
 The corresponding hazard ratios (i.e. exponentiated coefficients) in the table provide an 
estimate of the rate of failure for a one-unit increase in the respective covariate. Hazard ratios 
larger than 1.0 indicate the increase in the rate of failure occurring for a one-unit increase in the 
associated covariate, after controlling for other factors in the model. Conversely, hazard ratios 
smaller than 1.0 indicate the increase in the rate of failure occurring for a one-unit decrease in the 
associated covariate, after controlling for other factors in the model. Due to the small magnitude 
of the covariate coefficients all of the hazard ratios in Model I are very close to one. The 
likelihood ratio reports the test of whether the covariates are jointly equal to zero. In the case of 
Model I, and all subsequent models for that matter, we soundly reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are jointly zero. The overall model fit is reported below via the AIC, BIC, and log 
likelihood statistics. Finally, the total number of banks, the total number of bank failures, and 
total number of bank-year observations are reported in the latter third of the table. For Model I 
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we utilize all 6,669 banks, including all of the 452 failed banks, for analysis—yielding a total of 
130,507 bank-year observations. 
 Model II of Table 5 reports the regression results of conditioning community bank failure 
on both balance sheet information and the macroeconomic liquidity measure. The inclusion of 
the covariate Ted_Spread yields similar results for the bank-specific variables as in Model I, 
except that Lonre is now statistically insignificant. Interestingly, however, the Ted_Spread is 
highly significant and has a coefficient (102.0856) of high economic significance relative to the 
much smaller coefficients of the bank-specific covariates. The positive coefficient and 
correspondingly large hazard ratio associated with Ted_Spread indicates that a one-unit increase 
in the macroeconomic covariate is associated with a relatively strong increase in the rate of 
failure for community banks; that is, as market liquidity decreases the hazard rate for community 
banks markedly increases (or alternatively the survival likelihood decreases). Moreover, the AIC, 
BIC, and log likelihood statistics validate the use of the macroeconomic covariate in the model 
as all measures improve relative to Model I. Lastly, Model III provides an alternative 
specification to that of Model II as we substitute the covariate Loanlease in and remove the 
covariate Asset due to the high correlation between the two.44 The inclusion of the variable 
Loanlease yields a highly significant, economically small negative coefficient (-0.000010) 
similar to the other bank-specific variables. In general, the covariates Riskcapt1, Loancon, and 
Ted_Spread retain their coefficient sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. However, in the 
alternative model the covariate Loanci switches sign and Loanre now becomes significant at 
better than the 1% level. While this alternative specification shows some importance for the 
covariate Loanlease and Loanre, it provides an overall worse fit of the data relative to Model II. 
44 Wheelock and Wilson (2000) note that loans and leases are typically the least liquid and most risky portion of a 
bank’s assets; in some cases loans and leases can represent the largest portion of a bank’s assets. 
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Table 5 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Balance Sheet and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                      
Balance Sheet 
 
Model II                                                                   
Balance Sheet & Macro 
 
Model III                                                                   
Balance Sheet & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Asset 0.000006 0.00 1.000006 
 
0.000006 0.00 1.000006 
    Riskcapt1 -0.000101 0.00 0.999899 
 
-0.000104 0.00 0.999896 
 
-0.000101 0.00 0.999899 
Loanci -0.000008 0.00 0.999992 
 
-0.000009 0.00 0.999991 
 
0.000011 0.00 1.000011 
Loancon -0.000070 0.00 0.999930 
 
-0.000070 0.00 0.999930 
 
-0.000040 0.00 0.999960 
Loanre 0.000002 0.10 1.000002 
 
0.000002 0.12 1.000002 
 
0.000020 0.00 1.000020 
Loanlease 
        
-0.000010 0.00 0.9999899 
Ted_Spread 
    
102.0856 0.00 2.16E+44 
 
97.5489 0.00 2.32E+42 
            Likelihood Ratio 1,334.03 0.00 
  
1,347.72 0.00 
  
1,316.44 0.00 
             AIC 6,296.17 
 
6,284.47 
 
6,315.76 
BIC 6,330.20 
 
6,325.31 
 
6,356.59 
Log Likelihood -3,143.09 
 
-3,136.24 
 
-3,151.88 
            Banks 6,669 
 
6,669 
 
6,669 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 130,507   130,507   130,517 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on balance sheet and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the significance of the 
covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the degrees-of-freedom-
adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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 Table 5 provides important information about community bank failure conditional on 
asset size and loan specifics. Moreover, it shows that macroeconomic liquidity conditions play a 
significant role in the conditional failure risk of the institutions. Yet, conditioning on only 
balance sheet information is not without its shortfalls; the small economic significance of the 
associated coefficients implies that the sole use of balance sheet information to predict 
community bank failure, or hazard rates, is a relatively inefficient approach. 
 Table 6 reports the results of conditioning community bank failure on income statement 
information. Model I shows the income statement variables Intinc, Intexp, Nonintinc, Netinc, 
and LLLP are all highly significant. The coefficients on Intinc, Nonintinc, and Netinc are 
negative indicating that a decrease in any source of income increases the risk of community bank 
failure. The covariates Intexp and LLP are both positive which means that an increase in interest 
expenses and expenses set aside for bad loans subsequently increases the rate of bank failure. 
Similar to conditioning on balance sheet information in Table 5, we find that the covariates, 
while statistically significant, tend to be economically small suggesting that conditioning 
community bank failure on income statement covariates is not the most informative approach. 
 In Model II we again augment the bank-specific variables with the macroeconomic 
covariate Ted_Spread. However, in this instance we find the addition of the covariate to be 
statistically insignificant; this result comes in stark contrast to that of Table 5.45 The other 
covariates in the model remain unchanged from the specification in Model I. Lastly, in Model 
III, we remove the covariate Netinc and insert the covariate Incext, as the two variables are very 
similar income measures, to see which specification performs better overall. The results strongly 
  
45 Though the sign of Ted_Spread is the opposite of what theory would dictate a 95% confidence interval of the 
insignificant coefficient broadly ranges from -84.46 to 64.46. 
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Table 6 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Income Statement and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                      
Income Statement 
 
Model II                                                                   
Income Statement & Macro   
Model III                                                                   
Income Statement & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Intinc -0.000145 0.00 0.999855 
 
-0.000145 0.00 0.999855 
 
-0.000145 0.00 0.999855 
Incext 
        
-0.000044 0.00 0.999956 
Intexp 0.000162 0.00 1.000162 
 
0.000162 0.00 1.000162 
 
0.000162 0.00 1.000162 
Nonintinc -0.000046 0.00 0.999954 
 
-0.000046 0.00 0.999954 
 
-0.000046 0.00 0.999954 
Netinc -0.000044 0.00 0.999956 
 
-0.000044 0.00 0.999956 
    LLLP 0.000022 0.00 1.000022 
 
0.000022 0.00 1.000022 
 
0.000022 0.00 1.000022 
Ted_Spread 
    
-1.6341 0.97 0.195136 
 
-1.6537 0.97 0.191342 
            Likelihood Ratio 603.98 0.00 
  
603.99 0.00 
  
603.96 0.00 
             AIC 7,026.10 
 
7,028.09 
 
7,028.12 
BIC 7,060.12 
 
7,068.93 
 
7,068.95 
Log Likelihood -3,508.04 
 
-3,508.05 
 
-3,508.06 
            Banks 6,669 
 
6,669 
 
6,669 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 130,495   130,495   130,495 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on income statement and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the significance of the 
covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the degrees-of-freedom-
adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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mirror those from Model II, in fact the coefficient on Incext (-0.000044) is the same as Netinc in 
Model II; moreover, both Model II and III provide very similar best-fit measures. 
 Overall, Table 6 provides useful information about community bank failure conditional 
on income sources and uses. We find a dichotomous result, relative to Table 5, pertaining to the 
usefulness of macroeconomic liquidity information. Yet, similar to Table 5, we find 
economically small covariate coefficients from conditioning community bank failure solely on 
income statement information suggesting that such an approach is likely not the optimal 
methodology to determining why community banks fail. 
 Given the low economic significance of using balance sheet and income statement 
information as conditioning variables of community bank failure, we appeal to prior literature 
and examine ratios based on the CAMELS ratings. Tables 7 through 10 utilize the CAMELS 
financial ratios which prior work has found to be quite relevant for predicting aggregate US 
commercial bank failure. Table 7 reports the results of conditioning community bank failure on 
capital adequacy financial ratios. Model I shows that Eq_Asset and Eq_RWA are both negative 
and highly statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests a more 
meaningful economic impact from the covariates than those in Tables 5 and 6. The negative 
coefficients on Eq_Asset and Eq_RWA align with our expectations and prior findings regarding 
US commercial banks (see Kolari et al., 2002; Cole and Wu., 2009; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; 
Alali and Romero, 2013). Clearly, a bank which has less equity has less protection against 
unforeseen loan losses and declines in asset values. Accordingly, results show that community 
banks with higher equity as a percentage of total assets (or risk-weighted adjusted assets) are less 
likely to fail. Contrasting with prior literature on US commercial banks we find that the 
Eq_Loanlease ratio is highly insignificant in predicting community bank failure. 
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Table 7 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Capital Adequacy Financial Ratios and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                      
Capital Adequacy 
 
Model II                                                                   
Capital Adequacy & Macro   
Model III                                                                   
Capital Adequacy & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Eq_Asset -23.1528 0.00 8.81E-11 
 
-26.5347 0.00 2.99E-12 
 
-50.5253 0.00 1.14E-22 
Eq_Loanlease 0.000343 0.99 1.000343 
 
0.000394 0.99 1.000394 
    Eq_RWA -17.6261 0.00 2.21E-08 
 
-15.7521 0.00 1.44E-07 
    Ted_Spread 
    
88.2394 0.00 2.10E+38 
 
114.1555 0.00 3.78E+49 
            Likelihood Ratio 2,704.43 0.00 
  
2,719.88 0.00 
  
2,677.95 0.00 
             AIC 4,918.66 
 
4,905.22 
 
4,946.29 
BIC 4,939.06 
 
4,932.42 
 
4,959.90 
Log Likelihood -2,456.33 
 
-2,448.61 
 
-2,471.14 
            Banks 6,640 
 
6,640 
 
6,669 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 129,904   129,904   130,517 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on capital adequacy financial ratio and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the 
significance of the covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the 
degrees-of-freedom-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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 In Model II, as before, we incorporate the macroeconomic covariate into the 
specification. Results show a substantial impact from its integration; the (positive) coefficient on 
Ted_Spread is 88.2394 and it has a P-value better than the 1% significance level. Additionally, 
all of the best-fit criteria show an improvement by including the macroeconomic factor into the 
model. This outcome provides solid evidence in favor of macroeconomic liquidity conditions 
strongly impacting the hazard rate of community bank failure. Lastly, Model III employs only 
the Eq_Asset covariate and the macroeconomic measure. The majority of prior work generally 
just incorporates this single bank-specific measure into their multivariate analysis. Our findings 
in Model III strongly mirror those of prior studies in terms of sign, significance, and magnitude 
for Eq_Asset. The overall results of Table 7 underlie the importance of capital adequacy (as 
measured by Eq_Asset and Eq_RWA) in predicting community bank failure. Additionally, the 
findings support the importance of macroeconomic conditions in the plight of predicting 
community bank failure. 
 Table 8 reports the results of conditioning community bank failure on asset quality and 
liquidity financial ratios. The most interesting part of Model I pertains to the loan-to-asset 
covariates we analyze. In Model I we include four loan-to-asset ratios: Loanci_Asset, 
Loancon_Asset, Loanre_Asset, and Loanlease_Asset.46 We find the coefficients on 
Loanci_Asset, Loanre_Asset, and Loanlease_Asset are positive, which is consistent with the 
findings of Wheelock and Wilson (2000). However, we find only the covariate Loanre_Asset is 
statistically significant, while Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that the other two covariates, 
Loanci_Asset and Loanlease_Asset, are significant. Alali and Romero (2013) similarly report the 
covariate Loanre_Asset to be positive but insignificant. However, they also find that the 
46 We also analyze the agricultural-based ratio Loanag_Asset. In general, we find the covariate to be negative and 
highly significant. However, because this data is unavailable for many banks we are restricted in its use for reporting 
results. 
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covariate Loanlease_Asset is negative and significant which is an interesting contrast to both our 
results and Wheelock and Wilson (2000). Nonetheless, we interpret the positive significance of 
the real estate loans to total assets ratio as a reflection of the niche lending market which 
community banks often fill. Moreover, the fact that an increase in the Loanre_Asset covariate 
increases failure risk comes in sharp contrast to reports that the percentage of default rates are 
generally lower for community banks than non-community banks. Yet, the strong ties of the real 
estate market to the most recent financial crisis combined with the extensive real estate loans 
smaller institutions held on their balance sheets caused deep financial losses and suffering from 
this lending segment. Thus, we observe that community banks with higher real estate loans as a 
percentage of total assets have increased failure risk. Additionally, in line with Ali and Romero 
(2013) we find Loancon_Asset to be negative and significant, though the coefficient we find      
(-12.3806) is much larger than what they document (-0.52). This large coefficient magnitude and 
subsequent hazard rate are a reflection of community banks’ strong position in the consumer 
lending market; hence, we observe that as consumer loans decrease as a percentage of total assets 
there is an increase in community bank failure risk. 
 In moving from Model I to Model II we again see, as in Table 7, that the Ted_Spread 
variable is both positive and highly significant. Moreover, its addition to the model improves the 
overall fit. This finding, taken together with the prior tables, shows that while bank-specific 
variables (specifically financial ratios) play a crucial role in determining community bank 
failure, the contribution of market liquidity as proxied by the TED spread is ultimately very 
important to whether community banks fail or survive. Model III merely removes the 
insignificant covariate Loanlease_Asset from the analysis. The new specification improves the fit 
to the data and renders the covariate Loanci_Asset statistically significant at better than the 5%  
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Table 8 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Asset Quality and Liquidity Financial Ratio and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                       
Asset Quality and Liquidity 
 
Model II                                                                   
Asset Quality and Liquidity & Macro   
Model III                                                                   
Capital Adequacy & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Loanci_Asset 2.2632 0.13 9.6137 
 
2.0856 0.17 8.0491 
 
2.4808 0.04 11.9513 
Loancon_Asset -12.3806 0.00 4.20E-06 
 
-12.0713 0.00 5.72E-06 
 
-11.5350 0.00 9.78E-06 
Loanre_Asset 5.3348 0.00 207.4388 
 
5.2723 0.00 194.8677 
 
5.628771 0.00 278.3199 
Loanlease_Asset 0.417512 0.81 1.518179 
 
0.725293 0.67 2.0653 
    Chargeoff_Asset 4.7343 0.29 113.7821 
 
6.4821 0.15 653.3248 
 
6.2314 0.17 508.4688 
LLLP_Asset -25.3005 0.00 1.03E-11 
 
-25.7622 0.00 6.48E-12 
 
-25.5917 0.00 7.69E-12 
LLLP_Loanlease 19.9335 0.00 4.54E+08 
 
20.8230 0.00 1.10E+09 
 
20.8859 0.00 1.18E+09 
Chargeoff_Loanlease 9.4587 0.00 12,818.89 
 
9.0360 0.00 8,399.87 
 
9.1278 0.00 9,208.03 
Loanlease_Dep -3.5544 0.00 0.028599 
 
-3.8106 0.00 0.022135 
 
-3.5568 0.00 0.028531 
Riskcapt1_RWA -26.9329 0.00 2.01E-12 
 
-26.7728 0.00 2.36E-12 
 
-26.8533 0.00 2.18E-12 
Ted_Spread 
    
65.4359 0.00 2.62E+28 
 
64.9422 0.00 1.60E+28 
            Likelihood Ratio 3,012.33 0.00 
  
3,022.57 0.00 
  
3,022.39 0.00 
             AIC 4,624.77 
 
4,616.53 
 
4,614.70 
BIC 4,692.78 
 
4,691.34 
 
4,682.71 
Log Likelihood -2,302.38 
 
-2,297.26 
 
-2,297.35 
            Banks 6,640 
 
6,640 
 
6,640 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 129,900   129,900   129,900 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on asset quality and liquidity financial ratio and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific 
and macroeconomic variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the 
significance of the covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the 
degrees-of-freedom-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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level. A couple of other interesting points worth mentioning concerning Table 8, recent work by 
Alali and Romero (2013) find that the covariate Chargeoff_Asset is seemingly very useful in 
explaining US commercial bank failure; however, we find the variable to be largely insignificant 
in each model.47 Additionally, they document a positive relationship between Loanlease_Dep, 
whereas we find a consistently negative one for community banks. 
 Table 9 reports the results of conditioning community bank failure on earnings financial 
ratios. Model I shows that Incext_Asset, Netopinc_Asset, Wage_Asset, and ROE are all of the 
expected negative sign, and highly significant. The coefficient on Wage_Asset has the largest 
magnitude of -267.8146 while ROE has the smallest at -0.042289. Though we do not explicitly 
include management ratios in this study we argue that the Wage_Asset variable indirectly 
proxies for management information in the CAMELS ratings system. Accordingly, we reason 
that better more efficient managers require higher compensation for their efforts, thus we should 
see that an increase in the Wage_Asset covariate results in a reduction in bank failure risk. 
Furthermore, the covariate also encompasses the fact that community banks are heavily reliant 
on retaining quality employees with strong ties to the community and superior relationship 
building skills. In order for the small banks to retain such employees they must pay reasonable 
wages and benefits to avoid high employee turnover and consequential detrimental effects to the 
institution. As such, a similar effect in the Wage_Asset covariate should also be observed as 
previously described. The results of Table 9 strongly verify our reasoning—as the wage 
component increases as a proportion of total assets we see a vast decrease in the likelihood of  
 
 
47 They report a coefficient of approximately 647.11 with a hazard ratio of 1.09E+13, and a P-value of 0.01. 
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Table 9 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Earnings Financial Ratio and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                       
Earnings 
 
Model II                                                                   
Earnings & Macro   
Model III                                                                   
Earnings & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Incext_Asset -4.8288 0.00 0.007997 
 
-4.8316 0.00 0.007974 
    Netopinc_Asset -10.5121 0.00 0.000027 
 
-10.4892 0.00 0.000028 
    Wage_Asset -267.8146 0.00 4.90E-117 
 
-267.8107 0.00 4.90E-117 
 
-236.9618 0.00 1.20E-103 
ROA 
        
-15.1905 0.00 2.53E-07 
ROE -0.042289 0.00 0.958592 
 
-0.042451 0.00 0.958437 
 
-0.033989 0.00 0.966582 
Ted_Spread 
    
14.1004 0.61 1,329,615 
 
0.042538 0.88 1.043456 
            Likelihood Ratio 1,332.97 0.00 
  
1,333.22 0.00 
  
1,244.59 0.00 
             AIC 6,295.27 
 
6,297.02 
 
6,383.65 
BIC 6,322.49 
 
6,331.04 
 
6,410.87 
Log Likelihood -3,143.64 
 
-3,143.51 
 
-3,187.83 
            Banks 6,669 
 
6,669 
 
6,669 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 130,517   130,517   130,517 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on earnings financial ratio and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the 
significance of the covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the 
degrees-of-freedom-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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community bank failure. Given this line of thought we underline the importance of quality 
management and employees in the community banking industry.48 
 The addition of the macroeconomic liquidity factor in Model II yields a positive but 
insignificant Ted_Spread. Interestingly, this is the same result we found when evaluating income 
statement information in Table 6 and the earnings ratios at hand are similarly based on income 
statement information. The AIC, BIC, and log likelihood criterion show a dramatic drop off in 
the fit of the model when compared to Tables 7 and 8; this is the same pattern witnessed between 
Tables 5 and 6 when comparing balance sheet and income statement information, respectively, 
as well. Overall, it seems that community bank failure predicated on income statement 
information, even when evaluated as financial ratios, provides less pertinent information to 
predicting bank failure relative to balance sheet data. Lastly, Model III incorporates the ROA 
covariate and removes the covariates Netopinc_Asset and Incext_Asset due to high correlations 
between the covariates. In doing so we find that both Wage_Asset and ROE remain largely 
unchanged and Ted_Spread still remains statistically insignificant. The new variable ROA is 
negative and highly significant, which is not too surprising considering its relation to 
Netopinc_Asset. However, the overall fit of Model III is markedly worse than that of the other 
two specifications. 
 Given the relative importance of the CAMELS financial ratios we utilize the covariates 
analyzed in Tables 7 through 9 to form a single aggregate model. Table 10 reports the regression 
results of conditioning community bank failure on the aggregate financial ratios. In Model I of 
the aggregate analysis we find that the covariate Eq_Asset is still the most valuable capital 
adequacy measure in predicting community bank failure. Moreover, we still see that an increase 
48 Alali and Romero (2013) document a positive but insignificant coefficient for their salary and wages/total assets 
earnings ratio. 
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in the ratios Loanci_Asset and Loanre_Asset result in an increase in community bank failure 
risk. The large negative coefficient on Loancon_Asset once again highlights the important 
unique relationship between consumer lending and community banks. Reviewing the asset 
quality and liquidity ratios we find that the covariate Chargeoff_Asset becomes statistically 
significant in the aggregate regression; however, its importance in the community banking 
industry is still dwarfed by that of US commercial banks. The importance of the covariate 
LLLP_Asset really emerges in Table 10, and at first glance the result seems somewhat 
counterintuitive. Given that loan loss provisions are expenses set aside for bad debt, it seems that 
a decrease in this variable relative to total assets should decrease the risk of bank failure. 
However, loan loss provisions are quite pro-cyclical and subject to considerable managerial 
earnings management. As such, the provisions for loan and lease losses are generally lower 
during good economic times; yet, during subsequent economic downturns, as the value of assets 
decline and more capital is needed to buffer against potential future losses, capital is at its most 
expensive and becomes largely unattainable for smaller banks altogether—forcing a “credit 
crunch” and a risk in bank failure risk. Accordingly, the LLLP_Asset variable is capturing the 
strong cyclicality of loan loss provisioning in the community banking industry. In other words, 
those community banks which don’t build adequate capital buffers prior to an economic 
downturn have a much higher risk of failure. Lastly, the earnings ratios show that income before 
extraordinary items relative to total assets (Incext_Asset) is the best income-based measure to 
capture the predictability of community bank failure. Moreover, the traditional measure of bank 
ROE, while significant, is economically very small after controlling for other available 
covariates. Our indirect proxy of bank management, Wage_Asset, still has the largest coefficient 
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of all ratios, and as such we again stress the importance of community banks in possessing 
effective management teams to remain financially healthy and thriving. 
 Model II again incorporates the Ted_Spread covariate into our analysis and, as in the 
majority of prior cases, shows an important contribution to the community bank failure 
specification. The covariate is again positive and highly significant; moreover, the coefficient 
(97.1341) still possesses a momentous economic impact. Additionally, the best-fit statistics show 
a sizable improvement in the model fit with the addition of the macroeconomic covariate. 
Overall, we conclude that US macroeconomic liquidity conditions play a vitally important role in 
the failure and survival rates of the community bank industry. Finally, in Model III we provide 
an alternative specification in which we supplement Model II with several more potentially 
relevant covariates. We include the covariates Eq_RWA, Loanlease_Asset, and Netint_Asset 
(which was found to be relatively unimportant in Table 9 and was consequently left out of the 
analysis) into the model. The addition of the covariates provides only a slight improvement in the 
models overall fit; the variable Eq_RWA is significant at better than the 5% level, though 
Eq_Asset losses its significance at the 1% level suggesting both variables are reasonably similar 
proxies. Loanlease_Asset is still statistically insignificant and actually causes Loancon_Asset to 
become insignificant with its addition. The most interesting result is the addition of the net 
interest margin covariate (Netint_Asset) which is both statistically and economically significant. 
This supplementary finding places additional emphasis on the need to monitor community bank 
investment and debt decisions. 
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Table 10 
Cox Survival Model Conditioned on Aggregate Financial Ratio and Macroeconomic Covariates 
  
Model I                                                             
Aggregate 
 
Model II                                                                   
Aggregate & Macro   
Model III                                                                   
Aggregate & Macro 
Variables Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio   Coef. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Eq_Asset -19.7574 0.00 2.63E-09 
 
-22.91245 0.00 1.12E-10 
 
-11.7910 0.03 7.57E-06 
Eq_RWA 
        
-10.3821 0.02 0.000031 
Loanci_Asset 3.3866 0.00 29.5639 
 
3.4317 0.00 30.9296 
 
3.2183 0.05 24.9855 
Loancon_Asset -7.5150 0.00 0.000545 
 
-6.7472 0.01 0.001174 
 
-4.5029 0.11 0.011077 
Loanre_Asset 4.6877 0.00 108.5991 
 
4.8761 0.00 131.1229 
 
4.2903 0.00 72.9873 
Loanlease_Asset 
        
1.3391 0.45 3.8154 
Chargeoff_Asset 10.8211 0.04 50,063.70 
 
12.7626 0.02 348,935.90 
 
9.4555 0.08 12,778.60 
LLLP_Asset -31.8804 0.00 1.43E-14 
 
-32.3875 0.00 8.60E-15 
 
-32.5584 0.00 7.25E-15 
LLLP_Loanlease 12.6740 0.00 319,325.80 
 
13.0029 0.00 4.44E+05 
 
14.0180 0.00 1.22E+06 
Chargeoff_Loanlease 3.9003 0.00 49.4157 
 
3.4894 0.06 32.7677 
 
4.0008 0.04 54.6425 
Loanlease_Dep -2.5013 0.04 0.081979 
 
-2.6768 0.00 0.068780 
 
-3.1483 0.00 0.042926 
Riskcapt1_RWA -13.8300 0.00 0.000001 
 
-12.8127 0.00 0.000003 
 
-8.7675 0.00 0.000156 
Incext_Asset -7.2707 0.01 0.000696 
 
-7.0849 0.01 0.000838 
 
-9.6459 0.00 0.000065 
Netopinc_Asset 0.5995 0.75 1.821137 
 
1.6549 0.38 5.2328 
 
3.0405 0.13 20.9167 
Netint_Asset 
        
-23.9150 0.00 4.11E-11 
Wage_Asset -176.8089 0.00 1.63E-77 
 
-176.3705 0.00 2.53E-77 
 
-157.2648 0.00 5.02E-69 
ROE -0.025705 0.00 0.974623 
 
-0.027222 0.00 0.973145 
 
-0.028236 0.00 0.972159 
Ted_Spread 
    
97.1341 
 
1.53E+42 
 
70.8544 0.00 5.91E+30 
            Likelihood Ratio 3,376.01 0.00 
  
3,398.96 0.00 
  
3,429.89 0.00 
             AIC 4,269.08 
 
4,248.13 
 
4,223.21 
BIC 4,364.29 
 
4,350.15 
 
4,345.62 
Log Likelihood -2,120.54 
 
-2,109.07 
 
-2,093.60 
            Banks 6,640 
 
6,640 
 
6,640 
Failures 452 
 
452 
 
452 
Obs. (bank-year) 129,900   129,900   129,900 
Note. The Cox regression models are based on aggregate financial ratio and macroeconomic information. For each full set of M bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables we compare the M regressors and M-1 regressor models and retain the appropriate model based on the following: (1) the significance 
of the covariates based on the P-values, (2) the likelihood ratio which tests whether βx=0, (3) the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), (4) the degrees-of-freedom-
adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and (5) the log likelihood ratio best-fit criterion. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The last 40 years have seen the community banking sector markedly shrink. In particular, 
extensive changes in regulation and industry practices over the last 20 years have played a 
critical role in the downsizing of community banks in the US financial system. Moreover, the 
far-reaching roots of the 2008 global financial crisis had severe consequences for the banking 
industry as a whole. Yet, in spite of the institutional decline community banks continue to play a 
vital role in the US economy. Due to their economic and financial importance this paper 
conducts an exploratory investigation, utilizing survival analysis, to determine which accounting 
variables aid in predicting community bank failure. Prior work largely focuses on aggregate US 
commercial banks; however, we feel that the indicators and early warning signs of community 
bank failure should recognize the distinct differences and risk profiles of community and non-
community banks. 
 We utilize a broad set of FDIC bank-specific accounting data over the period 1992-2013 
to examine the characteristics of community banks which failed between the years 2000-2013. 
We incorporate information from balance sheets, income statements, and financial ratios based 
on the CAMELS ratings. We also incorporate a well-known US market liquidity component into 
our models to try and link how macroeconomic liquidity shocks, proxied by the TED spread, 
contribute to community bank failure. Overall, we utilize 452 failed community banks consisting 
of 6,350 bank-year observations and 6,217 non-failed community banks consisting of 124,167 
bank-year observations, for a total sample of 6,669 community banks and 130,517 bank-year 
observations. 
 Our empirical results indicate that ordinary balance sheet and income statement 
information are a relatively ineffective way to predict community bank failure, notwithstanding 
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balance sheet information offers an informational edge over income statement information and 
highlights that smaller banks (based on total assets) are actually less likely to fail than their larger 
community bank counterparts. Financial ratio information, in particular ratios which encompass 
capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity, and earnings, provide a dramatic increase in the 
ability to predict community bank failure risk; this finding is in line with prior literature which 
examines firm and commercial bank failures. We find that community banks which have 
declining amounts of equity and loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets (i.e. 
Eq_Asset and LLLP_Asset) have substantially increased failure rates. We also find that banks 
with more commercial and industrial loans as well as real estate loans relative to total assets (i.e. 
Loanci_Asset and Loanre_Asset) have increased failure rates. Interestingly, community banks 
which reduce their proportion of consumer lending as a percentage of total assets (i.e. 
Loancon_Asset) are more likely to fail—emphasizing the importance of community banks and 
their smaller, rural lending practices. Income-based ratios such as net operating income to total 
assets and return on equity (Netint_Asset and ROE) seem to have less relative importance in 
predicting community bank failure. The most fascinating result pertains to the salary and wage 
expenses to total assets ratio (i.e. Wage_Asset) which we argue indirectly proxies as a manager 
effectiveness/efficiency and quality employee retention measure. The covariate is both highly 
statistically and economically significant. Provided that “better” managers and employees 
require increased compensation for their efforts, we find that a reduction in salary and wages as a 
proportion of total assets results in a dramatic increase in community bank failure risk. Thus, 
managerial effectiveness and efficiency in addition to employee quality seems to be a vital part 
of financially healthy community banks. Of particular noteworthiness, we also document that the 
use of a macroeconomic indicator of liquidity provides a substantial improvement in modeling 
133 
 
predictive community bank failure. Prior studies have indicated that macroeconomic variables 
play a secondary role to firm- or bank-specific characteristics, and while we fundamentally agree 
with this assessment, our results provide further impetus to explore the impact of liquidity on the 
community banking sector. Specifically, we document that as macroeconomic liquidity 
conditions deteriorate (i.e. as the TED spread widens) there is a considerable rise in the failure 
rate of community banks, especially for institutions which are already experiencing financial 
difficulties. 
 The results of this paper have important practical implications at an institutional and 
governance level for protecting community banks, such as serving as early warning signals of 
impending problems. Furthermore, our analysis serves as an important cue that more research in 
the area of community banks is vital to the enhancement of the industry; we provide motivation 
for future research to continue to investigate the importance of macroeconomic effects on the US 
community banking industry. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 
Best Fit Copulas based on Log-likelihood         
Full Sample Period (Oct. 1992 - Oct. 2013) 
           
   
Energy Foods & Fibers Grains & Oilseeds Livestock Precious Metals 
  
Normal Copula -23.7330 -9.2894 -19.7170 -4.9685 -19.0050 
  
Student’s t Copula -27.9620 -11.0520 -20.7880 -3.7519 -20.3250 
    Rotated-Gumbel Copula -34.7900 -15.3100 -22.7990 -5.7289 -24.5840 
Note. This table provides the best fit measure for the copula functions based on the log-likelihood criteria, for each sub-sector, over the full sample 
period. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1 
Correlation Matrix of Balance Sheet and Macroeconomic Conditioning Variables 
 
Asset Liab Eqtot Riskcapt1 Loanci Loancon Loanre Loanag Totalloan Ted_ Spread 
Asset 1.0000 
         Liab 0.8651 1.0000 
        Eqtot 0.8798 0.7644 1.0000 
       Riskcapt1 0.6959 0.9052 0.7702 1.0000 
      Loanci 0.5951 0.6865 0.5117 0.6068 1.0000 
     Loancon 0.3227 0.2783 0.2919 0.2273 0.1733 1.0000 
    Loanre 0.7754 0.9374 0.6860 0.8692 0.5661 0.1404 1.0000 
   Loanag 0.1769 0.1785 0.1411 0.1391 0.1626 0.0701 0.0578 1.0000 
  Loanlease 0.9576 0.8357 0.8113 0.6585 0.6201 0.3241 0.8184 0.1828 1.0000 
 Ted_Spread -0.0123 -0.0105 -0.0146 -0.0115 0.0076 0.0093 0.0134 -0.0072 0.0151 1.0000 
Note. Pairwise correlations based on balance sheet and macroeconomic conditioning variables. 
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Table B2 
Correlation Matrix of Income Statement and Macroeconomic Conditioning Variables 
 
Intinc Incext Intexp Nonintinc Netinc Netopinc LLLP Ted_ Spread 
Intinc 1.0000 
       Incext 0.3020 1.0000 
      Intexp 0.8448 0.1343 1.0000 
     Nonintinc 0.1802 0.5456 0.1011 1.0000 
    Netinc 0.3018 0.9973 0.1346 0.5443 1.0000 
   Netopinc 0.2995 0.9899 0.1338 0.5499 0.9896 1.0000 
  LLLP 0.4514 -0.1772 0.3410 0.1029 -0.2028 -0.2046 1.0000 
 Ted_Spread 0.0670 -0.0408 0.1996 -0.0077 -0.0410 -0.0301 0.0220 1.0000 
Note. Pairwise correlations based on income statement and macroeconomic conditioning variables. 
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Table B3 
Correlation Matrix of Aggregate Financial Ratio and Macroeconomic Conditioning Variables 
 
Eq_Asset Eq_ Loanlease Eq_RWA 
Loanci_ 
Asset 
Loancon_ 
Asset 
Loanre_ 
Asset 
Loanag_ 
Asset 
Loanlease_ 
Asset 
Lossallow_ 
Asset 
Chargeoff_ 
Asset 
LLLP_ 
Asset 
LLLP_ 
Loanlease 
Chargeoff_ 
Loanlease 
Loanlease_ 
Dep 
Riskcapt1_ 
RWA 
Incext_ 
Asset 
Netopinc_ 
Asset 
Netint_ 
Asset 
Wage_   
Asset ROA ROE 
Ted_ 
Spread 
Eq_Asset 1.0000                      
Eq_Loanlease 0.1512 1.0000                     
Eq_RWA 0.0174 0.2201 1.0000                    
Loanci_Asset 0.7888 -0.0172 -0.0025 1.0000                   
Loancon_ 
Asset 0.1848 -0.0132 -0.0294 0.1841 1.0000                  
Loanre_Asset 0.8161 -0.0322 -0.0024 0.8080 0.1928 1.0000                 
Loanag_Asset -0.0264 -0.0094 -0.0187 -0.0296 -0.0164 -0.4487 1.0000                
Loanlease_ 
Asset 0.8911 -0.0562 -0.0362 0.8049 0.1906 0.9485 0.0077 1.0000               
Lossallow_ 
Asset 0.8162 -0.0210 -0.0021 0.8077 0.1941 0.8455 0.0481 0.7973 1.0000              
Chargeoff_ 
Asset 0.2867 -0.0030 -0.0033 0.4885 0.1041 0.2451 -0.0412 0.2971 0.2443 1.0000             
LLLP_Asset 0.7936 -0.0028 -0.0022 0.8630 0.1967 0.8334 -0.0416 0.7950 0.9833 0.2911 1.0000            
LLLP_ 
Loanlease -0.2103 0.1436 0.0243 -0.0263 0.0018 -0.1569 0.0369 -0.1158 -0.1573 0.0091 -0.1274 1.0000           
Chargeoff_ 
Loanlease 0.0101 -0.0055 0.0040 0.0138 0.0170 0.0115 -0.0712 0.0274 0.0111 0.0302 0.0121 0.0036 1.0000          
Loanlease_ 
Dep 0.0396 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0116 0.0193 0.0406 -0.0054 0.0616 0.0212 0.0101 0.0123 -0.0094 0.0041 1.0000         
Riskcapt1_ 
RWA 0.0179 0.1591 0.9979 -0.0015 -0.0278 -0.0013 -0.0179 -0.0344 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0011 0.0235 0.0036 0.0005 1.0000        
Incext_Asset 0.7311 0.0366 -0.0034 0.8072 0.1605 0.7054 0.0164 0.6636 0.7055 0.3924 0.7514 0.0636 0.0083 0.0109 -0.0027 1.0000       
Netopinc_ 
Asset 0.0067 0.0365 0.0226 0.0055 0.0720 0.0040 0.0747 -0.0082 0.0043 -0.0226 0.0035 -0.0108 -0.0435 -0.0099 0.0211 0.1520 1.0000      
Netint_Asset -0.0217 -0.0120 -0.0514 -0.0085 0.3308 -0.0167 0.0493 0.0305 -0.0164 0.0136 -0.0144 0.0161 0.0113 0.0132 -0.0506 0.0082 0.1268 1.0000     
Wage_Asset 0.1319 0.0840 -0.0007 0.8252 0.1873 -0.0297 -0.0224 -0.0042 0.0401 0.2527 0.6867 -0.1880 0.0102 -0.0005 0.0003 0.6986 0.0073 -0.0150 1.0000    
ROA 0.0006 0.0365 0.0226 -0.0006 0.0682 -0.0021 0.0714 -0.0150 -0.0018 -0.0243 -0.0036 0.0005 -0.0438 -0.0102 0.0214 0.1492 0.9420 0.1246 0.0000 1.0000   
ROE -0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0009 0.0286 -0.0011 0.0218 -0.0033 -0.0010 -0.0150 -0.0015 -0.0072 -0.0362 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0158 0.1503 0.0512 -0.0007 0.1565 1.0000  
Ted_Spread 0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0018 0.0000 0.0269 -0.0005 0.0101 0.0194 -0.0007 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0104 0.0061 -0.0018 0.0000 -0.0168 -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0247 -0.0009 1.0000 
Note. Pairwise correlations based on aggregate financial ratios and macroeconomic conditioning variables. 
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